SURVEY

October 1968
10s $1.50

a journal of
Soviet and East European studies

Czechoslovakia

Günter Grass

Students and Revolution

Max Beloff Marc Ferro Lewis Feuer
Colin Crouch John Mander Sidney Hook

Nationalism Revisited

Harold R. Isaacs

Soviet Protests

Alexander Tvardovsky Lidia Chukovskaya

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Internationalism or Russification?

From the USSR a unique indictment of Russian chauvinism by a celebrated Soviet Ukrainian critic

Ivan Dzyuba

"A masterly piece of political writing which can leave no interested person unmoved."

David Floyd, Daily Telegraph

"So thoroughly documented, so convincing. . . that it is virtually impossible to dispute on logical, factual grounds." *Peter Worthington, The Toronto Telegram*

First world publication 42s.

Weidenfeld & Nicolson

'His work is a *cri de coeur* in defence of the abandoned principles of the Leninist nationalities policy, in defence of humaneness and of justice. Dzyuba has made a penetrating analysis of Marxist writings on the nationalities question and of discussions of the subject within the Party. . . and has arrived at the conclusion that the present situation and the relationships between the nations in the USSR are a far cry from those advocated by Lenin in his writings.'

Opinion from the Soviet Union

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SURVEY

A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies

No. 69 October 1968

Editor: Leopold Labedz

The Lessons of Prague ..... *Günter Grass* 3

Czechoslovakia and After ..... *Leopold Labedz* 7

Documents—Czechoslovakia 22

Students and Revolution

Universities and Violence ..... *Max Beloff* 39

Emancipation of a Generation ..... *Marc Ferro* 41

Patterns of Irrationality ..... *Lewis S. Feuer* 43

An Indispensable Activity ..... *John Mander* 52

The Chiliastic Urge ..... *Colin Crouch* 55

Academic Freedom and Academic Anarchy ..... *Sidney Hook* 62

Group Identity and Political Change ..... *Harold R. Isaacs* 76

'Attack or Defend. . . .'—Sholokhov Examined *Patrick Waddington* 99

Documents—Soviet Union 107

The Moscow Correspondent—A Comment ..... *Robert Conquest* 122

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Views and Reviews

Poland and Czechoslovakia: The Individual and Power Relations *Joseph Frankel* 125

Soviet Policy and the Middle East War ..... *George Heitmann* 134

'The Cancer Ward', Part II ..... *Manya Harari* 145

Letters to the Editor 150

Quarterly Notes 154

Our Contributors 164

Index for 1968 165

Editorial Assistants: Peter Howard, Margaret Evling

Editorial office: Ilford House, 133 Oxford Street, London, W.1.

Subscription office: Research Publications, 11 Nelson Road, London, S.E.10.

Subscription rates: £2 or $6 a year. Single copies 10s. or $1.50.

American Distributors: Franklin Square Subscription Agency, 545 Cedar Lane, Teaneck, New Jersey, 0766, U.S.A., with whom subscriptions may be entered.

Survey is published by Information Bulletin, Ltd., 133 Oxford Street, London. W.1, on behalf of the International Association for Cultural Freedom.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE LESSONS OF PRAGUE

*Günter Grass**

PROTEST is a reaction to injustice. While injustice remains, protest fades and life returns to normal. Just as Czechoslovakia forced Vietnam out of the picture, Biafra is now beginning to overshadow Czechoslovakia; at the same time there are earthquakes, presidential elections and new protests and diversions.

So let us give up—if only for a while—what is frequently no more than our zealous reaction to the headlines. Let us look back—for the occupation of Czechoslovakia is already behind us—and let us analyse our own position.

The questions are: Is democratic socialism our concern?

To what extent are we responsible for the present failure of democratic socialism?

It would be easy to prove that the earlier applause of the convinced cold warriors, which rose to a crescendo and then faded into a lament when Czechoslovakia was occupied, is partly responsible for the Czech tragedy.

But for a discussion of the past or the future Cold War we have chosen the wrong place. The wrong people are sitting in the stalls.

My question points more directly to the intellectual failure of the European left, in so far as it can be considered to be radical or revolutionary.

For over a year, when the writers Vaculik, Klima, Havel, Kundera, Kohout and Liehm, still in the days of Antonin Novotny's presidency, made their speeches, which were at one and the same time both an indictment and a programme, the west European revolutionary left and the student protesters, whose numbers were increasing at the time, had every opportunity to try to understand the brave efforts of the Czechs and Slovaks and to take them up as their own cause.

But the models for the Berlin and Paris students were not Vaculik and Havel; they made a more photogenic choice: the Argentinian professional revolutionary Che Guevara was inflated to pin-up size. In other words, while the Czech reformers tried to implement their reforms under most difficult conditions and in the face of great opposition, which, as has been proved, is still insurmountable, the Western radical left—also known as the New Left—revelled in its romantic revolutionary posture. The leftists, having no programme and using incomprehensible jargon, managed to debase their protest and provoke the radical right into action. What the election in Baden-Württemberg indicated became reality in France a little later: the west European reactionaries have never been stronger than during this summer.

* This is the text of the speech delivered at a meeting of writers in Basle organized after the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How could Stalinist reaction in the Soviet Union stand still while its conservative brothers were so obviously successful? It had to strike. The action of the police in Berlin and Paris and the action of the occupation powers in Czechoslovakia illustrate the harmony of police-state attitudes, East and West, in a kind of negative coexistence.

But however closely the brutalities of international power politics resemble each other, the New Left in the West saw little or no reason to take notice of the New Left in Czechoslovakia and even less reason to support it. They had different and often even opposing goals.

While the Czechs and the Slovaks demanded the liberalization of their system and tolerance for opposing views, in our country tolerance was rejected and liberalism was declared the arch-enemy of revolution.

In Prague and Bratislava reforms and theories had to prove themselves in practice, while here reform was slandered as reformism and theorizing was carried to the extreme of hair-splitting. Once again there was a demand for all or nothing. In the outcome there was less than nothing.

While the Czech students, writers and scholars presented their case soberly and without sentimentality, the west European left chose revolutionary theatricals. The New Left in Czechoslovakia is being suppressed by the superior strength of reaction; the Western left failed because of what it was, because of its own inability to learn the lesson of Prague. Intellectually, it shares the guilt for what has happened. Whatever the mood in which its spokesmen of yesterday continue to ape their former posture, they will have to face this charge.

My point about shared guilt does not apply in the first instance to the minority of radical students who, coming mostly from upper-middle-class homes, have extended their opposition to their parental background to include the entire Establishment. My criticism is really aimed at the intellectuals of my generation, who were too ready to spare the students the necessary criticism, and who tried to participate in the blind activism of a pseudo-revolutionary movement.

For a whole year I tried to draw the attention of the students and of the writers of my generation to the socialist reforms in Czechoslovakia. I did so in many discussions, in speeches and in an open exchange of letters with Pavel Kohout, but with little success.

The laughter of the revolutionaries from all too good homes, and the lack of interest among the left *élite* will remain indelibly impressed on my memory. Their arrogance was obvious: 'They lack revolutionary perspective. What Professor Sik is trying to do is pure liberalism, or even worse: social democracy.'

With Teutonic arrogance, SDS delegations went to Prague to teach the Czechs and Slovaks some of their armchair Marxism.

The polite but secretly disappointed reaction of the Czech students to the West German visit can be summed up in the sentence of a young historian of the Charles University in Prague: 'They don't know anything but they know everything better.' To give an example:

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the *Kursbuch No. 13*, which contains contributions on the theme 'Students and Power', the writer Hans Magnus Enzensberger said about the Prague student movement: 'The documents suggest that they have a most limited horizon. The political substance is negligible. . . . The DDR is considered an enemy. Within the camp, sympathy is restricted to Yugoslavia and Rumania. The Cuban and Chinese models and experience are ignored or rejected out of hand.' So much for their testimony.

The Prague reform efforts have proved to be, according to Hans Magnus Enzensberger, inadequate and unattractive. In other words: Alexander Dubcek's carefully formulated programme for a democratic socialism could not stand up against the cult of Che Guevara. A sober process, even then restricted by necessary compromise and now interrupted by power politics, was drowned by rhythmic clapping, empty phrases and loud shouts of Ho Chi Minh.

Anyone who has ever tried to give the Czech reform proposals a hearing will know what wonderful disciples Josef Goebbels has found among the west European left.

WILL the occupation of Czechoslovakia have a sobering effect on revolutionaries in Rome's exquisite drawing-rooms, in Berlin's Republican Club, or in the Paris Latin Quarter? I question whether there are any hopeful signs that the disaster of the west European left may be mitigated. This community, verbally so radical, has always searched for and found a refuge: yesterday it was Cuba; today, after Fidel Castro approved the occupation of Czechoslovakia, there is always Mao's China free of charge. And should this outlet fail them, there always remains egotism. Narcissus knows how to survive.

Now that the false solidarities have become so transparent, the students may recognize the charlatanism of which they were the victims when they were led to believe that the future was in the stale model of a *Räte-Republik*, while close at hand Prague and Bratislava tried for the first time to overcome the division in the world and to bridge the contradictions between socialism and social democracy.

If we ask ourselves today whether we can help Czechoslovakia in any way, I think we should dispense with worthless gestures of pity and should rather actively take up the challenge which democratic socialism offers.

For me as a social democrat, this means the following: just as socialism tried to find its own versions of the basic democratic rights enunciated during the Enlightenment, so social democracy should try to rid itself of its penny-more-penny-less type of thinking and develop a socialism of the seventies which seeks high-level participation and joint responsibility in controlling the exercise of power and the means of production. Marx is not an infallible father of the Church. The dogmatic interpretation of his writings has led to catastrophic failures in the socialist People's Republics.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Today we know that the expropriation of basic industries in these republics was not expropriation, but appropriation by the state. State capitalism is not an alternative to private capitalism. State-controlled trade unions make workers' participation in the People's Republics impossible. Let us take some pride in the fact that trade unions in the parliamentary democracies have been able to escape the clutches of the state. Let them put their independence to good use and hear the call of Prague and Bratislava. If the Czechs and Slovaks with their reforms have come half way to meet the socialist parties in the West, we must ask ourselves whether we want to stay where we have become bogged down, or whether we are prepared to move forward to meet them. The Geneva speech of Foreign Minister Willy Brandt indicated that the question is not one of short-term interests and the slow growth of wealth; his demand for a world-wide renunciation of force and the condemnation of any kind of intervention was made at a time when the losses in the various theatres of war were rising more rapidly than the social product. The genocide in Biafra for which all, yes all, social systems are responsible, is the most horrifying result of East-West power politics: British, Soviet, Swiss, Czech, Portuguese, and French arms are competing on African soil as the inhuman expression of what can be cynically called development aid.

Now that Czech socialism, after its temporary suppression, has become a universal necessity, its first task should be to co-ordinate East-West development aid. The west European social democratic parties are called upon to produce a reform programme for the co-ordination of aid, in order to put an end to the power struggle between East and West and to give some meaning to the present empty concept of coexistence.

Two bloated world powers have converted stupidity into military divisions and atomic warheads. We are between the two, always threatened by a well-meaning pat on the shoulder from one giant or the other, and at last we have understood the lesson of Prague.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND AFTER

Leopold Labedz

'OUR soldiers have but one purpose in Czechoslovakia: to safeguard and strengthen the great friendship between our nations, to safeguard the inviolability of the freedom, independence and sovereignty of Czechoslovakia.' This is just one random quotation from *Pravda* (10 September 1968) about the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. Its articles on the subject were of such a surrealistic character ('Proletarian Internationalism in Action', 'Good Neighbour Policy', etc.) that for a time the newly gagged Czechoslovak press was able to puncture Soviet pretensions by simply reproducing them without comment. This in turn has led to accusations that 'counter-revolutionaries' had found new ways of misleading Czechoslovak opinion by using even more crafty methods.

It is easy to show that the Soviet decision to intervene violates every principle of state relations and every obligation undertaken by the Soviet Union as binding in its conduct towards other 'socialist states', all of them solemnly embodied in ideological declarations and international agreements. The Warsaw Treaty itself included among its provisions 'respect for the independence and sovereignty of states', 'non-interference in each other's affairs', and the obligation 'to refrain from the threat of force or use of force in international relations'. It is also easy to show the hollowness of Soviet arguments simply by comparing discarded justifications of the invasion with subsequent ones. But that would be a somewhat pointless exercise: the real Soviet arguments are tanks not justifications. Fidel Castro, who supported the Soviet invasion, said: 'What cannot be denied is that the sovereignty of the Czechoslovak state was violated. This would be a fiction, an untruth. And the violation was, in fact, of a flagrant nature.'

The hypocrisy with which in the past the Soviet Union justified the violations of its treaties has on this occasion been surpassed. It is doubtful whether many will be persuaded this time that the rape of Czechoslovakia was a case of love at first sight. But apart from the question of the morality of Soviet behaviour, the political significance of Moscow's decision lies of course not only in its effect on the internal scene in Czechoslovakia, but in its general long-term effects on the countries of east Europe, on the Soviet Union, on the world's communist parties, and on the international balance of power.

THE Czechoslovak 'experiment with freedom' has been cut short and with it the hope of the peaceful transformation of a communist party dictatorship into a political structure admitting a certain measure of liberty which could permit an evolution towards some form of political pluralism. This was the frightening prospect faced by the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet leaders and their die-hard satellites-allies. And the internal evolution of Czechoslovakia could not only provide a legitimate bad example for others to follow; it might also have led to a shift in the balance of power in Europe, in the first place through the rapprochement of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia, which was likely to be followed by increased pressure for autonomy in other east European countries.

Internally, Czechoslovak developments were leading to a deviation from the Soviet model in two ways: through the abolition of the institution of censorship, and through the proposed changes in the Party statutes which, though falling short of explicitly permitting Party factions, would have allowed opposition inside the Party and made it possible for the minority to contest legitimately the view of the majority. Thus the impending institutional changes in Czechoslovakia were to go beyond the Leninist framework of 1918 in respect of the former and of 1921 in respect of the latter, the first such institutional change in the direction of greater freedom in the history of any ruling communist party. It is not really surprising that the orthodox communist leaders formed in the Stalinist school should have felt that this might eventually endanger their own positions of power. They have made perfectly clear in their numerous statements that this was the crux of the matter for them. The charges against the Czechoslovak leaders, starting with the Warsaw letter, through the *Pravda* article (22 August 1968) justifying the invasion, to the later ideological elaborations on the theme of 'silent counter-revolution', have all concentrated on two main points: the abandonment of the 'leading role of the Party', and the abolition of censorship.

During their seven months' 'interval of freedom' the Czechoslovak reformers faced a difficult, if not impossible, tactical dilemma: to be unduly cautious meant the inevitable retreat of the population into political apathy and the eventual reconsolidation of the Party apparatus, with its attendant 'Gomulkaist' perspective of regression from freedom and of a retreat from the expected reforms, while to be even moderately bold entailed the risk of provoking Soviet intervention. Even if some tactical mistakes were made, they were not decisive: it would be quite unjust to charge the Czechoslovaks in retrospect with a lack of political moderation. On the contrary, if ever there were a nation which showed great self-restraint, it was Czechoslovakia in 1968. The whole history of the tug-of-war between the Czechoslovak leaders and their Warsaw Pact 'allies', from the decision to allow the military manoeuvres of its troops in Czechoslovakia to Cierna and Bratislava, testifies to this. The general unflappability of the Czechoslovak national character, the absence of extremism, the pragmatic approach to politics, and the high degree of self-control in a critical situation impressed all observers and deprived the Soviet leaders of any plausible pretext for the intervention.

In the larger perspective it is clear that the Soviet decision was

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not determined on the tactical level, and that ostensible Soviet fears of 'counter-revolution' and 'German revanchism' were simply masking a fear of freedom. One has only to notice that unlike Rumania, Czechoslovakia did not aspire to a completely independent foreign policy; that unlike Poland, it made no attempt to de-collectivize agriculture; that unlike East Germany, it has not allowed any private enterprise activity. One should also keep in mind that unlike Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia experienced no disturbances, on the contrary all was quiet and orderly. In fact, there was a greater degree of self-restraint than one would have thought possible in a country where the population had for the first time the opportunity to react openly against 20 years of political oppression and economic mismanagement. The degree of this self-restraint is not quite realized abroad, because many of the things which the Czechoslovaks forced themselves to refrain from doing were naturally not publicized: thus, for instance, the Soviet involvement in the murder of Jan Masaryk was not disclosed, no legal proceedings were taken against the authors of the fake trials; the Czechoslovak Social Democrats did not press for the resuscitation of their party, as they might have done, in order not to incense the Russians, and many other instances of political self-restraint can be quoted. Yet despite all this, the result was the same as in Hungary: Soviet military intervention. Different national reactions in Hungary 1956 and in Czechoslovakia 1968 did not matter in the end, it was not a question of tactics, just as different policies of the Polish and Czechoslovak governments-in-exile vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during the last war did not matter in the end either, as Eduard Benes discovered in 1948. Ironically, although in other respects Stalin's hold on the country was incomparably greater, it was Brezhnev who established direct Soviet military control of the strategically-situated Bohemia.

UNTIL the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia, the official view on relations between states, communist and non-communist, was stated quite unambiguously on many occasions. It was summarized in the entry on sovereignty in the *Large Soviet Encyclopaedia* (second edition, vol. 41, 1956):

> The principle of sovereignty is the basic and generally acknowledged principle of international law, which has received juridical embodiment in the United Nations Charter, which states that the United Nations Organization is 'founded on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members'. From the principle of the sovereign equality of states, there ensues the impermissibility of interference in the internal affairs of other states. Every act directed towards the violation of sovereignty is an illegal act, contrary to the norms of international law.

The November 1960 Statement of World Communist Parties proclaimed:

> The socialist camp is a social, economic and political community of free and sovereign peoples united by the close bonds of inter-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> national socialist solidarity. . . . Every country in the socialist camp is ensured genuinely equal rights and independence.

Two books published in the Soviet Union shortly before the invasion specifically rejected the use of force in relations between the 'socialist states'. Thus Sh. P. Sanakoev, in *The World System of Socialism* (Moscow, 1968), wrote:

> In the conditions of the world socialist system the method of solving problems through negotiation objectively becomes the *only* [emphasis in the original] method. Such means as the use of force, threats, pressure, etc. are contrary to the spirit of socialist policy and diplomacy.

And A. P. Butenko, in *The World Socialist System and Anti-Communism* (Moscow, 1968), said:

> Within the world socialist system the principle of respect for state sovereignty presupposes the supreme right of the socialist nations to dispose of all the natural, economic and human resources within the limits of their state borders; the indisputable right of each people independently to decide the fate of their country. . . . Socialist states believe firmly in non-intervention by one state in the internal affairs of another, they respect the laws and traditions of fraternal countries, and consider impermissible the utilization of any means of economic, political, and military pressure in their mutual relations; they struggle against the commission of any acts in inter-state relations designed to discredit or change the membership of the party and state organs to which the people have entrusted the administration of the country.

After the invasion there was at first an attempt to justify it on the grounds that Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces had been invited into the country by Czechoslovak 'Party and government leaders', but this ineffective pretext was shelved and replaced by a 'deeper', ideological justification to the effect that it was necessary to prevent the victory of a 'peaceful counter-revolution'.[1] This new theory was then elaborated by Sergei Kovalev, who used the 'class approach' and argued that 'bourgeois legality' cannot be the basis of relations between 'socialist states'. He said in *Pravda* (26 September 1968) that

> from a Marxist point of view the norms of law, including the norms of mutual relations of the socialist countries, cannot be interpreted narrowly, formally, and in isolation from the general context of class struggle in the modern world. . . . The formal observance of freedom of self-determination of a nation in the concrete situation that arose in Czechoslovakia would be freedom of 'self-determina-

[1] The first reference to a 'quiet', 'silent', or 'peaceful' counter-revolution was made in an article in the Polish *Trybuna Ludu* (3 September 1968) and was later taken up by the Soviet press. *Pravda* (11 September 1968) developed the theme, but failed to answer the question of the editor of the Italian communist *L'Unita*, Maurizio Ferrara, who in the issue of 3 September 1968 disputed *Pravda's* earlier assertion that in the event of counter-revolution intervention became a duty and asked: 'Who will decide when that duty is to be implemented?'

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion' not of the popular masses, the working people, but of their enemies.

This provoked an acid reply from the communist *Morning Star* (27 September 1968), which quoted Brezhnev's speech at the Twenty-third CPSU Congress in 1966 in which he said that none of the communist parties 'can find the right conclusions for the problems that arise before them better than themselves'. The paper went on to say that Kovalev's thesis was contrary to 'the decisions of his own and other parties on the principles governing relations with the socialist states and communist parties', and it asserted that observance of those principles did not amount to 'judging by the yardstick of bourgeois law'. Plaintively, it demanded that Kovalev's thesis [2] should be speedily and officially repudiated, as 'it would do irreparable damage to the unity of the international communist movement and relations between socialist states if it gained any further currency'.

And, indeed, the implications of Kovalev's thesis are very far-reaching. Not only does it explicitly subordinate international law to 'the laws of class struggle'—this after all is an old Leninist precept—but it also claims for the Soviet Union the right to intervene militarily in other 'socialist countries' when it considers that socialism is 'endangered' there. In strict logic it implies that any country in which the communist party takes power would have to give up its sovereignty if the communist party in question accepted as legitimate this new Soviet 'doctrine of intervention' in the 'socialist countries'. It implies a right of intervention in the internal affairs of China and Rumania, of Yugoslavia and Albania. It not only runs counter to the universally accepted principles of international law; it directly contradicts the Soviet interpretation of that law, at least since the time when it gave up its early revolutionary approach and emphasized the principle of state sovereignty. Since then no exceptions to or limitations on state sovereignty have been recognized in Soviet legal theory, no matter how much the practice has contradicted it. The Soviet *Juridical Dictionary* (Moscow, 1956) declared unambiguously that 'all states must respect each other's sovereignty, and all of them are equal in their sovereignty'. The *Diplomatic Dictionary* (Moscow, 1961) was even more emphatic in respect of the relations between the socialist states, where 'conditions are created for the more consistent and fuller observance of the universally recognized principles and norms of international law'. To those who had not been convinced by previous Soviet actions in eastern Europe,

[2] He is the head of *Pravda's* propaganda department. His 'doctrine of intervention' was supported in *Pravda* (23 October 1968) by Nicolas Chaoui, the General Secretary of the Lebanese CP. The Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences denounced the Soviet justifications of the invasion and the new doctrine forming their basis as flights of 'schoolboy logic'. However, the Soviet and satellite press continued to elaborate the new orthodoxy: Gomulka criticized 'some communist parties who approach the problem from the point of view of abstract sovereignty', and the well-known *Pravda* commentator, Yuri Zhukov, quoted him approvingly (24 October 1968).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the occupation of Czechoslovakia demonstrated the hollowness of such assertions. They have now been replaced by a doctrine explicitly claiming the Soviet right to intervene militarily in the countries of the 'socialist commonwealth'.

This new 'Brezhnev doctrine', formulated by Kovalev, was of course violently opposed by the Yugoslavs. In his speech delivered in Prokuplje on 22 October 1968 Tito rejected the idea of 'conditional sovereignty', as did his Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Marko Nikezic, at the United Nations General Assembly. The Yugoslav position was summed up by Zdravko Micic in *Review of International Affairs* (5 October 1968): 'No quasi-Marxist mythology and phraseology can disguise a crystal-clear truth—the fact that a group of socialist states has decided to impose its will on another socialist country. . . . If the socialist states assume the right, as they have done in the case of Czechoslovakia, to prevent through the use of armed power the consolidation of a democratic but socialist social system, the question which logically arises is: would the imperialist powers allow any communist party to alter the nature of the social and political system in any of the capitalist states by means of a democratic political struggle?'

Indeed, why should the sovereignty of the 'socialist' countries be more vulnerable in Soviet theory than the sovereignty of the 'capitalist' countries? And how can the latter believe that the 'class approach' would be applicable only to the 'socialist' countries and not to themselves? This would indeed be a strange manifestation of the anti-capitalist attitude. And what if Kovalev's thesis were to be adopted by 'class enemies'? If articles in *Literarni listy* can be taken as giving the Soviet Union the right to intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia to reintroduce censorship, what about the 1962 situation with Soviet missiles in Cuba? Yet Cuba remains sovereign and Czechoslovakia is occupied. No, even communist parties may find it difficult to accept Kovalev's thesis as the basis for the maintenance of relations between the communist states, not to mention its value as a principle conducive to world peace.

However, it is obviously not a matter of principles. The most explicit explanation of the motives behind the intervention in Czechoslovakia, which justified it in terms of Bolshevik *Realpolitik*, was given by the editor of the Warsaw *Polityka* (7 September 1968), Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski, who wrote:

> The tendency leading to the free play of forces is not acceptable in a situation where the basic problem of the epoch: who—whom? is not yet finally decided. To have permitted such a tendency to arise, to have consented to its existence, would have inevitably led to a situation in which the communist parties would have been forced to make one concession after another to the enemies of socialism in order to stay alive. The ultimate effect of this would be to weaken them; it might even have led to the loss of their leading role.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The same point was made, somewhat less explicitly, in innumerable Soviet articles. *Kommunist* (no. 13, 1968) stressed in its editorial that events in Czechoslovakia were a reminder of the necessity 'to stand firm by the principle of democratic centralism', and of the impossibility 'of making any compromise in the struggle with bourgeois ideologies'. Or, as Mr Gromyko less elegantly put it in the United Nations, for the benefit of those not used to doctrinal jargon: 'Stop poking your nose into our garden. . . .'

As many have pointed out, before they took the decision to enter Czechoslovakia the Soviet leaders were presented with a dilemma: on the one hand, 'the leading role of the Party' was endangered in the countries where it ruled; on the other, the clear-cut support of many non-ruling parties would be sacrificed. The general condemnation of the Soviet aggression could have been anticipated, and so could its effect on the planned meeting of the communist parties in Moscow which, as a result of the opposition to the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia, had to be 'postponed'. Thus years of preparation for the restoration of the Soviet Union's leading position, if not its hegemony over the great majority of the world communist parties, have come to nought. The delays and hesitations shown in taking the decision to intervene in Czechoslovakia (seven months as against seven days in the case of Hungary) clearly reveal that the Soviet leaders felt the dilemma acutely. Yet it was really not surprising that they decided to sacrifice the opinions and interests of foreign communists on the altar of Soviet *raison d'état*. This, after all, had been the pattern of Soviet policy under Lenin (Brest Litovsk), under Stalin (the Soviet-Nazi Pact), and under Khrushchev (Hungary). Only this time the decision meant that the Soviet design to unify the pro-Soviet parties was ruined and the polycentric disarray made worse. For the first time in history the Soviet Union found itself in a position where only a small minority of communist parties supported it on a basic issue. The great majority of them, and practically all the elements in world public opinion which on past occasions had been sympathetic to the Soviet Union, have this time almost unanimously condemned its action. They included all the neutralist countries of the Third World (with the exception of most Arab countries), and even such front organizations as the World Federation of Trade Unions.[3]

In this modern Tower of Babel, which is composed of voices expounding the ideological positions of various communist parties, the Czechoslovak issue has called forth some strange duets: many communist parties which were at loggerheads with each other condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, others supported it, notwithstanding their continuing antagonism and their deeply divergent,

[3] There is only one step from the tragic to the ridiculous. The head of the Polish trade unions, Loga-Sowinski, called the resolution adopted by the Presidium of the WFTU in Prague after the invasion, 'illegal'.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sometimes diametrically opposite, motives for doing so. Peking, which continued its denunciations of the Japanese Communist Party, castigated Soviet 'fascist aggression', an epithet only slightly stronger in tone than the label given to this act by the Japanese Communist Party, which called it 'a disgrace to socialism'. A similar case of strange bedfellowship was manifested by the Albanian and Yugoslav communists. Here, there was a difference in attitude to the victims of aggression, the Yugoslavs supporting Dubcek, although critical of his 'compromises' with the Russians, and the Albanians denouncing him as a capitulating revisionist. (But the danger of Soviet expansion through the Balkans towards the Mediterranean did not damp down Albanian hostility to the 'traitor' Tito and Yugoslavia.) Equally paradoxically, by supporting the Soviet Union, Fidel Castro found himself on the same side of the fence as the pro-Soviet orthodox communist parties of Latin America, to whom he is hostile because of their lack of revolutionary zeal. One of such 'reformist' leaders, Louis Corvalan, the General Secretary of the Chilean CP, in a speech on 24 August 1968, said: 'We feel a true revolutionary pride in the fact that our position [on Czechoslovakia] coincides with that assumed here by those who are in the vanguard of the struggle against imperialism—our heroic Vietnamese, Cuban, and Korean comrades.' On the other hand, Dr Cheddi Jagan, unlike some of his colleagues from the People's Progressive Party, regretted the invasion.

'PROGRESSIVE' and New Left opinion was thrown into a state of deep confusion. Students who demonstrated in front of the Soviet Embassy in London against the Soviet aggression chanted as usual 'Ho Ho Ho Chi Minh', politically a somewhat strange conditioned reflex, considering that Hanoi's was the first of the communist parties in Asia to give prompt support to the Soviet action against 'reactionary forces' in Czechoslovakia. The Western communist parties, which have been virtually unanimous in their criticism of the Soviet action, have shown marked differences in the 'fence-sitting' features with which such criticisms were made. Condemnation ranged from strong and explicit statements by the Swedish and Austrian Communist Parties, through the Italian communist *tatticismo*, to the French communists' back-pedalling 'reprobation'. The one Western communist party which supported the invasion was the newly-created West German Communist Party which, the very moment it became legal, promptly issued a declaration supporting the Soviet suppression of the Czechoslovak communists. All the other communist parties took the opposite stand. The Belgian CP declared that 'the sooner Soviet troops can be withdrawn from Czechoslovak territory, the better it will be' (*Drapeau Rouge*, 23 August 1968). The Dutch CP said that the Soviet action 'constitutes a violation of all decisions and declarations of the international communist movement' (*De Waarheid*, 26 August 1968). The Danish Communist Party issued a statement to the effect that there was

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not sufficient justification for the military invasion of Czechoslovakia, though it was somewhat ambiguous in its condemnation (*Land og Folk*, 25–26 August 1968). Not so the Norwegian Communist Party, which declared that the invasion was 'the most serious breach of the principles governing relations between socialist states' (*Friheten*, 23–29 August 1968). The Swiss communists reacted no less critically and proclaimed in their organ *Voix Ouvrière* (21 August 1968) that 'The impossible has happened. The troops of five socialist countries have penetrated into Czechoslovak territory.' They condemned this action saying that it 'will have far-reaching and very grave consequences for the international workers' movement'. But the most vehement condemnation came from the Swedish and Austrian communists. C. H. Hermansson, the leader of the VKP (the re-named 'revisionist' Swedish CP), was particularly emphatic in dissociating his Party from the Soviet aggression. He had good reason for doing so as it happened on the eve of the Swedish elections and it caused the slashing of the votes cast for his Party by half. The Austrian communists were no less outspoken. The theoretical organ of the Austrian Communist Party, *Weg und Ziel*, published in its October 1968 issue a sharp editorial denouncing the occupation. It not only considered it an immeasurable 'blow to the prestige and the credibility of the Soviet Union', but described it as 'the greatest intellectual crisis' in the history of communism. It bitterly pointed out that it was a 'blow to the theories of west European communists which were most in line with the Action Programme and the practices of the Czechoslovak communists'. The editorial even went so far as to criticize matters pertaining to internal Soviet affairs:

> It is undeniable that in decisive political areas there is no democracy, no real exchange of opinions, no free discussion. Every decision of every presidum is infallible, and the people do not receive enough information to form a free opinion and to develop free alternatives to the ruling opinion. . . . The idea of the infallibility of a party leadership is unacceptable for communists . . . and they certainly cannot accept that criticism of the decisions of the leadership of the CPSU be regarded as anti-Soviet. . . . The socialist structure of a state without private property is no guarantee against criminal acts, as was clearly proved during the Stalin era. And it is certainly no guarantee whatsoever against decisions which are catastrophic for the entire workers' movement. . . .

It is, of course, not the first time in history that foreign communist parties have found that Moscow does not take any account of their interests when it comes to the defence of its own. Yet an unconditional allegiance to the Kremlin is no longer the lodestar for communists everywhere, and this makes the effects of the invasion of Czechoslovakia something of a watershed in the relations with Moscow of even some of its most faithful acolytes.

For many years now the Western communist parties have been trying hard to make a new, respectable, 'democratic' image for themselves.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

They have assured the electorate that they accept the idea of a multi-party system and that they would preserve existing democratic freedoms. They have wooed the social democrats and radical parties. They have stressed that they are committed to their own independent road to socialism. All these efforts have been put to a severe test by the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Not only is it no longer possible to point to Czechoslovakia as a model of evolution towards a more democratic form of government in a communist country, but even the most immediate problems of the political tactics of Western communists in their own countries have been put into jeopardy by this event. The French and Italian communists, seeking alliances with socialists, are presented with Soviet statements justifying the military intervention in terms of the danger of the impending counter-revolution constituted by the possible revival of the activities of the Czechoslovak socialists. One can almost say that while the French and the Italian communists are trying to pursue a policy of *Front Populaire*, Moscow is using arguments from the Comintern's Third Period. The French communists had particular reasons to worry, as the May student revolution exposed them as a reformist party for the revolutionary-minded, while the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August reinforced the doubts of the electorate about the Party's 'democratic' respectability. It is not certain that such parties will be able to reconcile their opposition to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which should have made them respectable to the non-communist left, with their continuing support of the Soviet Union; showing it did not help the French CP with the Federation of the Left.

The process of polycentrism has its own logic and it leads not only to conflicts between communist parties, but to intra-party conflicts as well. Even the most faithful of the faithful have taken contrary positions. The pro-Soviet Jeanette Vermeersch, the widow of Thorez, resigned from the French Politbureau because it condemned the Soviet action. On the other hand, Louis Aragon and Elsa Triolet, who for 40 years justified every Soviet act, have now expressed their deep sympathy for Czechoslovakia 'suffering under a foreign occupation'. Aragon did not waver during the Great Purge, the Stalin-Hitler Pact, or the Doctors' Plot. After Stalin's death he criticized Picasso for his drawing of Stalin which was not deferential enough. He supported the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolution. All this in vain. Like so many others he has become an object of denunciation in the Soviet press.

Not surprisingly, all the communist parties who denounced the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia now tried to emphasize the difference between the 1956 Hungarian case and the present one. The logic of such arguments was tenuous to say the least: it is difficult not to see that *Poprostu*, *Irodalmi Ujsag*, and *Literarni listy* were basically standing for the same thing. To be against the former two, but to support the latter one, requires a degree of doctrinal doublethink which is not easy to reconcile with more elementary political attitudes. As a result of

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Czechoslovakia, the communist parties, whatever their official stand, were deeply divided on the issue. Among those which condemned the Soviet Union, the British Communist Party had a strong pro-Soviet opposition, as the letters in the correspondence column of the *Morning Star* and the stand taken by Palme Dutt have shown; in France, Waldeck Rochet faced a pro-Soviet opposition led by Jeanette Vermeersch, an opposition which was reportedly backed by over 30 per cent of Party members; similar pro-Soviet opposition to the leadership of Laurie Aarons in the Australian Communist Party amounted to about 25 per cent. Approximately the same oppositional strength was manifested in the Finnish Communist Party, which also condemned the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia. The American Communist Party, which supported the Soviet action, and the pro-Soviet Indian Communist Party, which vacillated, were split down the middle.[4] The three parties which have attempted in the past to remain 'neutral' in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Cuban, the North Vietnamese, and the North Korean, echoed the Soviet line on Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, the Rumanians have protested strongly against it, and only became more cautious and circumspect when the threat of similar Soviet action against Rumania was raised.

Among the Elder Statesmen of the New Left, Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre denounced the Soviet action and warned against the possibility of a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia and Albania (*The Times*, 9 October 1968), while the younger representatives of the New Left qualified their criticism by stressing their negative view of the Czechoslovak reform movement. A member of the editorial board of the *New Left Review* said: 'We are in a difficult situation. We cannot accept military intervention, but Dubcek's policies, especially in economics, do not represent the kind of revolutionary socialism we have been talking about' (*Guardian*, New York, 14 September 1968).

Among the members of the Old Left, some who have for decades justified the Stalinist horrors and the post-Stalinist repressions, have now become very critical (though not of their own past). Here is what the two editors of the *Monthly Review* (October 1968) had to say on the subject:

> Leo Huberman: 'In the eyes of the Czech people, the socialism they have lived with for 20 years was far short of their expectations. Were their complaints legitimate?
>
> 'They wanted to democratize the system. Did it need democratization? In Czechoslovakia, as in the Soviet Union and all the People's Democracies, the record was indeed frightful: bureaucracy and over-centralization carried to extreme lengths; appalling violations of civil liberties; wholesale arrests, torture, and fake confessions; deprivation of freedom and life for large numbers of

[4] Somnath Lahiri, a leading communist from West Bengal who has just returned from Prague, told the Party's National Council meeting in Delhi, held from 3 to 8 September: 'From what I have seen of the occupation in Czechoslovakia, if this is defence of Socialism, then slavery is better' (*National Herald*, 7 September 1968).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

people; no really effective participation by the masses in deciding who was to govern them and how they were to be governed; deception, hypocrisy, and lies the characteristic behaviour of the privileged ruling group; glorification of the working class in theory, scorn and distrust of the working class in practice.

'This was the reality. Why shouldn't the Czechs want to democratize such a system? . . . How can the government possibly know what is happening in the country, what the people really feel, what is going right and what is going wrong? Shut the mouths of the people and you necessarily hear only from your yes-men and your secret police—and the worth of their testimony can be judged by the obvious miscalculations made by the Russians when they invaded Czechoslovakia. They had counted on at least some Quislings: they found none!'

Paul M. Sweezy: 'The Czech crisis marks the beginning of the end of Moscow's political and ideological influence in the advanced capitalist countries. Either the Communist Parties recognize it and try to adjust to it, or they go under. Given their histories, it is doubtful whether they can successfully adjust. But either way, the era of Moscow-orientation is nearing the end.'

THE least one can say about the post-invasion situation is that as far as the revolutionary left, old or new, is concerned, it is ideologically an unholy mess. Doctrinally, it would be difficult to put this particular Humpty Dumpty together again. After Czechoslovakia, Moscow's hopes for the resuscitation of the communist movement under its leadership do not look very promising, but this does not deter it from trying to organize the conference of communist parties at some unspecified future date. But a *Pravda* editorial about the Budapest meeting which decided to postpone it was pathetic in its evasiveness. It even managed to avoid mentioning Czechoslovakia altogether, and said that 'the only subject under discussion was the question of the conference' (*Pravda*, 7 October 1968).

It is clear that the old type of dilemma which the Soviet Union has faced throughout its history and which it has been able somehow to by-pass, the dilemma of *raison d'état* versus its influence in the communist movement, becomes qualitatively different in a polycentric situation. No longer can the Soviet Union rely on the automatic support of the communist parties; it cannot even count on the majority of the pro-Soviet ones.

Czechoslovakia marks a new stage in the polycentric decomposition of communism. The eternal Soviet dilemma mentioned above—communist universalism or *raison d'état*—has reached a new acuteness. It began with Brest-Litovsk, the duality of *Narkomindel* and Comintern, the subordination of the interests of the 'world revolution' to the interests of 'socialism in one country'. It is now clear that as the Soviet leaders cannot reconsolidate their hegemony in the communist movement they have to settle for the reconsolidation of communism in one empire. The basis of their claim to the legitimacy of their power is a

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

universalist one, but the basis of their empire cannot be universal. Ideologically, Moscow is losing whatever magnetism it used to possess. The occupation of Czechoslovakia revealed not just Soviet ideological isolation, but also the fact that it now has to face a conflict both with the 'revolutionary' communist parties, and with the 'reformist' ones. Paradoxically, all Soviet efforts to reunify communism under its aegis only helped to exacerbate its internal conflicts. In 1948 Stalin could still maintain that Soviet and general communist interests were identical and avoid the dilemma by the excommunication and the ideological containment of Yugoslavia. In 1956 the suppression of the Hungarian revolution was supported by all communist parties. In 1968 Moscow was compelled to complain in the pages of *Pravda* that 'some foreign communists' do not understand the necessity for the Soviet action.

To non-communists this action highlighted the fact that the Soviet position in east Europe has always been a matter of sheer military preponderance and of very little else. Having subjected the area after the war, the Soviet Union has since had to intervene militarily, or to threaten such intervention, in almost all the east European countries, despite the fact that they were all ruled by communist parties. In 1953 it was East Germany, in 1956 Poland and Hungary, in 1968 Czechoslovakia. In Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Albania, Moscow lost its control and cannot regain it without military intervention. But now Rumania is feeling the threat, tomorrow perhaps Yugoslavia and Albania. The only exception is Bulgaria, where a military coup was prevented a few years ago with the help of Soviet intelligence services.

The occupation of Czechoslovakia not only ended the attempt made there 'to give socialism a human face'; it destroyed the hopes of the liberal intelligentsia in other east European countries and in the Soviet Union itself, hopes connected with the success of the Czechoslovak 'experiment with freedom'. It will take some time before the political depression and the feeling of helplessness induced by the Soviet action is overcome and the battle of freedom resumed. The suppression of the Hungarian revolution did not extinguish it, nor will the occupation of Czechoslovakia, but it is undoubtedly a great setback. Pious Western sentiments ritualistically expressed cannot do much to change this. Anyway, the east Europeans have no illusions left on that score.[5]

The Soviet intervention has put paid to the dreams of liberalization and disheartened the reformists in east Europe. They tend now to see their only chance in internal changes in the Soviet Union, but it is a

[5] There were also other sentiments expressed in the West. Three weeks before the Soviet invasion Joseph Craft wrote in the *International Herald Tribune* (29 June 1968): 'A system that assures Russian security through friendly regimes in Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany has a certain logic.' And two months after the invasion *The Guardian* (17 October 1968) wrote in its editorial: 'Russia's statement of its claims in eastern Europe was brutally frank. But within the limits it set, east Europeans, if they follow the example of Czechoslovakia, can work to let a little light into their lives.'

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

long-term prospect. The Soviet policy of imperial reconsolidation is promoted by the die-hards and strengthens their hand. Imperial communism means the ascendance of the Great Russian chauvinists of the Party *apparat*, of the military, and of the political police. Contrary to what some Western commentators assert, it increases the dangers to peace and the security of west Europe.[6]

The paradox of the situation is that the ideological weakening of the Soviet leadership, both internal and external, pushes the Soviet leadership to actions which may be in effect more dangerous than the more cautious policy of Stalin (who did not invade Yugoslavia). Other factors, of course, also play their role: the growing military might of the Soviet Union, the existing opportunities, etc. But in any case it is striking that while the Soviet Union received a series of knocks after Stalin's death, its power position has not been basically affected, despite such setbacks as the troubles in east Europe, the frustration of its threat to Berlin, the conflict with China, the fiasco of the Cuban gamble, and the defeat of its Arab protégés by Israel in 1967.

The polycentric decomposition of communism and internal difficulties are stimulating a tough reaction on the part of the Soviet ruling *élite*. It is not just that its leaders are 'Stalin's heirs', who made their career under him and learned their politics from him, although it is also that. There are wider forces at work. The basic factor is the question of the legitimacy of the regime. The Soviet Party leadership fears the snowballing effect of any reforms, its political conditioning and post-Stalinist experience inclines it to view them as opening Pandora's Box and putting their positions and the system in which they hold them in jeopardy. They saw the effects of Khrushchev's speech, and their neo-Stalinist policies are designed to undo the damage caused by 'destalinization' to the legitimacy of the system. Their endeavours in Czechoslovakia will remain incomplete as long as they have not succeeded in making the Czechoslovaks accept the Soviet version of the danger of 'counter-revolution'. This should give legitimacy to the Soviet August action, and should induce the protesting communist parties to accept it as justified, on the Hungarian 1956 model. It is hoped that the Czecho-

[6] A typical example of such attitudes is the opinion expressed in the same editorial of *The Guardian* (17 October 1968): 'As long as [Moscow's] actions are the traditional ones of a Great Power they are foreseeable and can be guarded against. A relapse into Comintern politics would be more menacing.' This is doubtful. It is arguable that it would be less menacing, because in a polycentric communism Moscow would be chasing a chimera and unable to achieve its goals. Stalin controlled the Comintern, Brezhnev cannot resuscitate one. If the Moscow meeting, the convocation of which could be fairly described as a relapse into Comintern politics, had had higher priority, there would have been no invasion of Czechoslovakia. A more menacing policy is the one which is based on a solid power basis. In the present circumstances the imperial communism of Moscow may be more dangerous precisely because it is so ideologically vulnerable. It was Napoleon, and not Babeuf, who projected the 'internal contradictions' of the French Revolution abroad. As for the foreseeability of the actions of a Great Power, they may not be all that easy to guess, judging by the Western editorial comments on the expected Soviet behaviour before the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

slovak leadership will then be so compromised that it would be ready for replacement. If retrospective legitimacy can be conferred on the Soviet actions and it is accepted by foreign communists, the Soviet leaders expect that the march to the Moscow meeting can be resumed.

Can the clock be put back in this way? Perhaps it can to some extent, but not completely. It was a popular fallacy after 1956 to believe in the 'inevitable' liberalization of communist regimes and the 'impossibility' of 'restalinization'. But it was true that Khrushchev's speech had shattered the myth of Party infallibility. The occupation of Czechoslovakia can help to keep the Soviet empire together, but it has struck another blow to the myth of 'proletarian internationalism'. It is difficult to imagine that it will have no lasting repercussions in the communist movement, even though this movement is used by now to the unbrotherly polemics between the 'fraternal parties'. After Czechoslovakia there is almost no ideological veil left to cover the naked imperial interest of the Soviet Union.

In the long run it may eventually also have negative internal repercussions. The Soviet Union is a multi-national state, and imperial communism inevitably depends on its appeal to Great Russian chauvinism. This, in the era of national communisms, may provoke the reaction of other nationalities in the Soviet Union, where 'bourgeois nationalism' is already on the increase. Universal empires begin their decline when their claims to universalism are no longer believed. Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia not only blocked the way to the reform of the communist regimes, thus contributing to their social and political sclerosis, but it has also undermined still further Soviet influence among its supporters abroad. One day the Soviet leaders will face problems resulting from recent actions, not on the periphery, but at the centre of the empire. The power of an empire, according to Montesquieu, rests on the 'fear' and 'enthusiasm' of its subjects, and empires decline when these two factors are no longer operative. After Czechoslovakia the fear has increased, but hardly the 'enthusiasm'. Slowly the Soviet principles of legitimacy are being undermined. In his *Esprit des Lois*, Montesquieu also said that despotic government is 'ruined by its own intrinsic imperfections, when some accidental causes do not prevent the corrupting of its principles'.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Documents: Czechoslovakia

BEFORE THE INVASION

Shortly before the invasion of Czechoslovakia we asked a prominent Czech journalist to write an article about the situation and future prospects, as seen from Prague. We decided to publish it although it has been overtaken by events, because it is a telling testimony to the spirit which inspired first 'the Czechoslovak experiment' and then the Czechoslovak resistance. The name of the author is being withheld for obvious reasons.

WITH every turn of events since January 1968 this question, 'whither Czechoslovakia', has reappeared with special urgency. It is in fact a sign of uncertainty, of a state of mind veering between hope and fear.

We were already asking ourselves this question after that historic session of the Party's Central Committee which really only made one weighty decision—to change the person of the First Secretary. But that meeting also demonstrated a profound change within the Party's supreme organ. Never since 1929, when Klement Gottwald assumed the leadership, had it witnessed such a sharp conflict. The meeting became historic not because of any new programme it proclaimed, but because of the hold that it broke. In a normal, democratic manner it deprived Antonin Novotny of the top post, which was in itself an event of unique importance for the whole community of socialist countries. And furthermore it broke the artificially sustained unity within the Party's Central Committee.

These two achievements led to an avalanche of political events and changes whose end result still cannot be foreseen.

Though we are speaking of an event occurring inside one political party, it had extraordinary repercussions throughout the whole of society. For this was the party of paramount importance, the party which had exercised a political monopoly in Czechoslovakia for 20 years.

We are not concerned here with tracing the causes of what happened at the January Plenum, but to look at the course of events thereafter and seek at least a partial answer to the question: Where will Czechoslovakia end up?

A final answer can of course only be furnished by that future shape of affairs which will emerge from the process—the contest between various forces—which Czechoslovakia is now experiencing. The contest is by no means decided; it is continuing now and may go on for many months and even years. Again, it is a contest concerning not

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

only one country, but socialism generally in the modern world. It is in fact an unscheduled test of socialism's ability really to provide the man-in-the-street with all human rights and democratic freedoms. Hence the great interest shown by the outside world, West and East alike. At the same time this contest has become an unsought challenge to all sides: a challenge to the Western bourgeois system, and to the political systems of the other socialist countries too. To a certain extent the contest has the character of a threat: no one in Czechoslovakia intends it so, but it is interpreted in some countries that way.

WHAT in Czechoslovakia is called the 'democratization process' means at bottom an attempt to break up what had been previously called the socialist system, viz., the Stalinist version constructed like a pyramid with the Communist Party at its apex. The men at the apex tried by all means at their disposal to manage every aspect of life and to take a direct hand in steering every organization in society, from trade unions to artists' and writers' associations.

The organizational pattern of society in Czechoslovakia, as in other countries, was an imported one. Having arisen under the special conditions of twentieth-century Russia, diametrically opposed to those of modern Czechoslovakia, this pattern was bound when applied to this country to burst asunder all the traditions of a central European land. The process not only led to the horrors of executions and mass imprisonment, but had deeper psychological effects. It offended the national consciousness and feelings of Czechs and Slovaks, amongst whom left-wing political thought had struck deeper roots than in any other socialist country.

It is therefore only logical and natural that the months following January should have seen a continuous settling of accounts with the past: not just the most recent past, the events of the fifties, but the pre-war past as well. There was a continuous effort to restore to their rightful place in history great personalities who for 20 years had been passed over in silence, or only mentioned in terms of unscholarly, propagandistic denunciation. Here I am thinking primarily of the first Czechoslovak President, T. G. Masaryk, one of the greatest figures in the whole history of the Czech nation. But a reappraisal was under way of the whole period of the First, pre-war, Republic, which emerged as one of the most democratic regimes in all Europe after Versailles.

At the same time a start was made in opening up, with dogged ruthlessness, the annals of the last two decades, with their fearful record of humiliation and contempt for ordinary human lives. Statements were printed by people who had survived many years of imprisonment and bestial treatment, corporal and spiritual.

This was a cleansing bath such as no socialist country had been subjected to in like degree; a very necessary bath, if the past evils were not to recur.

It is a remarkable feature of the cleansing process, I think, that it

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proceeded in complete calm with no pogrom atmosphere and no physical attacks upon anybody, not even on those who might be most to blame for crimes against humanity.

This is a matter which deserves to be closely examined and its reasons sought, for it is closely relevant to the subsequent campaign against Czechoslovakia waged in most of the communist countries. For there was a psychological justification for the campaign. A country where one could speak and write openly about crimes for which the leading representatives of the ruling political party were chiefly responsible must surely have undergone a counter-revolutionary upheaval—such was the common logical inference. Yet in Czechoslovakia there reigned absolute peace, at a time when the Warsaw police were suppressing student demonstrations with ruthless severity and Paris students were manning the barricades and fighting street battles with *their* authorities. During that time there was no disturbance in Czechoslovakia at all. Far from clashes occurring with the police, there were not even demonstrations or processions. The surgical operations on the cancers of the recent past were only conducted in the press, radio and television. Much of what was revealed was shocking, for it displayed in all its nakedness the working of a power mechanism whose wheels had crushed the lives or health of hundreds and thousands of citizens, communist and non-communist, old and young, representing *par excellence* the moral and intellectual flower of all classes of society. Yet not even this evidence provoked the public into a single act of violence. It remained calm. Hence the invention, in one communist country, of the theory of 'creeping counter-revolution' in Czechoslovakia, such that no politicians, journalists or men-in-the-street are capable of discerning it!

The psychological basis of such absurd theories is clearly the inability to grasp how people could possibly remain calm while learning of the indescribable atrocities committed under the aegis of the Communist Party. It is hard to understand how the public, far from attacking such a Party, discovered an affection for some of its prominent personalities and began to cheer them on heartily in their political struggle.

Clearly the theorists of 'counter-revolution' were subconsciously afflicted by one fear and one alone, that if such a process were to start in their own countries, it might lead to such outbreaks of mob anger that the consequences would be hard to foresee.

Explanations were accordingly constructed with the aim of proving ideologically that Czechoslovakia was undergoing a counter-revolutionary struggle against socialism, against the Communist Party, against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The campaign to throw light on the darkest patches of the past must be a campaign waged—it was argued—by equally dark, anti-socialist, forces. For it was inconceivable that the chief authors of the campaign should themselves be communists, and in many cases highly placed officials of their Party.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In terms of the previous experience of the various communist countries the situation I have described appeared quite illogical; it was something quite outside the realm of the familiar. Czechoslovak events were accordingly interpreted in the neighbouring states along conventional lines: imperialist diversionary activities . . . American and West German espionage . . . dark forces of domestic reaction. In Czechoslovakia herself these labels provoked anger or mirth, and left a deep imprint on the minds of most of the public.

The very 'quietness' of the Czechoslovak revolution is proof of the political maturity of the public, of the vigour of the country's democratic tradition, and of the flexibility of the leading communists. And it affords an example practically unique in history of the solution of a deep crisis in the political system. It is in my view a paramount condition for the accomplishment of far-reaching changes. But of course it is not the only factor which affects the course of events.

SINCE this is not a historical essay, but simply a series of thoughts occurring to one participant in the Czechoslovak political scene, I should like to refer to a number of socio-political phenomena which strike me as crucial for answering the question I asked at the beginning.

One such phenomenon is the involvement of the masses in Czechoslovak politics. This of course happened in stages. During the first two months of the year there was little sign of it. But in the spring the situation changed, and no doubt the scandal around General Sejna played a role in this. But even then decisions continued to be made in the factories, for example, by groups of officials of the pre-January sort, men still capable of manipulating the rank-and-file. Hence the appearance even at this time of numerous resolutions protesting against the press, radio and television campaigns for unveiling the past.

An important part in stimulating public opinion and bringing wider circles into the political struggle was played by the 'Two Thousand Words' declaration, which provoked a crisis situation. Quite a few leading politicians considered the publication of this manifesto on 27 June to be a blow for the future prospects of democratization. It was described as a national tragedy simply because high-ranking communist officials felt it put a weapon into the hands of the 'conservative', i.e. pro-Novotny, groups. It came out in the press on the eve of a series of district-level Party conferences, and Party leaders expected that its effect would be to change the character of those conferences into platforms for urging a return to the old ways, instead of supporting progress.

The Party leaders accordingly felt it necessary to dissociate themselves from the 'Two Thousand Words' as vociferously as possible, so as to reinforce the progressive tendency of the district meetings and thereby the whole process of democratization. But this was a serious

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

miscalculation. The manifesto did, admittedly, give a spur to a few conservative deputies who denounced it as an appeal to counter-revolution. But its effect on the district conferences was to mobilize still more support for the progressive cause. The leaders' denunciation was received with distrust and embarrassment, and in the end the Party leaders quietly dissociated themselves from their own initial position.

The 'Two Thousand Words' led to a clearer polarization of conservative and forward-looking forces. It strengthened the latter by adding the support of a greater bulk of public opinion and it cannot be gainsaid, whatever one may think of the manifesto's detailed content, that it acted as a catalyst in broadening the democratic front.

On the other hand it certainly complicated relations between Czechoslovakia and the other communist countries, causing an intensification of their campaign against the alleged counter-revolution and indirectly hastening the convocation of the Warsaw meeting of five communist parties, whose notorious Warsaw letter constituted an ultimatum to the communist leaders in Prague to halt the whole democratization process.

The Warsaw letter has played a role of extraordinary importance in the latest chapter of Czechoslovakia's history. It was sent at a time when a considerable part of the country's border was already surrounded by Soviet, Polish and East German army units and when Soviet troops were actually stationed on Czechoslovak soil, having stayed on after the conclusion of Warsaw Pact staff exercises. These military movements, combined with the ideological offensive that reached its climax in the Warsaw letter, had created a practically unanimous surge of feeling inside Czechoslovakia, a national movement in defence of independence and sovereignty. The most vivid expression of this was the 'Message from the Public to the Communist Party Presidium', copies of which were signed by hundreds of thousands of men and women throughout the country. The signature-collecting campaign turned in fact into a national referendum, testifying to the unlimited support on which the Communist Party leaders could draw.

During this period the firm position of these leaders won them prestige such as their Party had never enjoyed in the past and achieved the virtual rehabilitation of communist policies in the eyes of the whole population. Their forthrightness automatically made them genuine exponents of the popular will of both Czechs and Slovaks. An atmosphere was created which could only be compared to that of September 1938, just before the Munich agreement, when Hitler's threats produced a complete solidarity of will among the Czechoslovaks. In mid-July 1968, similarly, a national unity was recreated which restored that trust in the Communist Party that had been so undermined over the preceding 20 years.

The question at issue was now Czechoslovakia's sovereignty, and minor disagreements were largely overshadowed. In the press and on radio and television one could sense the same concentration on a single

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

aim: the rallying of all the country's forces in order to preserve its independence and its ability to decide domestic affairs without foreign interference. This period immediately preceding the Cierna meetings represents the high point so far of mass public participation in Czechoslovak political life.

When the Cierna negotiations proved long-drawn-out, however, and there were absolutely no reports on the proceedings, the public mood changed considerably. Distrust and disappointment arose, exacerbated by the meaningless final communiqué and a speech from the President which almost provoked panic. The first bad impression was not altogether erased by subsequent statements from other leading communist officials.

The Cierna talks with the Russian leaders were followed by the Bratislava confrontation with all five signatory parties of the Warsaw letter; the resultant declaration has been well described as 'written in Sanskrit', so far removed was it from the plain language of contemporary Czechoslovakia.

After these two meetings a gulf widened between Communist Party statements and public opinion, which kept reiterating: 'What did you promise them at Bratislava? How did you manage to calm them down?' To which the communist leaders kept replying: 'We promised nothing. All is well. Democratization continues.'

But the assurances no longer carried the same conviction as before the meetings. The public waited for evidence that they had produced the one kind of victory that would be meaningful—an absolute guarantee that the affairs of the country would be decided solely by its own people and their elected representatives. The documents will long be studied by historians. But it can at least be asserted in their favour that

1. they implied the maintenance of state sovereignty, and that
2. temporarily, at least, they halted the mutual polemics between Czechoslovakia and the other communist countries.

For some observers, what had been gained was chiefly time and room for manoeuvre. The world press praised the skill of the Czechoslovak negotiators, who had managed virtually to annul the Warsaw letter. But at home, neither press nor public were so enthusiastic. Early in August fears began to show that the communist leaders were trying to impose a standstill on political progress. As I write now, the public is prepared to believe that they refrained from signing any specific promises of action such as the Warsaw letter had demanded, namely the reintroduction of censorship and preservation of the monopolistic political system. On the other hand it is assumed that they must have countered charges from the Soviet side by assurances that they had the domestic situation well in hand and were well able to rein in the journalists and prevent in fact any erosion of the one-party monopoly. And these hypothetical assurances must oblige them to try to demonstrate their validity in practice.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Today, then, Czechoslovakia is once more faced with the same question as in January. Where will she get to? Where *can* she go? Once more it must be asked whether she can make a radical break with Stalinist socialism and whether she can achieve democratic socialism. This last, ill-defined aim gathers around it the support of widely differing groups. The range of opinion extends from those who would merely reform the old Stalinist version, maintaining a one-party monopoly while ridding it of its brutal consequences, to those who would give free play to all political parties in the manner of Czechoslovakia's pre-war bourgeois democracy, while preserving the socio-economic features of socialism.

In my own view, neither of these extremes fits in with the real needs or the current feasibilities of Czechoslovakia today. Anything of course may happen, but if developments proceed at all normally one must expect the appearance of a new kind of democratic socialism in harmony with two basic popular wishes. One is the desire for genuinely democratic relations between organizations and institutions—and hence the abandonment of the Communist Party's pre-January role as virtual director of all other agencies—and for the implementation of all democratic rights and freedoms; and the other is the desire to preserve that basic achievement of socialism, the transfer to public ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange. It seems to me that the future form of democratic socialism in my country must be one as distinct from the system prevailing in the other communist countries as from the various kinds of bourgeois democracy in the West. For though it may appear that the same questions are still being asked now as they were nine months ago, there have in fact been fundamental changes in the pattern of power within society, and in the state of public opinion.

The great bulk of the population has demonstrated its rejection of any return to the Novotny era, and this popular will has had its institutional repercussions.

The most weighty changes are those that have taken place inside the Communist Party. It has got rid of Novotny and of a large number of his most compromised associates. It has accepted an Action Programme which, for all its vagueness on some points, proclaims far-reaching democratic reforms such as no other communist country—not even Yugoslavia—has witnessed. It has initiated the Rehabilitation Law, giving practical effect to the denunciation of arbitrary rule in the past. It has given a lead in abolishing censorship and restoring freedom of speech and publication. It has taken a decisive stand in favour of national interests, sovereignty and an independent foreign policy. It has undergone a profound transformation of its own internal life, as shown by the completely democratic method of electing delegates to the extraordinary Fourteenth Congress scheduled for 9 September.

Yet significant as they are, even these changes do not mean that

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Czechoslovak Communist Party has been converted into a completely democratic political organization. It is true that the new draft Party statutes, due to be submitted to the Fourteenth Congress, represent a marked breakthrough in the democratic direction. But the Party, naturally, is not a homogeneous body. It contains various factions: radically democratic, moderately centralist and, at the far end, conservative in the Stalinist manner. All these trends are moreover represented in the leadership itself. Accordingly, every Party decision is a compromise, leaning sometimes to the progressive, sometimes to the reactionary side according to the situation. This always ties the hands of the progressives, and it cannot be excluded that the conservatives—for whom the hesitant centre group constitutes a kind of reserve force—may one day reconsolidate their ranks. It is therefore possible that a collision may occur some time between conservatives and progressives inside the Party, which might even lead (barring artificial obstacles) to the creation of two parties, a democratic-socialist and a Stalinist one. There can be no doubt that the first of the two would have the greater popular support.

AN important consideration for Czechoslovakia's future is the position of other political organizations and social groupings. Of the older organizations, some importance could attach to the two non-communist parties, the Czechoslovak Socialist Party and the Czechoslovak People's Party. Tightly controlled until January by the communists and unable to make any move—even to accept new members—without their agreement, both parties have obtained considerable scope for independent activity since then. They have partly changed their leading personalities, put new life into their newspapers and increased their membership. Yet this is still minute compared with that of the Communist Party. The public still regards them with reserve as parties that have compromised themselves intolerably in the past, and the feeling is intensified by their inability even now to take the plunge and form policies convincingly distinct from those of the communists on all issues. This acts as a great brake on their efforts to swell their ranks, and the situation in turn hinders overall progress towards political democracy and props up the communists' power monopoly.

What of the prospect for new organizations? I shall not dwell here on organizations such as the Society for Human Rights which, though they may exert a kind of pressure at given moments, have no strictly political ambition.

A more significant body is the KAN (*Klub angazovanych nestraniku*, literally ' Non-Party Engagés' Club ', or, more freely, ' Club for Independents with Political Consciences '). This now has branches in all regions and in a large number of districts and localities. It has grown at random, winning some respect even among top-level communists and sometimes causing needless alarm. Its organizers, however, seem not to be quite sure what they want or how to work for it; they are

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

uncertain whether to try to be a political party or something more like a debating club. KAN suffers from the lack of politically-minded leaders and of printed organs. By mid-August it had still failed to secure 'registration' by the Ministry of the Interior, so that it is still struggling for the right to exist.

An important role as pressure-group fell during the spring to the *Klub 231*, the organization of former political prisoners. In its early days it inspired fear and even disgust among the leading communists, whose frequent attacks hamstrung the club's activities. Its political disappearance has been secured by its transformation into a series of official institutions for solving the social problems of former political prisoners as they undergo rehabilitation procedures.

What, finally, of the old 'mass organizations' like the trade unions and youth league? These erstwhile pillars of so-called working-class dictatorship, which under the Stalinist order acted as mere transmission belts for the communist command system, are going through a critical period as their artificial unity is shaken. Various interest groups within these organizations are rebelliously demanding a degree of independence, and some are prizing themselves free altogether.

This tendency has of course the valuable effect of rocking the old pyramid of political power. But if we survey the current state of the various parties and organizations we must conclude that none has yet acquired such strength that, in a crisis, it could effectively oppose its voice to that of the Communist Party. The body which does in fact speak loudest, namely the Co-ordinating Committee set up by the various professional unions representing writers, journalists, artists, theatre and film workers, etc., is not in fact a social force of adequate strength. The voice of the Co-ordinating Committee is heard and cannot be ignored; but it could not strike home at the crucial moment.

More remarkable by far is a movement which arose among workers in the factories of the Ostrava industrial area in the form of Committees for the Defence of Free Speech. Similar groups have now arisen throughout the country at factory, local and institutional levels. This is the one movement which is of working-class origin and has really grown up from below. Attempts to bring the various units together have not, however, been very successful; only in Ostrava has it proved possible to form a Regional Council of these workers' committees. The movement operates quietly and beyond the public ken, without benefit of press support. Its proletarian backing makes its future somewhat hopeful, but it has no leader to date.

The foregoing only serves to emphasize the decisive importance of the Communist Party as the sole political force which continues to drive the machinery of state; everything else is small and stunted by comparison.

The leadership of this Party is actively concerned, we can see from its behaviour, to prevent basic changes in the pattern of power. I have already mentioned how it has dealt with the *Klub 231* by, in effect,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nationalizing it. It is tackling the KAN problem a different way, doing its utmost to ensure that this body, far from becoming a state-wide force, remains as a debating forum organized at no higher than district level.

Social democracy remains a hidden threat for the communists. A fairly large number of small groups of social democrats who rejected fusion with the communists 20 years ago are striving, in line with their brave traditions, to revive the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party. The Communist Party has been paralysing all such attempts, giving as its chief argument that their success would lead to a struggle between rival progressive forces, provoking a sharp reaction both from the Soviet Union and from the most aggressive orthodox quarters at home.

In sum, then, the only remaining opposition force is that represented by freedom of speech, or, in other words, by the journalists themselves. Even here we cannot ignore various trends towards the introduction of a controlled press. Fresh attacks have created a paradoxical situation. Feeling that freedom of expression, despite the abolition of censorship, has only been granted to them temporarily, journalists have joined together to guard over the liberty which they all prize. If they were convinced that freedom of publication had come to stay, they would certainly be criticizing each other's views vehemently. That they refrain from mutual attacks for fear of threatening their newly-won liberty is a sign of the half-hearted, abnormal, nervous and unstable character of the political scene. For society is still in the stage of democratization, not yet of democracy. Everything is still in the balance, though all assure one another that a return to pre-January conditions is unthinkable.

Journalists are continually being reminded by politicians, on the one hand, that they have been admitted to a role in political life as a favour (though they have played such a role since time immemorial), and, on the other hand, that they share responsibility for the conduct of state affairs (though such responsibility belongs truly to the government alone, while journalists can only answer for what they write). This has created a strange fringe atmosphere in the relationship between press and politicians. The latter still retain the old feeling that they are responsible for what the newspapers say, both towards the public and towards those foreign representatives with whom they have to negotiate. Add to this the various attempts to subject the press to control from a political centre, or to nationalize them in some subtle way, and it is not surprising that commentators huddle together and refrain from mutual argument. They are quite aware that their abnormal behaviour is a result of the political monopoly system, and that in normal democratic conditions they would break up into political groups and do battle with each other.

THERE is a clear tendency, then, to try to preserve the distribution of political power as it was in 1967, or at least to freeze the present situation and halt all further progress towards democratization. No

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wonder many people recall the contrast in Poland between the high hopes of 1956 and the tragic events of March 1968; no wonder that the fear has been expressed at so many political meetings that Dubcek might become a second Gomulka.

Such fears were strengthened this summer by the second 'General's scandal'—that around Gen. Vaclav Prchlik, which was a classic case of the struggle between those who want to freeze the situation and those who would forge ahead. Gen. Prchlik was head of the 'main political administration' of the Defence Ministry. As a member of the Party's Central Committee he had played an important part in the tense days just before the January upheaval. His progressive activity within the army and at the Central Committee session put him among those who deserve most credit for the change of line. Soon after the January switch he was put in charge of the important eighth department of the Central Committee apparatus, dealing with army, security and militia. Early in July he spoke at a press conference about the Warsaw Pact and relations between its members, criticizing the unequal status of the partners. Prchlik's replies to questions provoked a violent onslaught from the Soviet army paper *Krasnaya Zvezda*. Just before the negotiations with the Soviet Party leaders at Cierna, Prchlik was removed from his post at the head of the eighth department, on the grounds that the department itself was being dissolved. His closest colleagues, all progressively-minded military men, were likewise dismissed.

The event led to a lively press campaign, in which commentators unanimously deplored Prchlik's removal. This, significantly, was the first case of the dismissal from office of a man who had assisted the democratization process, and the precedent has led to conflict, albeit not a public one, between the press and Dubcek's leading team in the Party, who must bear full responsibility for the action taken. Its outcome will enable us to form a somewhat clearer picture of the prospects of the revival process in Czechoslovakia.

I have left a number of serious internal problems unmentioned, notably the historic attempt to settle relations between Czechs and Slovaks by setting up a federal state—a delicate and complex problem, both intrinsically and psychologically, because of the national feelings it arouses on both sides. But I regard this issue, not as basic to my title-question, but as parallel to it. The Czech-Slovak issue is, of course, related to the democratization problem, but it might conceivably be solved and still leave democracy unachieved. This last is a problem common to all nationalities alike.

I cannot conceive Czechoslovak society returning to the conditions of last year. Too many social and institutional links have been loosened for good. It would be hard to reintroduce censorship, or the direct control of the government of the unions, the youth organization and so forth by the Communist Party. But it would be less hard to achieve a standstill, maintaining the monopoly status of the Party as the only decisive political force, and this would be a source of potential relapses

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into the evils of the Novotny regime. The alternative possibility that a standstill would prove a mere temporary pause in progress is theoretically feasible; but monopoly groups like the Stalinist *élite* have never betrayed an inclination to suicide.

In either case it seems unlikely that the democratic socialism so widely acclaimed in Czechoslovakia will ever again take the form of a classical parliamentary democracy. The model has been considerably discredited in Czechoslovakia, and there is little hope of the appearance of strong parties, besides the communists, such as its working requires.

A far more realistic hope of achieving effective control over the ruling Party is afforded by the array of forces—the reconstituted trade unions, youth and student groups, Society for Human Rights, KAN, professional unions and, not least, the press itself—which cannot individually compare in strength with the Communist Party, but whose combined influence could also provide scope for the existing non-communist parties. The varied activity of all these elements together may become a guarantee of democratic rights, and hence furnish hope of a renaissance of socialism—both inside Czechoslovakia and beyond its borders. For it is this activity which may possibly provide the conditions in which the paramount role of secret decision-making can be replaced by open political life under public surveillance.

(*Translated by Deryck Viney*)

AFTER THE INVASION

After the occupation of Czechoslovakia there was a short period when Czechoslovak publications were still able to print contributions expressing the feelings of their authors in more or less direct form. It did not last long, and soon the two celebrated literary journals, Literarni listy *and* Kulturny Zivot, *which played such an important role in the struggle for the liberalization of Czechoslovakia before its occupation, had to close down. We publish below poignant and anguished replies to the question 'What next?', put to some of the contributors to* Kulturny Zivot *by its editors shortly before the journal ceased publication.*

Jozef Bob: What next? This is the question that we have been asking again and again during the past few days. We seek an answer, although we know full well that the issue has already been decided. We try to enlist reason where reason, truth, and right have hopelessly capitulated and foundered, where, instead of reason and a reasonable settlement, 'ideological grimaces of passion', intolerance, and coercion have prevailed. Reason does not show us anything that has not first affected our senses. Therefore do not let us describe as reasonable something that stems from the ordinary instinct of self-preservation. Yes, we feel the menacing authority of such facts as death, ruin, and the senseless

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sacrifice of human life. Only these facts drive our decisions to the level of pre-rational morality. No, we do not recommend running our heads against a wall. But when we are forced to come to terms with ' reality ', let us not lose the conviction that there exists a reality that is more sublime and humane [that it exists], deep within us, in ' the Rock of Ages '.

The greatest tragedies are those which, while humiliating people and nations, seem interminable, without a definite and foreseeable end. However, the tragedy and tensions pass and the mechanism of life must go on. People will eat, drink, work, and play. The bounds of our physical and intellectual existence are only conceptual. The mechanism of life, if set in motion without its intellectual core, can only function in a dehumanized form. Because of this, we shall not abandon our task and our duty to create values. We know that habit is stronger than reason and that the so-called sense of reality may obliterate the ideal. Therefore we advocate an intellectual mobilization. Therefore we ask: What next? We want to be with you in the search for answers which are not easy.

Pavel Stevcek: After the shock of the betrayal and the cynical humiliation of our nations, it is necessary to face the facts, to analyse the situation. The spasms of suppressed sobs and the sad gesture of clenched teeth and fists, all these will pass. The history of our nations—although it does not record a breach of faith of this kind—has armed us: with the force of ideas, with hope, with truth and justice. It is again our duty to use these tested weapons. For again the existence or non-existence of the Slovaks and Czechs and of their common state is at stake. Were it not for this, every individual might make his own personal attempt to survive in a suit of armour fashioned from his own grief, bitterness and passivity. I am convinced that again—Oh God, how many times already!—the time has come when it is worth while making sacrifices for this nation and for this society, to make sure that we shall regain our lost freedom and that we shall be allowed to be ourselves again.

The times in which we are being forced to live are not the times of words, and particularly not the times of free words. Therefore let us declare, while still we may, that we shall not forget. We shall not forget that the tracks of their tanks have crushed the old tradition of sincere friendship, a friendship which had its heroic history, its moral laws and rules. We shall not forget Danka Kosanova, whom they murdered, nor the dozens of other victims who were criminally slain. We shall not forget that they even ordered us to wash the blood off the paving, to level the grave mounds, and to blot out signs. These are crimes and wrongs which are not subject to historical rehabilitation. We ought to promise, for the second time, to preserve the original meaning and significance of words for the future, in our minds and in our hearts if we are not allowed to do so in writing: breach of faith, aggression,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

invasion, treason, the criminal killing of innocent people, etc. As you can see, we have already been forced to euphemize these facts and now one must speak of entry, stay, placement; one good thing is that we do not have to write about a friendly visit by the troops of the five Warsaw Pact countries. . . . We will certainly not be permitted to write accurately; well, at least let us read accurately. I also think that there is no other political and national way out than to demonstrate active faith in the reasonableness and justification of the enforced compromise, while, on the other hand, we must always remember that this is a dictate, a compromise, and that the ultimate alternative would be national suicide. In this sense, a mandate of active faith in Svoboda, Dubcek, Smrkovsky, Cernik, and Husak is the only possible guarantee that they will be able to lead the republic and its nations out of this period which is to date the blackest in their history. Then I believe that we must make the greatest possible effort to preserve the continuity of the post-January policies of the Dubcek leadership, of the concept of democratic socialism. At the same time we see with despair that it was precisely for this that we have now become the subject of power politics, because of an idea which frightened Them more than anything in the world. However, it would be senseless to submit to the ignominious fate dealt us by this compromise and dictate, if we were to revert to something other than what the ideal of democratic socialism meant and still means to us. I say again that precisely this is the cruel character of our paradoxical situation: They want to punish us with Their tanks for the new ideal of democratic socialism—but in the compromise which They have forced upon us, They have given a guarantee that we are to be allowed to go on dreaming our dream of democratic socialism undisturbed and as sovereign people. Therefore let us realize that there is no real guarantee, only a weak and feeble hope. Finally, I believe that the black night from 20 to 21 August 1968 ought also to signify the beginning of the end of improvisation in the forming of Czech and Slovak political conceptions of socialism. We have now had to pay for this bitter lesson with the loss of our sovereignty as a state and nation. A temporary loss we must hope. Brutal reality has forced us more than once to face a new truth, new, although we have suspected its existence for a long time: even a small socialist state is always threatened by a big and powerful socialist state. Although this does not fit in with Marxism at all, this is the truth inscribed in blood on the pavements of our towns. Whether we want it or not, if we consider dispassionately all the causes which led to the occupation of our territory, we must also see that the ' pre-January ' political group in the Party improvised un-national, un-sovereign, and vassal policies and that these politicians tried to sate their unquenchable thirst for power at the cost of a gradual loss of our sovereignty. Hence, not only must the distortions and infractions of the law in the fifties and the following years be laid at their door, but also the shameful August days, whether they are dead or still alive.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Socialism has again been discredited. It has been debased and has become an instrument of chauvinist great-power politics. If it wants to purge itself—if it still can do so—before history and mankind, it must produce guarantees that small nations and states will be really free, independent, and fully sovereign, *de jure* and *de facto*. The only possible political credo of Czechoslovakia in the present situation must be the creation of such guarantees.

Roman Kalisky: Before answering the question 'What next?' I must ask another question: What is our position?

We are an occupied country.

We are alone.

We have sobered up from our last illusions.

We are an occupied country despite the fact that after the 'negotiations' in Moscow the leading representatives of the CPCS and of the Slovak CP speak of the situation which has arisen purely as a result of the arrival of the Warsaw Pact armies on our territory.

When my neighbour forces my door in the middle of the night, turns my home into a shambles and kills my children, a local reporter may write about an 'unexpected visit by a neighbour', but this does not change the facts. Forcing an entry will still be forcing an entry, and murder will still be murder. There are no people who perished due to an unfortunate accident during the invasion, there are no people who were killed in action, there are only fellow citizens who were murdered. Because those who respond with deadly fire to bare hands raised against tanks and to stones thrown at armour are guilty of murder. Not only from the moral, but also from the legal aspect. Even if there were 10 instead of one Slavin with the graves of Soviet soldiers who died in the Second World War, this could not undo a single murder. ('Russians go home, we cannot afford another Slavin'—unfortunately this slogan is not an invention of mine, but one of the bitter, ironical signs daubed on walls which helped in releasing pent-up emotions.)

We are being asked to keep calm and to judge the situation coolly and soberly. All right, let us talk about the situation which has arisen and not about the occupation. Only this situation has not arisen. Atmospheric disturbances or earthquakes occur. The situation in which we find ourselves was created by the USSR with the aid of other 'allied countries' and their armies. And we are supposed to normalize this situation. This is really too much to ask of us. There can be only one normalization that can be real: the withdrawal to the last man of foreign troops. Any other normalization would be illusory, camouflage. Communications can be restored, beer can be drawn, musicals performed, one can dance the can-can and even open brothels. This is how any occupation power has always tried to 'normalize' the situation.

However, even after the intruders have left there is the danger that they will still be here, although not physically; that the military occupation will only assume a different form and change into a political

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

occupation. The protection of a nation by a foreign great power is not always only protection, so-called: it is tutelage and supervision.

The leadership of the CPCS and the government may become reconciled with the Moscow 'Accord', particularly if forced to do so, and do all that they can in the context of what they promised or of what they are permitted to do. The nation need not, must not become reconciled. This may and will produce tension between our nations and the government, between the people and those representatives for whom this people went with bare hands against tanks and machine guns. Let us hope that this tension will be at least a moral corrective of government policies; that the government will realize the limits beyond which it must not go, and beyond which it must not retreat, whatever the cost, whatever the consequences. Our nations want to live, but they cannot live on their knees. Our nations will follow their own road, although for the time being (and no one can know how long) this will be only a spiritual road. They want us to be good. We shall be good: to one another. Let us help, comfort, and aid one another. However, we shall not be obedient if we are asked to do anything that would mean a betrayal of our personal or national honour. This is how we can go on, looking towards the more distant rather than towards the immediate future. For history will prove us right.

We are alone. We have always been alone and we have only tried to convince ourselves that we are not alone. We did so 30 years ago, just as we did until recently.

Let us clearly remember this and let no one confuse us in this. It is from precisely this knowledge that we can draw our dignity and pride, although it must be a sad dignity and a sad pride. However, situations like this can seldom be alleviated through careless gaiety. Although at the back of our minds we may hope for a miracle, and although a miracle in the Kremlin would suit us well, and it is our duty to foresee and to be prepared for the coming development, we must never again try to rely on anyone else. No one will do for us what we have to do.

We have sobered up from our lost illusions: we have freed ourselves from the illusions of alliance, fraternal and internationalist ties, and from Slavophile illusions. We have come to know from our personal experience whom these slogans serve when they are needed for the promotion of great-power interests through brute force. The minds of many of us are still in turmoil, but, just like a man whose head is clearing after alcoholic intoxication, we are sobering up from day to day. However, it is precisely this sobriety, which is irreconcilable with political romanticism, which is the precondition if we are at long last to become a modern European nation that is free from any complexes. We survived Magyar oppression, we survived fascism and Stalinism, and we shall survive this also. The political groups, the regime, the guiding force need not survive it, but nations, yes. The Slovak and the Czech nation may have the right to derive great profit yet from the experience which it began to gain starting from the unforgettable night of 20 to 21

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

August 1968. And not only moral profit. It is in this knowledge that we can live on and must go on.

Milan Hamada: I am afraid that time is not only working for us, but also against us. I am afraid that in addition to the politician who begins to forget his own human dignity and the human dignity of those whom he leads, there has already appeared the politician who literally exploits the existing situation with professional detachment, without the will to overcome this situation in human, and particularly in moral terms. There are times when we must not ask for something which we have the right to demand at once, for the sole reason that our action would be devoid of moral value at this time, without which it would also be devoid of the full value of a *human* action. We are now wont to emphasize the importance of cold reason. As a writer, it is my experience that a literary work which is merely the product of cold and rational calculation is devoid of life. It seems to me that this applies to any human work, including a political action. This action too can miss its aim unless its reasoning is permeated by feeling. Perhaps from the political aspect the point that I have made is petty, yet let us remember that what is left to us of those things which we can regard as our own and which bear the stamp of social and human independence and sovereignty is the independence and sovereignty of our spirit. We must never give up this independence and sovereignty of spirit for anything, not even to make a quick profit. For if we violated our spiritual sovereignty there would be nothing left that could confirm our human dignity and our truth.

Stefan Drug: Our forebears found out many a time that they could only rely on themselves in decisive moments, that they must help themselves. Reason and sober deliberation are our only effective allies this time too. This does not mean that we have to bow in despair and defeatism, nor does this mean that we have to wait in passivity and inactive silence. Let us try to preserve—with all our strength and under any circumstances—the unique and astounding unity of all sections of our two nations, of the people and of the government, demonstrated in the past few days. After all, we recognized the power of this unity, and it alone can help us also in the coming days. And what unites us still exists: in addition to this existing ideal, which is chiefly the post-January ideal of humanitarian and democratic socialism, is the principle of a really human life. It will pay us to live and fight for this. The disfavour of the mighty ones may delay the realization of these ideals, but it cannot erase them. Especially will it depend on all of us as to when it will be possible fully to implement these ideas. Let us not swerve, let us continue to pursue our aims.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

*Students and Revolution: A Discussion**

UNIVERSITIES AND VIOLENCE

Max Beloff

MR LABEDZ'S ARTICLE is certainly a major contribution to the understanding of the kind of political phenomenon of which the 'students' revolt' is the most recent example. The only question is whether this example has an intellectual content serious enough to deserve the close attention which has been paid to it by Mr Labedz and other distinguished students of ideas, both in *Survey* and elsewhere. Is not the whole affair rather simpler even than he makes out? I think there is a difficulty here which faces those who have grown up in a tradition which takes ideas seriously, whether it be Western liberalism or classical Marxism.

The difficulty is illustrated by Mr Zehm's query 'Is there a left-wing fascism?', for the left-right dichotomy is applicable only to certain forms of political dialectic, whether the opposition be along authoritarian versus liberal or capitalist versus socialist lines. Fascism stands outside both these arguments, for while they represent attempts to grapple with serious choices in the real world, fascism represents an attempt to avoid these choices by falling back into a mythological twilight where it can be asserted that, provided one's feelings are sincere and held with passion, the choices need not be made and Utopia can come about as a mere by-product of the primal lust for destruction. If one reads with care Mr Woolf's collection of essays on the European fascist movements of the inter-war period—and in particular Mr Z. Barbu's account of the Rumanian Iron Guard, one can both see what links fascist movements despite their national disparities, and what symptoms a movement must show if we are to classify it as fascist.** If then we look at the 'student revolt', with its consistent attribution of the injustices and wickedness it finds, or professes to find, in contemporary society or in the universities themselves, to ill-defined scapegoats—'the system', 'the power-structure', 'the *élite*', 'the bureaucracy', we see an exact parallel to the fascists' denunciations of 'the system', 'capitalism', 'communism', 'the world Jewish conspiracy' and so forth. The student movement is not 'left-wing fascism', it is 'fascism'; there is no other term that so aptly places it in its historical context. And that is why a liberal society cannot compromise with it and should not.

All this does not mean to say that there are no real student grievances; many countries have conspicuously failed to handle the rapid growth of universities successfully, and all have failed to some extent.

* See *Survey*, no. 68.

** S. J. Woolf, ed., *European Fascism* (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But it was equally true that many of the evils that the fascists pointed to—mass-unemployment, mass-hunger alongside the deliberate halting of food production or the actual destruction of foodstuffs, and the annihilation of the rewards of thrift through inflation—were real evils, but we do not feel they justify Hitler, nor do they.

For what one senses when one reads or hears what the revolting students say is not that they have any new perception of current problems, still less any new solutions to offer, but rather that they make discussion of these problems impossible through their inability to proceed beyond the simple mouthing of slogans to an actual analysis of what is wrong and how it could be put right. There is among young people who should be intellectually more sophisticated than others of their generation an intellectual vacuity and a degree of gullibility which is truly frightening.

But it is less frightening than the fact that they have been joined—and not only in France where M. Bourricaud is over-kind to the professoriat, but elsewhere—by a varying proportion of the teaching body, that is to say by those very persons who are totally committed by the profession they have espoused to intellectual values, and to the belief that it is through the free operations of the intellect alone that society can solve its problems. One should feel towards a university teacher who sides with the student revolt the same degree of extra horror that one would feel for a doctor who in defiance of the Hippocratic oath lent himself to the designs of a mass-murderer.

It is, however, also legitimate to ask what it is about the intellectual history of recent decades, about what we have thought proper disciplines for universities to follow, about the content or lack of it in our teaching of philosophy, sociology or politics, that has produced students and even teachers to whom the primary operations of the intellect are alien.

A self-examination of this kind is imperative and will take a very long time. But it need not and should not deter us from the needs of the moment. The university in the modern world rests on the belief that through the handing down and refinement of human knowledge, whether in the natural sciences, the social sciences or the humanities—and there can be no division between them here—man will be brought step by step, slowly and painfully, a little further from barbarism and a little nearer to the civilization of which his noblest prophets and teachers have dreamed. And this process must either be accepted or rejected as a whole; there can be no middle ground. For it is in the combination between authority and free enquiry that the secret of the university's achievement rests.

One must therefore avoid being side-tracked by irrelevancies such as the argument about the use of 'violence'. The only argument possible in a university context is argument. Anything else—the shouting-down of opponents, sit-ins, strikes—all this is inadmissible and, even if 'non-violent', must be put down. We have a responsibility to see that the aberrations of one generation do not rob the past and the future,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or sever the vital cord that links them together. The universities are the trustees of civilization and if they fail to guard their treasures against the challenge of a fascist barbarism they will be culpable before history as are the men of goodwill who sold the pass to Hitler and Mussolini.

Students and Revolution: A Discussion

EMANCIPATION OF A GENERATION

Marc Ferro

I AM PROMPTED BY Leopold Labedz's stimulating article to make a few supplementary remarks which do not necessarily follow the same direction as his analysis.

'A capitulation of the older generations possessing more historical experience.' This shows, it seems to me, precisely where the problem lies, without, however, providing a solution. I do not intend to enter into controversy by pointing out that Plekhanov and Condorcet had 'more historical experience' than Lenin and Robespierre, but I do not wish to evade the problem of historical experience and the generations.

The generation responsible for the 'revolution' of May, the generation which makes a stir in Berlin, Rome or New York, has grown up alongside the development of an 'audio-visual culture'. It derives its knowledge of the world not from Racine or Shakespeare but from Westerns, detective films and direct reporting. Its knowledge of the growth of passions comes not from reading *Madame Bovary* but from the 90-minute film of the book. It has integrated its rudimentary knowledge of psychology or history, its view of the world or of the morality of the world by means of a network of mental mechanisms which earlier generations did not make use of. But this knowledge has always been limited to what they wanted to know: if the programme was not interesting, the 1968 revolt turned off the television or put on a record.

First contact with the social world for these young people is in the *lycée* (and later, the university) classroom, with highly-specialized teachers whose mental world remains *unilinéaire* (literature, or history, or mathematics). The specialists in eighteenth-century history know nothing about the nineteenth, specialists in Russian history know nothing about America. If they are economists, moreover, the former are not interested in religion or art, and the latter know about Lenin but have nothing to say about Bely or Dostoevsky. In such conditions, it is not surprising that the young people are led to 'contest' the teaching of their masters, who know everything about a fraction but nothing

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

about the whole, and whose reaction to 'audio-visual culture' can be compared to the horrified and scornful reaction of fifteenth-century ecclesiastics to secular culture. They are at once contesting the nature of education, its sixteenth-century methods and the sacrosanct association of forced labour and knowledge. According to them, the members of the teaching body behave like veterans of the First World War, except that the latter glorify the trenches and the war, and the former glorify the exhausting and deadening work demanded by the examination system in France, or indeed in Germany.

The second contact with society occurs when, on reaching adulthood, the young people realize that 'the experience of the older generation' has led only to chaos. Neither socialists nor liberals have been able, in half a century, to regulate a balance between the university and society. The university has been democratized, but it was not foreseen that this would have repercussions on society as a whole, or that the problem of function would differ in any way from what it used to be. The roads have been widened, but they forgot to widen the exits. I will not dwell on the 'technical' modalities of the second contact with society, which Mr Labedz has analysed very well. I should like simply to make a few complementary remarks.

However paradoxical it may seem, the events in France, at least at the beginning, reminded me more of Algeria in 1954 than of Russia in 1917. Like the Arabs, the young people have been completely ignored, whether by the state, society or simply the family. Like the Arabs, they felt ignored, rejected and despised. In Algeria in 1950, not a single Frenchman read the French-language Arab literature or press; they were not even aware that there was such a thing as Islamic political thought. In the same way, in 1968, neither the university nor the political authorities were aware of the student press or the extent of its strength and determination. Two worlds, cohabiting, ignorant of each other; adults and young people, like the French and the Arabs. The young became 'proletarianized', even, indeed especially, if they were the sons of the bourgeoisie, through their economic and social dependence on their parents and guardians; similarly, the Arabs were dependent on the colonial power.

Ferhat Abbas used to say to me in 1950: 'What good is it to me if you instal running water in my house if the house does not belong to me?' In the same way, the young people today say to the adults: 'What good are your reforms if we are not able to decide them?'

There is the same incomprehension on the part of authority (ministers, teachers, law, parents) who fail to see that the protesters want to make the decisions themselves and, like the Arabs, seek first of all to humiliate the former oppressor. A difficult dialogue and a difficult reconversion.

Finally, a word on the revolutionary capacity of youth. It was clear that the students regarded solidarity between themselves and young workers as a *sine qua non* for the progress of the revolution. It is not only

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a revolt of youth, because the protest is grafted on to the international revolutionary tradition, which has already firmly taken root. It is a question of a return to the source; this is clear from the atavistic distrust of the dangers of bureaucracy, notably that associated with the 'offices' of parties, trade unions, etc. Beginning with the age-group born in 1944, this new revolutionary species has discovered, thanks to its own experience, a 'motor of history' which, in the twentieth century in the West, counts for as much as the class struggle: the problem of decision and of relations within the group.

By showing to the French people in May 1968 that they must take their destiny more firmly into their own hands, this generation has shown, like the socialists of yesterday, the problem of the alienation of labour, the alienation of knowledge, and the alienation of power within the framework of the group, the family and the state.

However, it has done more than 'those who were more experienced'; it has gone out into the streets.

For many, it has provided a purpose for their lives.

Students and Revolution: A Discussion

PATTERNS OF IRRATIONALITY

Lewis S. Feuer

WE ARE REDISCOVERING, as the essay of Leopold Labedz indicates, a truth which was well-known to ancient thinkers—the law of generational struggle. We think of Job, for instance, as in conflict with God, but we forget how he cried out: 'Upon my right hand rise the youth; they push away my feet, and they raise up against me the ways of their destruction' (Job, xxx, 12). Plato regarded generational struggle as the mainspring in the cycle of social systems, and Aristotle discussed it as a cause of social revolution. The modern era has been so preoccupied with class struggle that it has tended to overlook the more basic theme of generational struggle. Indeed, there has been a tendency to assign to the causal role of class conflict what often has been the outcome of generational conflict. What the advent of economically prosperous societies has done is to bring into relief the universality of the law of generational struggle. Student movements were familiar enough in so-called economically underdeveloped countries, but when they acted in Japan in 1960 at a time of unprecedented prosperity, in the United States in 1964, and in Gaullist France, one could see that economic causation could be secondary to the sheer psychological power arising from the generational unconscious. Here is something which is

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

truly a sociological law. For many years social scientists have been emphasizing the diversity of social systems and tending to adhere to what Karl Korsch, following Marx, called the 'principle of historical specification', that there were no trans-systematic universal sociological laws but that rather every sociological law was bounded by the domain of some given social system. An old insight may now re-emerge, that no sociological law has found its valid form until what it says is invariant for all social systems. Let us call this the principle of sociological invariance; I do not think we shall understand the phenomenon of student movements until we recognize the principle as exemplified, for instance, in the law of generational struggle.

Student movements arise in the environment of colleges and universities. These institutions may not in legal terms be *in loco parentis*; in psychological terms, however, they are the available substitutes for the students' fathers, and the revolt against the fathers seeks out by indirection the university system, the administration, the faculty. Whether the universities be large and impersonal as in Berkeley, Tokyo, or Paris, or whether they be small as were the German universities of 1817 or even Columbia College in 1968, whether they be in metropolitan centres or as the German universities or Cornell in the United States in small villages, student movements can make themselves felt as strong political-emotional forces. Student movements, we must further note, arise from a duality of emotion; not only are they founded on generational struggle but they also express the altruistic, love-yearning of youth; they fuse Eros and aggression in the most personal form. The culture of the universities, moreover, transmitted by professors, is one which has always been 'alienated' from society; every university partakes of the oasis, ivory tower, or monastery. Whether in ancient Athens at the Platonic Academy, or in medieval Paris with Abelard, or at Columbia reading Marx and Mao with a young professor of political science, the student imbibes a standpoint of men who have chosen the academy because they have in large part rejected their times, whether Periclean Athens, or feudal France, or affluent America. The 'university culture' (as we might call it) contains a further ingredient: it cherishes and nurtures the belief that the intellectual *élite* should be the ruling one. Plato's *Republic* spoke for the alienated intellectuals of all times when it affirmed the claim of philosopher-kings to rule; every intellectual regards himself as a philosopher-king whose place has been usurped by Philistine businessmen, workingmen, or some other uncultured group.

OUT OF THIS COMPLEX psychological background issue student movements; they express the form which generational struggle takes in the university setting. It differs from its counterpart among young workingmen, for instance, who will look for new jobs, migrate, or found more militant unions for better working conditions. The energies of workers' generational struggle tend to be absorbed into the struggle for existence and the advancement of their material welfare. There is little sense of

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

guilt or self-reproach among them; they do not feel guilty for leaving their fathers' world because the fathers often gave them little besides poverty. Theirs and their fathers' material and spiritual universes were the same. The workingman's generational revolt is direct and personal, with a minimum of cultural trauma or crisis of value-transitions. Among students, however, generational revolt involves an intense heightening of emotions of guilt, self-aggression as well as aggression towards the elders. Usually children of the middle class, they have the guilt of living on their fathers' earnings or on those of ordinary working people around them, while they lead what, especially in the humanistic and social science fields, most of them inwardly feel is a vacation-like existence, reading books, having long discussions, arranging one's schedule of hours to one's wishes, choosing courses and professors to suit the way they would like to spend their time. Yet the university culture too reinforces and provides an ideology for the rejection of their fathers. With a large reservoir of aggressive energy made available by the lack of concrete material challenges in his environment, the student is ready and available to leave his studies for the avocation of a fractional, half-time or so, activist. Each demonstration he engages in is something of a puberty rite, or *rite de passage*; some find it therapeutic, and quickly 'get it out of their systems'; others become fixated in this situation, and then seek to become full-time 'non-students' or 'professional revolutionists' so that they can re-enact the drama of generational struggle with an allied quest for a culminating political hegemony. Added to all this is the fact that the university setting is the last community of comradeship which most students will know in their lives, the last preserve of pure friendship before one is enveloped by the competitive, unfeeling adult world. If only all society could be remade in the image of the university; every student movement is a last desperate protest on behalf of the children's world. The great teachers from Plato to Dewey who have looked to liberation from student movements have had precisely this dream of the Children's Renaissance. No wonder that John Dewey, living through the student revolt in China on 4 May 1919, felt himself alive for the first time in many years, and after two years in China remained reluctant to return to the United States where generational revolt was not taking a political form.

GIVEN THEIR PSYCHOLOGICAL origins, one can understand why a self-destructive fate hovers over the evolution of student movements. The historical evidence indicates that they have probably been the most irrational force in modern history. We can show this briefly by referring to the three most consequential student movements in European history. The German student movement of 1815–1819 was largely responsible for the defeat of German liberalism for the next generation. The Russian student movement of the 1870s and 1880s was largely responsible for the destruction of the fragile beginnings of a Russian constitutionalism. The Bosnian student movement of 1914 did more

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than any other group of individuals to bring about the First World War. These facts may come as intruders on our own emotions. Many of us have taken part in student movements; they are tied up with the most cherished emotions of our youth. It is therefore difficult to judge them in a scientific way, to ask with complete candour and objectivity whether these movements made a contribution or detribution (if I may invent a needed word) to the advancement of humanity. Let us at least mention some of the salient facts in the three cases I have mentioned.

Karl Follen, the first student leader of modern times, taught his entranced followers in the *Burschenschaft* that all means were justified to achieve the sacred end of the 'Christian German Republic'. One disciple of his, Karl Sand, decided to put the master's words into practice; therefore on 23 March 1819 he stabbed to death a reactionary dramatist, Kotzebue, trying unsuccessfully then to kill himself. Prior to the murder, the student Sand sketched a portrait of himself kneeling on the church steps, and stabbing himself. All Germany was shaken by his deed. The student activists hailed it, and flocked to Sand's execution; indeed, they purchased as sacred relics the boards on which Sand's blood was splattered, and for years thereafter, in a rite of a death wish, would gather with the executioner in a cottage built of the scaffold's timbers. But when the Prussian Chancellor, the liberal reformer Hardenberg, heard the news he said: 'Now a constitution is impossible!' Kotzebue's murder provoked the enactment of the Carlsbad Resolutions and the dominance of Metternich; liberties of the press and the universities were abrogated. As Walter Simon writes in his book *The Failure of the Prussian Reform Movement*, the assassination of Kotzebue was the most significant setback to reform because it gave credence to the view that a widespread conspiracy for violence existed, and that the time was not ripe for representative government.

The Russian student movement was the most heroic and masochistic there ever was. Dmitri Karakozov, Andrei Zhelyabov, Sophia Perovskaya, Alexander Ulyanov, S. V. Balmashev, Ivan Kaliaev, P. Karpovich, Yegor Sazonov, inscribed their self-sacrificial names beside such assassinated as Alexander II, Minister of Interior Sipiagin, the Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich, Minister of Public Instruction Bogolepov, Minister of Interior von Plehve. What did they contribute to the rational evolution of Russian society? A man who admired them, Piotr Kropotkin, himself the most distinguished of the Russian anarchists, probably gave the answer when he wrote that 'the promulgation of a constitution was extremely near at hand during the last few months of the life of Alexander II'. He felt that the assassins' intervention was a historical accident which defeated Russia's hopes. Bernard Pares, who witnessed at first hand the activities of the Russian student movement, also wrote that 'the bomb that killed Alexander II put an end to the faint beginnings of Russian constitutionalism'. The propensity of the student movement for Czar-killing, bureaucrat-killing, and self-killing imparted

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to Russian political life all the psychological consequences of sons destroying the fathers; the emotional inventory of *Totem and Taboo* was projected on a national scale. The Social-Revolutionary Party, supported by the peasantry, felt impelled to endorse student terrorism. Thereby in the long run it contributed to the weakening of liberal values and modes of political thinking and action.

No social scientist would suggest that Gavrilo Princip's murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 was *the* cause of the First World War. The rivalries and hatreds of European nations have been an oft-told story. Yet for two generations a tradition of peace had been taking root in Europe. Peaceful social democratic movements were gaining in influence; men of great stature, men of peace, such as Jean Jaurès, were growing in their influence on the European mind. It was likely indeed that Russia, if it were spared the stress of war, would evolve rapidly in a liberal capitalist direction. There was a hope in Europe that a rational society would emerge whose prophets were Wells, Shaw, Anatole France, Norman Angell. The equilibrium of Europe was unstable but the roots of a growing stability were there too. In Russia finally the students were putting aside the politics of generational revolt. Yet its echo in the Balkans was strong enough to upset the European balance of power and mind, and to set moving a self-destructive chain of events. Gavrilo Princip, student, less than 20 years old, dreaming every night that he was murdering gendarmes, enacted his heroic-masochistic politics of generational struggle, and imposed its pattern of self-destruction on almost all Europe and most of the world.

Gavrilo's act was not an isolated occurrence; it sprang from the whole culture of the Bosnian student movement, whose members made a cult of Zherajic who in 1910 had tried to murder the Governor, and then killed himself. Zherajic said: 'We are a new generation, we are new men in every way.' The student movement took this to heart in its attempts on and assassinations of the old men. Almost all such acts against Austrian officials from 1910 to 1914 were done by student activists. A pamphlet, *The Death of a Hero*, by an advocate of terrorism, Vladimir Gacinovic, was holy writ among them. 'Young Bosnia had no fixed programme or stable organization', wrote a later participant; it had instead its ethic of terrorism and suicide. The series of killings and attempts culminated in the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Gavrilo Princip, working as a member of a team of three student activists. Gavrilo too tried to commit suicide with potassium cyanide but failed. Later, in several months of psychiatric interviews, he gave abundant evidence of the strains of generational revolt which had obsessed him. But he could not comprehend the consequences of his deed, and reiterated the purity of his motive.

WHY HAVE STUDENT movements had this irrational influence on history? The answer is not far to seek. A duality of motive inspires student

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

activists. On the one hand, in an altruistic spirit, they attach themselves to labour movements, peasants', nationalistic, racial and colonial movements. At the same time, however, the student activists are trying to achieve the programme of their generational unconscious—somehow to destroy, undermine, subjugate, or humiliate the older generation. In their choice of tactics, therefore, student activists will be trying to achieve two goals, one allied to the aims of an underlying mass carrier movement, the other consisting of their objectives of generational struggle. Given any choice among means for achieving a given political end, from national liberation to civil rights, the student movements will always look for those means which involve in addition the prospect of inflicting defeat on the elders. Thus, a 'projective politics' arises in which apart from the avowed conscious aim there is also the projecting on the decisions of political action of one's unconscious, of one's revolt against the father. A self-destructive mode of political behaviour, accompanied by the traits which Mr Labedz describes as a generational 'hypocrisy', develops. The superposition of a student movement on the processes of social change thus tends to deflect them from a rational evolution. Emotions issuing from the generational unconscious, deriving from the impulses to generational revolt, attach themselves to a more widespread mass political movement, and channel it into irrational directions.

We can thus understand why every student movement has tended to develop into an amoral force, advocating and defending all varieties of dishonesty. The idealistic component is very quickly subordinated to the turbulent feelings for destroying the elders; generational struggle involves feelings of guilt which are relatively absent in class struggle; they therefore take on a savagery of expression and personal hatred; by contrast, class struggles, fought over definable economic goals, are rational. All student leaders in modern history have been exponents of amorality—from Karl Follen and Nechaev to Mario Savio and Mark Rudd. At Columbia University last May, the patterns made familiar by the Berkeley student movement repeated themselves. The personal files of the President of Columbia University were stolen and photostated. Freedom of thought and speech was stamped out among the student activists. As one participant in the occupation of the Columbia buildings wrote, 'self-appointed censors' insisted on grabbing everything:

> Later, when the intimidation went beyond verbal admonishments, I saw them as part of a kind of Stalinist approach to the truth that many of the radicals observed. Nothing was to be written that did not conform with the immediate demands of the 'revolution'. Every word had to follow the SDS [Students for a Democratic Society] line. . . . I was told by members of the Steering Committee that I had to clear anything written about the commune with them.

The longing for violence obsessed the chief student leaders: 'But after

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the protests began and the days wore on and the violent intentions of some of the leadership became evident, more moderate students in the liberated buildings began voting instructions to the Central Committee to moderate both their demands and their tactics.' The moderates were told: 'You —— liberals don't understand what the scene's about. It's about power and disruption. The more blood the better.' Above all, there was the generational hypocrisy, the corruption of student idealism by generational revolt; the crypto-issues were the real ones: 'But the three issues [the gymnasium, amnesty, and the University's affiliation with the Institute for Defence Analysis] were pretexts. The point of the game was power. . . . It was revolution. . . . Everywhere the purpose was to destroy institutions of the American Establishment. . . .'[1] 'Participatory democracy' in practice was a transparent device whereby a 'highly organized minority' dominated an unorganized majority through a variety of pressures latent with violence, and compelled it to act against its better judgment.

A LAST WORD ABOUT THE middle-aged men who attach themselves to student movements in which they seek disciples. They would require a chapter in the psychology of politics. Bakunin, author of a catechism on the principles of destruction, seeking power through students, was sexually impotent, and became 'infatuated' with the student leader and murderer, Nechaev. John Ruskin, leading young Oxonians to repair a road, and sketching an authoritarian society, the Companions of Saint George, was similarly affected. Paul Goodman has written at length of how he has searched the streets and campuses to assuage his homosexuality; the 'Organized System' which he hates, and the hierarchy he defines, are a projective image of society as perceived with a homosexual's resentments. These 'youth-masters' (as we might call them) are for various reasons driven by a 'psychological imperialism' to seek out the student activists. Usually, however, they become alarmed when their student disciples draw the consequences in action of what they have taught. Paul Goodman preached violence, but when the Columbia students practised it, he decided he did not really mean it. He even decided after all his assaults on the Protestant ethic that 'maybe I am old-fashioned, Calvinistic'.[2] The latest youth-master, Herbert Marcuse, dismayed his disciples when they discovered that he enjoyed lecturing about revolution more than he did their practising it at Columbia. The disciples became disenchanted with their master at a public confrontation near Greenwich Village in May 1968. Their organ reported the scene:

Marcuse as the home favourite, is stripped down to white shirt

[1] Dotson Rader and Craig Anderson, 'Rebellion at Columbia', *The New Republic*, 11 May 1968, p. 10. Dotson Rader, 'More about Columbia', *The New Republic*, 8 June 1968, pp. 23–24.

[2] Paul Goodman, 'The Black Flag of Anarchism', *New York Times Magazine*, 14 July 1968, p. 22.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> sleeves, . . . ready to take on every last man who disputes his reign as philosopher-king of the New Left Republic. . . . Even Marcuse is an uptight philosopher-king as his noisy Republic seeks to hail him caesar. He tries to quiet things by noting that 'I have never advocated destroying college buildings for new institutions. . . . I advocate reformation within existing universities.' . . . But the mob seethes and someone yells that Marcuse is 'senile and infantile', only to be answered, 'you should be that senile', etc. . . . Marcuse looks a bit grim, for he knows full well that comes the revolution of his *élite*, the first Robespierre down the pike will save the Republic's weal by presenting Marcuse's head in a basket to the angry mob.[3]

The succession of aged and middle-aged youth-masters is a pathetic incident in the history of student movements. Their vogue is an indication of the weakness in the intellect and emotion of student movements and student leaders. No student leader, indeed no student activist, has ever written an essay or a book which has been an enduring contribution in presenting its own standpoint, its own analysis of society There have been Einsteins and Humes who have conceived their ideas and written their works in their twenties, and there have been great mathematicians like Galois in their teens. But not a single outstanding work of political thought has ever emerged from the student movement. The student activists are too confused in their emotions, and cannot be honest with themselves, because their programme so often reduces itself to denying whatever happens to be their fathers' world. When the student activists revolt against their fathers, they promptly therefore set about trying to find a new one among the would-be youth-masters of the elder generation. The youth-masters provide the students with oracular rewritings of nineteenth-century authors, but then the doctrine is of small importance; what counts is the instatement of a surrogate figure of the elder generation to approve of one's revolt.

Do the student movements of today represent a fascism of the left? Fascism classically has been linked with an apotheosis of the organic *Volk*, or the People; it has generally made a cult of youth, extolled violence, appealed to élitism, and ridiculed liberal democracy. The student movements repeat these themes, except that for the *Volk* they tend to substitute the Community. Also, whereas previous student movements tried to identify themselves with the peasantry or proletariat, the present movement looks for redemption either to the *lumpenproletariat* (as among the hippie section) or to the Negro race (as among its white Black Power auxiliaries) or the guerrilla fighters of Latin America, Asia, and Africa (as among the Maoist-Castroite contingent). All sections of the student movement are distributed in a sado-masochist continuum. The Stalinist theory of fascism held it was the rule of monopoly capital buttressed by a confused, vacillating middle class.

[3] Michael C. D. Macdonald, 'The Freaking out of Arthur Schlesinger', *The Village Voice*, 9 May 1968, pp. 3 and 50.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In this sense, the student movements would not be regarded as fascist. But in its underlying emotional co-ordinates, which after all are the central ones, the fascist spirit is a primitivist one; it is the resurgence of primitivism under the conditions of modern social existence. The neo-primitivist wants to reinstate violence, destruction, and sadistic sexuality; it demands that where there was ego and super-ego, let there be id. It hates rationality and representative democracy; although advocating an élitism of the alienated intellectuals, the latter's alienation leads them to a philosophical anti-intellectualism. As neo-primitivists, they detest civilization, and feel that civilization must be abrogated in so far as it requires any renunciation; therefore, they dislike the organized working class and look to those groups which are in their estimation closest to the primitive. As neo-primitivist, the student movements partake of a fascism of the left.

The Berkeley student movement which was so outraged when I said these things in 1964 at that time was singing songs of non-violence, and occupying buildings to the accompaniment of Joan Baez and her guitar, a primitivist Pied Piper singing of the new love. Today in Berkeley the non-violence is a forgotten stage prop; the student movement boasts of its bombings. Marvin Garson, the chief pamphleteer of the now antique 'Free Speech' Movement, and the vigorous promoter of *MacBird*, writes about:

> the series of successful and highly popular bombings which have occurred here recently: the steady bombing of the electric power system from mid-March when the lines leading to the Lawrence Radiation Lab were knocked down, to 4 June, when on the morning of the California primary 300,000 homes in Oakland were cut off; the dynamiting of a bulldozer engaged in urban renewal destruction of Berkeley's funkiest block; three separate bombings of the Berkeley draft board; and finally, last Tuesday night, the dynamiting of the checkpoint kiosk at the western entrance to the University campus, a symbol of the Board of Regents' property rights in the community of scholars.[4]

If the United States were to fail to meet its problems of racial relations in a liberal, rational spirit, that failure would be largely the outcome of the actions of its student movement. If the United States were to fail as the world's centre of liberal democracy, and thereby make possible a resurgence of neo-Stalinism among both the European communist and democratic countries, and among the Asian nations as well, then the responsibility for that failure would lie in much part with the tactics of the student movement. The essence of wisdom and science is that it is not only cross-cultural and cross-class but above all, cross-generational. Such wisdom and science are now needed for the study of student movements rather than the popular, facile flight to the cult of youth.

[4] Marvin Garson, 'Berkeley Curfew: "Don't Box Us In"', *The Village Voice*, 11 July 1968, p. 10.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Students and Revolution: A Discussion

AN INDISPENSABLE ACTIVITY

John Mander

IS THE MATCH PLAYED out; or is it only half-time? With the promise of new troubles in store for the 1968–69 academic season, it is obviously too early to say. The vacations are over; the walls of the Sorbonne—as of Hornsey's College of Art and Berlin's *Germanistisches Seminar*—have received a fresh coat of paint. The 'long hot summer' has been, in fact, counter-insurrectionary. The *Club Mediterranée* has taken over where the *Mouvement du 22 Mars* left off. The swing back to the 'Establishment'—whether in France, Czechoslovakia, or the United States—has had a depressive effect. True, plans are being laid for new provocations, new alignments on the far left. But this time it will be different. The shock-effect, which caught the authorities off balance in 1967–68, has worn off. The Special Branch has its eye on the young apostles of Sorel and Bakunin. In France, the regime will not show itself 'repressively tolerant': repression will be swift and firm, and will have the backing of the mass of the public. In Germany, one hears, the mood on the far left is despairing: no McCarthy, no Dubcek in sight—not even a *chien lit* as in Paris! Activism, as a policy, has led nowhere: or, rather, it has led to despondency. Is it the end of the affair?

The answer, naturally, will turn on one's view of this spring's *évènements*. Mr Labedz points out that in coming to grips with these events there lurks a twofold danger: the danger of over- and of under-estimating the importance of the 'student revolt'. He is surely right. There has been a tendency to speak, at one moment, as if the very foundations of society had been shaken—and the next, as if the whole thing were a schoolboy jape, a crass, adolescent parody of 1789 and 1917. About this, two points can be made. First, that this near-hysterical reaction—especially in France and Germany—tells us a great deal about the social and institutional health of the societies concerned. There is a feed-back, here, to the 'student revolt' itself. For if the '*structures*' of the 'Establishment' (the Revolution is polyglot) are indeed so feeble that they yield to the slightest pressure, the youngest generation would seem to be justified in its suspicion that parents and professors are paper-tigers—that their authority is ill-grounded, both subjectively and objectively. The implications of this are complex and, undeniably, deeply disturbing for Western society. Especially so since it is the most 'stable' countries, France and Germany, apparently free of the problems that have affected the Anglo-Saxons in the mid-sixties, that have reacted most hysterically. If the 'student revolt' has done nothing else, it has certainly rebuked our complacency.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The second point to be made—and here I take issue with Mr Labedz—is whether the successive over- and under-estimation of the revolt does not have its roots in a semantic difficulty. At the beginning of his article, Mr Labedz points to 'the contradictory character' of the student revolt and of the explanations of it that have been offered. Is the university too strict, or too permissive? Is there too much guidance ('manipulation'), or too little ('anonymous multiversities')? Certainly, no single hypothesis can encompass such a multiplicity of phenomena. And yet, somehow, we wish to speak of this strange new thing—to give it a name, to find a language for it. How do we set about it? The obvious starting-point—and possibly, too, the obvious pitfall—is to take the language the students themselves use. They speak of 'Revolution'; they quote Marx, Mao and Marcuse; and it is not difficult to detect traces of the thought of such various—and, of course, contradictory—*gurus* as Proudhon, Luxemburg, Artaud, Bloch, Reich, Godard, Ginsburg, Fanon and Stokely Carmichael. 'It has all happened before' say their opponents: or, alternatively, 'it is all happening again'. Nothing, naturally, is more calculated to enrage the new radicals. And, in a way, they are right. For the feeling they have is that they are 'making it new': and this is deep and inalienable. If Raymond Aron is right, it is a feeling that is likely to be around for a long time: it is a mark set on this generation. To ridicule it is easy. But it is easy, too, to ridicule a young man in love for the first time for supposing his feelings to be original: they are.

We should look askance, then, at any account of the revolt that fails to respect the authenticity of the *feelings* that underlie it. But that will not solve the semantic problem. The students, of course, use the language available to them: the French draw on their rich anti-bourgeois and revolutionary traditions; the Germans turn to Marx and Luxemburg and the Frankfurt School. The result is predictable: Dutschke, Habermas and Lefevre write a turgid, ideology-ridden prose; the French produce brilliant posters and witty graffiti. Both, it is clear, are working within a highly-defined national tradition. Yet there is a difference of quality in the product that points to something deeper. 'Existential' has become—perhaps a little late in the day—one of the fashionable adjectives of the revolt. Any action, apparently, can be held to be good if it is 'existential'—even violence, and especially the violence of black men against white. Which strikes the observer, then, as the more existential—the sub-Marxist *spinnereien* of Dutschke and the SDS, or the Gallic spirit of the *Beaux Arts* posters and the graffiti ('*le Masochisme aujourd'hui prend la forme du reformisme*'; '*Soyez réalistes, demandez l'impossible*!')? It seems that where the young rebels have a medium at hand—like the wall-poster or the wall-aphorism—which allows of an immediate, spontaneous release of feeling, the product has the ring of authenticity (Hornsey, in this country, has shown much the same). Equally, that where similar sentiments have to be expressed in a derivative of the language of Hegel or Marx, they tend

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to ring false. No wonder that so many rebels have turned to violence, the most immediate channel for affective release.

And this, of course, is what common sense would suggest. How often is the 'ideology' of a 20-year-old, or even a 27-year-old (many of the SDS leaders are true *ewige Studenten*), either interesting or original? Few of the admired *gurus* of 1968's revolt, after all, reached intellectual maturity until considerably older than their present adepts. 'Don't trust anyone over the age of 30' is a fine slogan; but it is not altogether flattering to Chairman Mao. And it is the same, surely, in the arts: Revolutions produce great journalism, not great literature. Poetry may be an exception: but for every work of genius—Blok's *The Twelve* say, or Auden's *Spain*—there is a mass of unreadable verbiage. Again, we forget that the greatest novel ever written about Revolution—Flaubert's *Education Sentimentale*—was first published some two decades after the events it describes, when its author was 46. We shall have to wait as long, no doubt, for the work that puts the events of spring 1968 in perspective.

DOES THIS MEAN THAT nothing worthwhile can be said in the short run? Clearly not. But it does mean, I think, that we should be wary of taking either what the revolutionaries or their opponents say at face value. Only time will tell whether May 1968 was the final splutter of Europe's revolutionary tradition—farce to 1917's tragedy, as it were—or whether it is the dress-rehearsal for still more spectacular convulsions: 1848 for 1871, 1905 for 1917. What attitude should we take in the meanwhile? Perhaps, reversing Mao's dictum, we ought to respect the revolt strategically, while despising it tactically. Take, for example, the key term 'Revolution'. Is it of significance that the rebels, in every country, should speak of Revolution, despising 'the contemporary form of masochism'—Reformism? Obviously, it is arguable that this is mere rhetoric, mere adolescent froth-blowing—quite apart from the fact that this word is being used in several contradictory senses. And this is the view taken, of course, by the orthodox Marxists themselves—like Professor Jürgen Habermas in Germany, or the CP leadership in France—who deny that a 'revolutionary situation' exists at all.

But it is possible to see a different, and deeper, significance in the students' insistence—even at Hornsey—on the term 'Revolution'. The essence of this revolt consists precisely in a total *contestation* of the various structures dominating the societies in which young people find themselves. It is quite true, as Mr Labedz and others point out, that 'direct democracy' can lead to instant tyranny, and rejection of 'repressive tolerance' to active intolerance. All this needs to be pointed out: two, after all, can play at *contestation*. But the essence of the revolt seems to me unquestionably anti-authoritarian: and recent events suggest that communist hierarchies are as little able to cope with the new challenge as any Western *Obrigkeit*. Indeed, one can go further, and argue that the revolt is essentially humanist. In the *contestation*

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the latest generation proposes, man is to be once again the measure of all things. Does the teaching of art history inhibit that spirit of free creativity it should be the purpose of an art college to foster? According to the Hornsey rebels, it does. Of course, this proposition can be contested—and should be. But then the argument for compulsory art history will have to be based, not on the principle that it makes the art colleges 'academically respectable', but on the sound humanistic proposition that it liberates and fertilizes the mind to be confronted with the artifacts of other cultures and civilizations. By the standards of Prague and Paris, Hornsey's is no doubt a mini-revolution. But the central argument is not so different; and it may serve as a model of what a fruitful *contestation* could be like. Hegel, one feels, would have approved: this is how the Spirit moves in history—and especially in the history of the Christian West. Despite the confusions, despite the contradictions, it would be far more alarming if the revolt had not taken place. In this sense, '*faire la Revolution*' can be grasped as a wholly traditional, indeed an indispensable, activity.

Students and Revolution: A Discussion

THE CHILIASTIC URGE

Colin Crouch

THE STUDENT REVOLT is worthy of some attention for three main reasons. First, the fact that it has encouraged a questioning and self-examination within the universities may provide an opportunity for those of more moderate temper than the revolutionaries themselves to achieve reforms that would otherwise be ignored. Second, and in contrast, if it continues to cause disruption, it could lead to the universities resorting to more authoritarian discipline in order to keep going, while at the same time providing a chance for those of the political right who would welcome an excuse to strike at university autonomy generally, with the net result of destroying what are in reality among the more liberal institutions in our society. Third, and on a wider scale, the issues raised by the more serious among the student ideologues and other philosophers of the New Left do touch on the crucial questions of human society and organization that should be demanding our attention.

It is for his emphasis on these wider philosophical concerns that Leopold Labedz's article is so valuable. He sums up the position very well when he says of the New Left: 'They express the present-day crisis of rationality, and represent the return to the Messianic hopes of earlier ages.' The religious note here is particularly important, as we shall see later. In thanking the left for turning our attention to these fundamental questions of social order, and possibly away from more

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

detailed and smaller questions that otherwise occupy the attention of social scientists, it is as well to remember that it is by no means profitable to become obsessed with these great issues. To believe that all is potentially challengeable is a vital and valuable element of the scientific approach; but to believe that all should be perennially challenged is little more than a recipe for chaos and neurosis. It is perhaps on this point that the far left have made impossible any reconciliation, almost any dialogue, between themselves and the rest of academic and political society. Total questioning and permanent revolution are just not possible positions for anyone who believes it is necessary that the world carry out its day-to-day activities. The only possible points of existence for the total radical are in the ivory tower of the university and in the chaos and crisis of revolutionary activity itself. It is because of his dread of isolation in the former that he must desperately, phrenetically, seek to create the latter. Opportunities for serious revolutionary activity being somewhat limited in Britain, this often involves resorting to the *ersatz* revolution of the protest march and violent demonstration.

But the fundamental questions are there nevertheless. To distinguish just a few of them which should and do occupy our attention: first, how can the Hobbesian problem of order be resolved while at the same time one assigns as strong an imperative to the demands of democracy as to those of order? Second, is it possible to maintain the individual liberty and potentiality for materialist advance that modern industrial society (as a *Gesellschaft*) has provided us, while at the same time keeping something of the warmth and feeling of 'belonging' that we assume characterizes the 'true' community or *Gemeinschaft*? Third, how does the individual reconcile the instinctive moral urge to act when he perceives evil with the incredible complexities of so many modern problems and the extremely limited prospect of any one individual being able to make more than a slight dent or superficial scratch in their surface? Finally, how applicable is the ideal of rationalism in the resolution of social problems when the possibility of objectivity has been severely questioned by the findings of the sociology and psychology of knowledge?

Of course, to identify these key problem areas in such a way is not to imply that they are necessarily capable of resolution, nor even that the reconciliation of the contradictions they pose is either urgent or necessary. It is entirely possible to live a full, intelligent and constructive life without ever even thinking of these questions. One of the great mercies of the complexity, scale and impersonality of modern society which so grieves and enrages the New Left is that massive contradictory elements can coexist quite happily for most of the time without any fearful consequences for the equilibrium of everyday life. It is a fallacy resulting from the mechanistic analogy which sees contradictions within societies as being the seeds of their destruction.

Furthermore, to suggest that the New Left, including the student left, is making an interesting commentary on fundamental questions is not

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to suggest that every young hooligan who goes berserk in Grosvenor Square is doing so because of a deep philosophical concern. Nevertheless, there is a philosophical concern at the root of the new left, and it is undeniably one of the most lively and vital schools of political thought, at least among the young, of the present time. It is rare to find a politically sensitive young person at our universities who has not been in some way affected by it, and there are a good many who have come to share many of its assumptions about our society

AS LABEDZ SHOWS IN THE early part of his article, it is somewhat difficult to speak of the left's assumptions as a collective whole, because the movement is fundamentally divided on many crucial issues. One can see a divide between the followers of Marcuse's élitism and those who continue to place all their hopes in the traditional proletariat. There are those who will say of the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, 'at least they have abolished private ownership', while others regard the societies of the communist world as even more intolerable than those of 'neo-capitalism'. There is fierce debate over whether Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 have seen movements of a revanchist bourgeoisie or of a progressive force of liberation. There are those who find their Mecca in Peking or Havana, and those who suspect all leaders, whether revolutionary, reformist or reactionary, of corruption and megalomania. There are the apostles of violence, whether of the black, student or working-class varieties, and there are those who continue to believe in the possibility of a solution to all our ills by an infinite extension of tolerance and abandonment of human striving and ambition, possibly aided by the relaxing and enervating properties of marijuana and LSD.

But behind all this understandable confusion of analysis and prescription it is possible to identify common themes that make it possible to talk of the New Left as a whole. Viewing it for present purposes in terms of the fundamental issues of human organization and activity mentioned above, there is a common assumption, which flirts dangerously with anarchism, that the problems of order and democracy can be resolved by the overthrow of those tendencies in society which make for material and political inequality, and by the achievement of the society of true consent through the removal of the forces and ideologies of conflict and competition, which are seen as holding in check the forces of an essentially pure human nature. Similarly, the resolution of the demand for individuality with that for community is seen through the creation of a participative society; community is assured through the possibility of direct and immediate participation, through simple and democratic organizational forms, in all decisions which will affect one's life, while individuality is assured through the equality of the participation and the ending of a society which demands conflict between men. The problem of action in a complex world is resolved through the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

philosophy of revolution, demanding total change and raising the prospect of a massive and powerful movement with which the individual can identify and in whose all-embracing whole he can sink his personal efforts.

The problem of rationality is seen with an acute awareness of the socially based nature of knowledge, linked with a view of that social background as being the victim of a huge class conspiracy. Thus rational action and debate in the existing world is meaningless. Only when the conspiracy has been overthrown can rational discussion acquire value again. As pointed out by Labedz, several people, including myself, have accused the left of a determined anti-rationalism. This charge is justified, but it should be remembered that their view often results from an initial *over*-dependence on and awareness of rationality. It is often the horror felt by the young mind at the extent of irrational inequality, arbitrary use of power, and socially sanctioned injustice that can be seen in so many areas of life, which leads to the conclusion that to attempt to follow a rationalist credo will simply result in being duped and misled. It is interesting to compare them with an earlier devotee of complete rationalism, Vilfredo Pareto, who was led by his observation of the absence of such criteria in human affairs to a position of almost total cynicism, the political implications of which proved the very opposite of those of the New Left.

Thus the philosophy of the left comprises themes which can seem very attractive to the sensitive young person, aware of social evils, distressed by the apparent failure of social democracy and reformist methods (through the Labour Party) to achieve rapid change, and sharing the increasingly widespread perplexity at what is felt to be an inability to become involved, to participate, in the serious business of life.

The left is able, through its philosophy of the participative revolution aiming to create the participative society, to provide a resolution to these problems that few other groups can offer. Disillusioned equally by Soviet communism and social democracy, many young people of the left are finding these new theories, or rather these new approaches to old theories, extremely attractive.

MAY I BE ALLOWED TO comment on this issue from personal experience? At the start of the eventful 1966–67 session at the London School of Economics I shared a good deal of the perspectives of the left, although never quite feeling able to accept their negativism and holism. As the disciplinary procedures of the Lent term progressed, I had considerable sympathy with those who were saying that the college's authorities were acting unjustly, and that it was only by a confrontation of our power to match their authority that we should be able to achieve justice. I still consider we were right in this, although the precise issues are not relevant to the present discussion. I thus gave my support to the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

idea of a 'sit-in' and took part in some of the discussions that tried to work out what we might do.

My approach to the issue, and that of many of my friends, was very much couched in orthodox political, particularly trade union, terms: we had been the victims of arbitrary authority, it was therefore necessary, in order to enforce on the authorities a new commitment to reasonable procedures, to assert some power of our own; or else, perhaps, by embarrassing the authorities publicly, to force them to back down. Thus the prospect of a 'sit-in' was viewed purely as a means to an end. In many ways it was a very unpleasant and disagreeable means. It meant disrupting one's normal pattern of life, considerable tension and several sleepless nights, not to mention causing chaos in an institution for which one had acquired considerable affection.

But as the 'sit-in' progressed, I found that this view was by no means universal. It was certainly not shared by the 'emergent leaders' who asserted themselves during the week, rendering the usual student union activists inarticulate and irrelevant. The 'sit-in' became an end in itself. As a form of participative activity which broke down 'structures' and created its own forms of experience, occupying the 'whole man', it was not so much part of the sojourn in the wilderness as a trailer for the promised land itself. Admittedly, a good deal of the emotional edge to that week resulted from the tiredness, the tension, the sudden exposure to the glare of national publicity of a group of young people not at all accustomed to such experience. But the emotionality was deliberately elevated to a virtue, an article of faith. People spoke of the 'community' that had been created during the 'sit-in'; they valued the 'concrete' nature of the immediacy of experience. They placed tremendous stress on 'spontaneity' and on the positive value of mass participative action. It was wrong to talk about tactics, to try to plan what our next moves should be, for that imposed a blueprint, lacked spontaneity, and smacked of the calculating world outside. It also meant allowing exogenous factors to impinge on our total autonomy, our total ability to control our own lives. It was more than wrong to do such things; it was treacherous. One was either committed or one had sold out. Once a course had been set by the mass, one had to abide by it. How else can matters be settled in a mass situation that has rejected calculation? We were to live in a world of the eternal present, the heritage of the immediate past being destroyed and the future being left to develop according to the dictates of constant spontaneity. All the elements of the new student left that have been revealed in Britain, France and elsewhere over the past year were in the atmosphere of the LSE during March 1967.

I do not mean to suggest that the leaders of the left lost sight of the immediate objectives of the 'sit-in'. Of these they were ever conscious. But the actual *process* of protest was raised to a position of value in its own right alongside these objectives, and became a related but independent issue of its own.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Some people who experienced that week still speak of it as though it was the most 'real' experience of their lives, as though the kind of experience and forms of organization developed there could stand as prototypes of what the good community would be like. I found myself in considerable lack of sympathy with this. As far as I was concerned, the experience of a group of students sitting in their college for a week as a protest could serve as a prototype for nothing more than another group of students sitting in their college for a week as part of a protest. Further, I found the emotional intensity, the self-consciousness, and the (essentially transatlantic) constant self-examination, self-analysis, and proclamation of ideals profoundly unsatisfying and, ultimately, repulsive. Whatever I had thought in the past, I did not belong to the New Left.

THE YEARNING FOR INVOLVEMENT, for community, for immediacy and concreteness is not confined to the New Left, although they are the most extreme and determined in their demands. And, whatever one's feelings about their ways of proceeding, it is impossible to deny that they are striking meaningful chords with their ideas. Essentially, I believe, and as is hinted at several times by Labedz, these are the chords of the religious experience.

It is through his religion that the sensitive soul has traditionally found an overall sense of the cosmic whole in time and space, has attempted to ascribe a movement, a purpose, to that cosmos, and has sought to locate himself and involve himself within its all-embracing plan. To the exceptionally religious, it is also important that there be a peer group with whom this sense can be translated into everyday life through the mechanism of community. There is much in the ideology of the New Left which fits the requirements of religion. Formerly it could probably be found too in the ideology of the old communist left, but awareness of the reality of the communist world has disqualified it, and the search for a new faith was inevitable.

The religious urge is real, and the question of its role and means of satisfaction in a world which regards itself as 'secularized' is problematic. It is the problem which haunts the whole work of Emile Durkheim, through his studies of the implications for community of the division of labour and the industrial revolution, the elementary forms of the religious life, and the results of the lack of its assurances and constraints in the problem of suicide.

It is also important in the background of the work of the other great founding father of sociology, Max Weber. To quote from Labedz's article: '. . . The chiliastic urge has proved so enduring in the history of humanity that it was unlikely that it would disappear for good. In his time Weber thought that there inevitably would be "rationalization" of society because of "routinization of charisma" and functional bureaucratic necessities. . . .' But Weber was aware of the limits of rationalism. Methodologically, he showed his awareness of the impor-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tance of the subjective in his concept of *Verstehen*. And, hostile though he may have been to many aspects of it, he was brought up in the Germanic Hegelian school. Weber was probably aware of the difficulties of reducing all to rationalist, impersonal procedures—that difficulty which J. S. Mill describes in his autobiography when he speaks of how depressing it was actually to live purely according to utilitarian criteria.

Weber was aware of man's need for a feeling of direction, vocation (*Beruf*) in his life. The fascinating thing about the *Beruf* which Weber studied in most detail—that of individualist Protestantism—is that here is a faith, a creed, which reconciles rationalism, for all its impersonality, with the deeper emotional need for fulfilment and vocation, by making a vocation out of rationalist activity, or of activity based on rationalist criteria. The conjunction was by no means a perfect one, but it is a crucially important phenomenon. Even if the Protestant ethic in its earliest forms became changed, its influence and essentials have influenced later developments. In some respects, social democracy can be seen as the individualist ethic with a social conscience.*

And it is precisely all this which is now being questioned so seriously. In many ways it is the old spirit of the Protestant ethic which is under the most heavy attack of all in several modern developments. First there is its inevitable association with early *laissez faire* capitalism and its cruelties and now generally discarded theories. At a more extreme level, the popularity of hallucinogenic drugs—with their attendant desire to lose individuality and the everyday world, to distort sense perception, to assert the very reverse of a 'hard work' ideology—is an explicit rejection of everything rationalist individualism stands for. The popularity of Eastern philosophies outside the Judaic-Christian tradition, particularly those philosophies which are non-rationalist and contemplative (hence not active, individualist, ambitious), marks a dissatisfaction with the norms of the rationalist and liberal-individualist tradition in the forms in which it has appeared over the past two centuries. The renewed attack on rationalism from the sociology of knowledge has already been mentioned above, as has the horror expressed by many new radicals at the ideas of planning, calculation and cautiousness.

There is a new desire for romance, excitement, which is becoming elevated into a political virtue. At the present time it is difficult to predict its future or the appropriate response to it of those still loyal to the rationalist creed. In particular, it is extremely difficult to establish alternative responses to the religious urge, and the associated problem of community. It is this question, rather than their own more immediate concerns, which is the most important issue raised by the student revolt.

* This is not intended to be a disparaging characterization. Indeed, I consider it to be the most viable and useful social philosophy at the present time, for all its faults.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC ANARCHY

*Sidney Hook**

THE twentieth century has been called 'the century of revolution', of political revolutions, social revolutions, scientific and technological revolutions. To these revolutions we must now add 'the academic revolution'; some might say the 'academic counter-revolution'. Whether one regards it as a revolution or a counter-revolution, the magnitude of educational change is overwhelming, particularly as it affects students. The world press has been full of news about student riots, protests, marches, and demonstrations in almost every major nation of the world, and on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Some observers assume that in view of the universality of student turmoil, we are confronted with one basic phenomenon, either a generational revolt or a flare-up against all authority. They try to judge the individual situations in their own countries in the light of what they regard as a world phenomenon.

This, I believe, is a profound error. One may as well argue that an increase in the death rate in many different countries proves that the same cause is operating everywhere. It would be unwarranted to assume that all of these expressions of student discontent are causally interrelated. It is probably true that there is a kind of infection of action which results when colourful news of student uprisings or 'happenings' splash into headlines or are featured on television screens. Such news may serve as a precipitating event, triggering off violent action in diverse situations of tension and conflict. Students in communist countries are rebelling against the political controls of a minority totalitarian party. There is nothing comparable to this in the United States. Students in some universities of England are protesting against the action of proctors who enforce arbitrary rules about the wearing of academic gowns or the observance of a 7 p.m. curfew, restrictions not likely to be found in the United States. Students in France and in Italy are protesting against the existence of physical conditions that would not be tolerated in the United States. For example, there are classrooms in which less than a third of the regularly enrolled students can be seated, and biology laboratories in which there is one microscope for 10 or 20 students. I was astonished when I was in Rome to discover that the key to the library of the philosophy institute could be found only in the pocket of the chief of staff of the philosophy

* Based on a lecture delivered under the auspices of the Institute for the Comparative Study of Ideologies at the University of Colorado, June 1968.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

department. Whenever a student wants to use the magnificent library he has to get the permission of the professor or his deputy. That there was no common or easy access to the library was taken as a matter of course.

Conditions of this sort have nothing to do with the alleged grievances of American students. If one wants to understand the situation in America, there is little illumination in relating it to aspects of the international scene. The American situation is unique because student behaviour has created a kind of crisis of confidence in the academic life of the country

IN order properly to assess recent events it is necessary to be clear about the nature of the university, the nature of academic freedom, and the meaning of students' rights. Let us begin with academic freedom to which almost everyone these days pays lip service.

What is academic freedom? This freedom is a very recent acquisition in America. It is less than a century old. It is an import from Imperial Germany, a country which was at the time not politically democratic but which nonetheless was the first to develop what we understand today by 'academic freedom'. In Germany 'academic freedom' was originally defined as *Lehrfreiheit* and *Lernfreiheit*: freedom to teach and freedom to learn. When 'academic freedom' was first introduced, or rather bruited about, in this country, nobody paid attention to *Lernfreiheit*. The founding fathers of the American Association of University Professors were only concerned with the freedom to teach, which was imperilled (or hardly existed) in the USA until Johns Hopkins was established as a regular graduate university. To this day, when we speak of academic freedom we normally mean freedom to teach. Freedom to learn, which today is at the basis of most claims for 'student academic freedom', has only recently received attention in the United States. The phrase 'student academic freedom' would have been considered a neologism only a few years ago.

A few years ago I proposed the shortest and most adequate definition of academic freedom (*Lehrfreiheit*). It is 'the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish, and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence, subject to no control or authority save the control and authority of the rational methods by which truth is established'. There are several important implications of this definition. First of all, this definition does not say that academic freedom is the right or freedom to teach the truth. It asserts only that academic freedom is the right or freedom to *seek* the truth. Does this mean that error has the same rights as truth? No, not when it is revealed as error; yes, until the issue is decided in the light of evidence and argument. Even if we accepted Augustine's dictum that 'error has no rights', according to my definition there would still be a right to be wrong. After all, no one can properly claim to be infallible or to possess the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

absolute truth. All we can ask of him is that he honestly seek the truth. If academic freedom is the right not to *teach* the truth but to *seek* the truth, then teachers must enjoy freedom from any ecclesiastical, religious, economic or political dogma that would bar the road to further inquiry.

Another very important implication of my definition is that the right to academic freedom is not a civil right, not a 'human right'. Notice that we have defined it as the right of *professionally qualified* persons. The right of academic freedom is a right that must be earned, whereas a civil right, or a human right, is something which does not have to be earned. It is possessed by every human being because he is a member of a community. You do not have to earn your right to speak freely. It is yours because you are a member of a democratic community. You do not have to earn your right to a fair trial. It is yours because you are a member of a civilized community, and it is intrinsic to your status as man and citizen. Anybody has a civil right to talk nonsense in any field he pleases. But by my definition one must be professionally qualified to talk nonsense in a university! Of course what you may think is nonsense may turn out to be the higher part of wisdom. If my definition is accepted, it also follows that the qualified teacher has the right honestly to reach any conclusion in the field of his competence. That is to say, academic freedom carries with it the right to heresy whether it is in biology, literature, or . . . politics! If a teacher honestly in pursuit of an argument comes to a conclusion that others regard as fascist or communist or racist or whatever, once he has been certified as competent by his peers, he merits protection by the community against those who would punish him for his heresy. Not only the community of scholars but the general community, if it supports academic freedom, must support his right to be wrong, subject, of course, to the criticism of his peers. Academic freedom does not mean immunity from criticism, vigorous criticism. Many people feel uncomfortable when I maintain that there is a right to heresy, but if one reflects upon the fact that the heresy of today may be the truth of tomorrow, that no one can plausibly claim infallibility or absolute truth for any theory, he will realize that the very nature of free academic activity implies an openness to all points of view provided only that they express the result of honest inquiry.

Does this mean that anything goes in a university or college, that a teacher can say or do anything he pleases? No. The right to heresy must not be confused with conspiracy, and by conspiracy in this connexion I mean a deliberate act in violation of the canons of professional ethics and integrity. If a professor of mathematics does not teach mathematics to his classes but insists upon teaching sociology or denouncing sin, or a professor of English concerns himself mainly with a defence of Lysenko or other subjects which are unrelated to his field and in which he has no competence, he cannot plead the right of heresy. He

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is violating the ethics of his profession. More important, suppose a teacher were discovered to be on the payroll of a corporation under instructions of its public relations office to propagandize for positions that are not reached as a result of his free inquiry but are dictated to him, we would rightly say that he has surrendered his professional integrity, that he has given hostages to the enemies of free inquiry, and therefore rendered himself *ipso facto* professionally unfit. The question of his fitness would be raised not on doctrinal grounds but on grounds of professional ethics. He would be entitled to a hearing but the burden of proof would rest on him to show why he should not be dismissed if the facts were as stated.

Similarly, suppose an individual were a member of a political party, whether he were a member of the communist party or the Ku Klux Klan, which gave him instructions to angle or slant his position in the classroom, and 'without exposing himself' to indoctrinate for the 'party line'. Whether it was the line of the communist party or the Ku Klux Klan, we would emphatically deny that such conduct fell under the right to heresy. This would be conspiracy, and render him presumptively unfit on grounds of professional ethics to continue teaching. His actions would be comparable to that of a physician who agreed to recommend unnecessary operations to his patients in order to split fees with the surgeon, or of a lawyer who agreed to throw his client's case for a better fee. All are guilty of unprofessional conduct.

If there is no right to conspiracy, then no member of any group which prescribes unprofessional conduct in the classroom or on campus for its teacher-members is entitled to the protection of academic freedom which he is sure to invoke when he is exposed as a member of such a group. Nor is it necessary to prove that he has actually carried out the official instructions of the group any more than it is necessary to prove that a person who has voluntarily joined a ring to commit a crime must carry it out before we are justified, after a hearing in which he would have an opportunity to rebut the evidence, in barring him from the position that would enable him to act on his instructions.

This conception of academic freedom is notably and eloquently expressed in the declaration of the Graduate School of the New School for Social Research which was founded by exiles from Hitler's Germany:

> The New School knows that no man can teach well, nor should be permitted to teach at all, unless he is prepared 'to follow the truth of scholarship wherever it may lead'. No inquiry is ever made as to whether a lecturer's private views are conservative, liberal, or radical; orthodox or agnostic; views of the aristocrat or commoner. Jealously safeguarding this precious principle, the New School stoutly affirms that a member of any political party or group which asserts the right to dictate in matters of science or scientific opinion is not free to teach the truth and thereby is disqualified as a teacher.

The battle for academic freedom has not yet been completely won in this country, but its principles are recognized by almost all accredited

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

institutions of higher learning. We have come a long way from the days when professors were considered merely 'hired hands' and could be arbitrarily dismissed. In the historical perspective it is true to say that never was *Lehrfreiheit*, the freedom to teach, in a healthier state than it is today. What is novel in the situation today is that among the potential threats to academic freedom, and there are always potential threats to academic freedom, are threats not only from some reactionary business tycoons, super-orthodox ecclesiastics, and chauvinistic politicians, but from students! How is this possible? This brings us to a consideration of the other aspect or phase of academic freedom which until recently has been neglected in our country, the concept of *Lernfreiheit* or freedom to learn.

WHAT is freedom to learn? Or what is 'student freedom'? It cannot mean what it originally meant in Germany, and this is one of the reasons why the concept was not introduced in this country in the latter part of the last century. The assumption was that all university bound students would complete the '*Gymnasium*' course of study. After they graduated from the '*Gymnasium*' and were accepted at a university, *Lernfreiheit* meant the freedom to attend any classes at any university in preparation for state-wide examinations. Our own college system was so completely different and so diverse in form and standards that the German sense of 'freedom to learn' could not be adopted.

We have to find a new meaning for 'freedom to learn'. Whatever meaning one gives it, two things should be obvious. First, there cannot be freedom to learn unless there is freedom to teach. You have no freedom to learn if your teachers are not free to teach the truth as they see it. The converse, however, is not true. It does not follow that there cannot be academic freedom or freedom to teach where there is no freedom to learn. Certainly, if freedom to learn is construed as the freedom to attend college or not to attend college, or as freedom to select the kind or type of college one finds congenial to one's educational needs or tastes, or as freedom to select the curriculum within the curricular choices provided by the college one attends, then such freedom has never been so widely recognized in the United States as it is today. And above all, if by academic freedom for students to learn one means freedom to challenge, to contest, to dissent, to debate within the contexts of intellectual inquiry, then American students today are freer than any other students in the world. They are certainly much freer than they were when I attended college, and freer today than they were yesterday.

Freedom to teach is not a human right but freedom to learn is. One does not have to earn the right of freedom to learn because the moral premise of a democratic society is that each individual has the right to as much education and schooling as will enable him to achieve his maximum growth as a person. Therefore, it is perfectly legitimate for a

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

university to study these problems and locate the obstacles which interfere with freedom of learning, but it is quite another thing to conclude that the university must launch itself on a crusade for the reconstruction of society in order to remove these obstacles and instate the conditions necessary for freedom of learning for all. For that would convert it into a political organization, and, since there are genuine differences about the necessary means to the goal, a highly partisan political organization.

We must make an important distinction here to avoid persistent confusion and misunderstanding. There are certain goals and objectives with respect to which the university as an institution *can* take an official position or make a public commitment without compromising its main, scholarly function. But these goals and objectives are directly related to its educational mission. For example, if a political measure threatens the academic freedom of the university, it can and should speak up in its defence. If there is public concern and discussion about what share of the resources of the community should be devoted to higher education, the university can and should make its voice heard, since the implementation of its educational ideals may depend upon the budget available to it. The assumption, of course, is that the position represents a genuine consensus of the faculty. There is an indefinite number of issues related to scholarship and research on which the university or its schools or departments may take a stand on the basis of available evidence. But in no case is the university justified in becoming a political or agitational instrument for pressuring the community to act in a controversial context. For example, let us assume that the medical faculty is convinced that fluoridation of the public water supply is a desirable health measure. It may announce this. It may not throw itself into a electoral campaign where the community is divided over the conflicting values of safety and expense, on the one side, and medical health on the other. Not only would the medical school be engaged in work foreign to its primary task, which on its educational side can be carried out by Federal and State Public Health Agencies, it would be pre-empting for itself a political role that does not necessarily follow from its commitment to the quest and publication of the truth. In a democratic community, it must be borne in mind, neither philosophers nor experts are kings. And it is wise to remember that one does not have to be an expert to evaluate intelligently the contributions of experts.

THIS conception of the university is fundamentally opposed to the view of the university as a revolutionary action organization which is basic to the whole strategy and tactics of the so-called Students for a Democratic Society. The members of this organization on the campuses of the country have been to a large extent of the New Left, and instrumental in producing chaos and confusion. What the tactics of the Students for a Democratic Society aim to achieve is to give dissent the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

immediate form of violent action, what they call euphemistically 'confrontation'. The measures which are finally adopted to counter this violent form of action are then seized upon by the SDS as a violation of academic manners and morals, as if the original confrontation had not occurred. If the administration or faculty makes a tactical error in dealing with this SDS provocation—and they often make errors—this 'error' is equated by some ritualistic liberals with the 'crimes' of the students. They can then rise above the conflict and either wash their hands of it or condemn the administration whose previous actions had never evoked even a murmur of criticism from them. Members of the SDS speak of respect for 'democratic rights'. Their words are a mockery because they have absolutely no respect for the rights of others.

Why do individuals who profess to be democratic take this attitude? One of the reasons expressed in the usual response by present-day academic rebels to the criticisms I have just made run like this: 'After all, despite what you say, the university today is nothing but an institution which functions to preserve the status quo; therefore the university is faithless to the ideals of the community of scholars. The university has systematically betrayed its mission because it is a reactionary social and political instrument which serves the purposes and interests of the ruling class.'

Even *if* this charge were true, it would not justify the lawless behaviour of the SDS; but it is certainly not true! The very freedom of dissent that students enjoy today in our universities, and which the SDS abuses so grossly, is in large measure a consequence of their spirit of experiment, their receptiveness to new ideas, the absence of enforced conformity among them, and their readiness to undertake new educational initiatives. We fought for the right of students to be as free as they are today in universities only to be told by irresponsible fanatics that the universities have to be destroyed because they are the bulwarks of the status quo. The charge is self-defeating because, if it were true, the SDS would be barred from every campus and its leaders expelled.

The actual truth is that in the United States today the universities are the vital centres of intellectual freedom and political dissent despite their obsolescent organizational form which vests legal power in the hands of non-academic Boards of Trustees.

On some issues a university may show doubtful wisdom or even be clearly wrong, but this is primarily something for the faculty to determine. The agitation at Columbia against involvement in AID touched on an issue that was already under investigation by the faculty itself. It is an issue that cannot be settled at a demagogic rally. What is the responsibility of individuals who believe in academic freedom when offered opportunities for research to defend the country which makes academic freedom possible? If fascism or communism triumphs, academic freedom is completely destroyed in educational institutions. Was it wrong for faculty members voluntarily to engage in research to prevent the victory

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Hitler? These questions are complex, and although the faculty can *listen* to the views of the students or the military or industry, it alone must have the power of decision with respect to them.

It is quite clear that unless checked it will not be long before those who think like the students of the SDS will be presuming to dictate the conclusions that their teachers should reach, especially on controversial matters. This is the standard procedure in totalitarian countries, in which official student organizations are the political arm of the ruling party. Already there are very disquieting signs of this in this country. I was lecturing at Cornell University just before the murder of Martin Luther King. A group of black nationalist students invaded the offices of the Chairman of the Economics Department and held him captive in order to get an apology from a teacher whose views on African affairs they disagreed with. Despite all their talk about 'participatory democracy' they are actually ignorant of its nature as thinkers from Thomas Jefferson to John Dewey have described it. Because society enjoys a democratic political system, this does not mean that all its institutions must be run on the same principle that guides political decisions. After all, an army in a democratic society cannot function that way, neither can the courts or a symphony orchestra, and certainly not a family of many small children. One man, one vote, from professor to janitor, is more in keeping with an intellectual pogrom than with a dedicated search for truth.

I do not want to give the impression that *all* of the things that the students ask for or advocate are educationally illegitimate. Some of their complaints are quite justified and should be supported. My main point, however, is that whatever the claims militant students have made, the methods by which they sought to realize them—the violence, the vandalism, the obscenity, the callous disregard of other students' rights, are much more contemptible and reprehensible than the practices they were protesting against. For they completely destroyed the possibility of reasoned discourse and democratic process. At Columbia, for example, a situation which as an alumnus I have studied very carefully, the SDS not only illegally seized university buildings and destroyed property, they held administrators as captive hostages, showered them with foul abuse, invaded the offices of the President, ransacked his files, stole some letters and published others. They resorted to arson. They even burned the research notes, the fruits of ten years' labour, of a professor who had spoken out against them. In fact the SDS at Columbia acted just like the German Storm Troopers did against the Jewish and socialist professors when Hitler came to power. One particular incident stands out as a symbol of their revolt. Those of you who have done work in political science know of the contributions of David Truman. He was for years Dean of Columbia College and then was promoted to the office of Provost and Vice-President of Columbia University to give him a larger sphere of

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

activity. In June 1967 he received a standing ovation from the students and faculty at the Columbia commencement because he had, among other things, opened channels of communication between the students and the faculty. As Dr Truman was walking to his office on the Morningside campus, a student strode up to him and spat in his face! This marks the extent to which the language and actions of the gutter have invaded the academy. That student remains unpunished, despite the fact that in spitting in David Truman's face he at the same time spat in the face of every self-respecting member of the Columbia faculty, and not only of the Columbia faculty but the faculty of the entire academic community. And yet there are some members of the faculty who court student popularity to a point that makes them faithless to their trust, who would grant amnesty to the students for all their actions.

Sometimes, in extenuation of such conduct, we are told that the resort to reason, persuasion, and democratic process has failed. Some student leaders say: 'You advise us to rely on democratic processes when we have legitimate demands. But what is the use of resorting to democratic processes when it only results in frustration? We make demands, we talk, we get a hearing but we do not get our way. We are only invited to talk some more.' Now this is a very odd conception of the democratic process. After all, the democratic process cannot guarantee any particular outcome any more than the scientific process can guarantee that any conclusion reached will be a true conclusion. Because the scientific process does not always lead to a valid result is no reason for throwing it overboard. Because the democratic process does not always enable you to get what you want does not justify you in abandoning it. If you have faith in democracy, your failure to convince others may mean that your evidence and arguments may be weak, that you may have to be more persuasive, to wait a little longer and work a little harder. Otherwise you commit the same kind of error as those who resort to civil disobedience, not as an educational act or as a deed of self-sacrifice to induce one's fellow-citizens to *rethink* their position, but as a political act to coerce the majority to yield to a minority on an issue the minority has lost in a fair political election. The first, the educational act, is a legitimate use of civil disobedience in a democracy. The second, the political act, is a tactic of implicit revolution and insurrection. The first violates the law in the hope that the example and the punishment endured will serve as a stimulus to induce second thoughts on the part of one's fellow citizens. Such civil disobedience is legitimate up to a point. But civil disobedience is illegimate when it becomes a political means of obstructing the freely determined decisions of the majority. If someone avows that he is a principled democrat, he cannot use civil disobedience to try to get his way by black-jacking or blackmailing the majority. Anyone, whether a student or not, who says: 'I will not abide by democratic rules unless I get my way by invoking

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

them', is not a democrat but at best a very confused anarchist. Some of those who, like Dr Spock and Reverend Coffin, have resorted to civil disobedience and urged others to do so, and then seek to evade the legal consequences of their action, have not the courage of their confusion. They seek to escape the legal punishment their actions not merely invite but morally require in contravention of the philosophical credo of the true conscientious practitioners of civil disobedience. When Thoreau practised civil disobedience, he did not run for the hills! Nor did he rely on legal technicalities. He welcomed his punishment. No student or any other person who is a sincere democrat and practises civil disobedience can fall back on the dialectics of evasion to escape the punishment entailed by his action. Socrates' argument in the *Crito* is still valid.

WHAT are the legitimate demands of students in conjunction with their right to learn, their *Lernfreiheit*? They fall into two classes: social and educational. In general, students should be entrusted with the power to regulate their social life through their own organizations. As far as possible students should be treated as adults and entrusted with the responsibilities of governing themselves, but held accountable for the abuse of those responsibilities. Moreover, they should not be deprived of rights that they would enjoy as citizens where the exercise of their rights as a citizen does not interfere with the educational mission of the university. I say 'in general' because the faculty even in this area cannot abdicate all responsibility. The faculty, even with respect to student life and student organization, must have the ultimate power of veto, in at least two areas which involve basic educational policy and human rights. If any action of the student body or of any student group threatens the educational mission or goal of the university, whether on campus or off campus, the faculty must be prepared to intervene. It must prevent the disruption of the educational process. For example, suppose students wanted to establish fraternities organized along racial or religious or secular lines that would interfere with proper educational processes. In that case the faculty should have the power to veto the proposed action. Or suppose students have the power to run their own organizations, as I think they should, but that in some communities the majority of the students deprive a minority of its rights. This could very well happen in a Southern university dominated by a racist majority. At this point the faculty should intervene.

With respect to strictly educational matters, students are justified in making three kinds of demands, wherever a situation exists that makes these demands relevant. First, students should have the right of educational participation in the form of consultation. They have the right to be heard, to receive explanations, to present their own views concerning *any* educational measures that affect them. This should apply to proposals to increase tuition, to requirements for graduation, to the use and modification of grading systems, even to the content of the courses.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It seems to me that any scholar or administrator worth his salt would welcome such discussion, welcome the active participation and consultation by students who in the past have been too indifferent to such matters. If one has a good reason for making an administrative or curricular change why not present it to the students and invite their reactions? It may be that the students will come up with better suggestions. The exercise of their right to consultation can itself become a vital educational experience, introducing them to a complex of interesting social problems, and motivating them in an authentic and, it is hoped, a lasting way.

Consultation is one thing. The power of decision, however, is another. When it comes to the ultimate decision in matters of education, the knowledge, the experience, the maturity of the faculty cannot be equated with that of the students. The SDS demands vehemently, and I quote from some of its literature, that the students have the power to make decisions on educational matters 'on an equal footing with the faculty'. This means that the students should have the power to outvote the faculty or any professor who seeks to give his course in a manner they disapprove of. One can imagine the fate of a course whose content or problems are difficult. It is not the personal authority of the teacher which is at stake here and risks being destroyed. It is the authority of the subject matter, of the scientific methods of approaching it, and of the possibility of quality education which is imperilled. Whether it is a medical school or a liberal arts college we are considering, we cannot permit the entering students, bright-eyed and eager though they may be, to make decisions on the same footing as their teachers, to give them educational powers equal to those of their teachers. Would their teachers be worthy of being their teachers if they did not have the authority of knowledge? Students would be cheated out of an education, if what they learned was decided by a majority vote of their peers. And so, with respect to this first demand, we must say 'Consultation, yes! Decision, no!'

Second, students have the right to request the individualization of the curriculum as far as possible. After all, each student differs from every other in his needs, his background, his interests. He responds in a different way to different types and kinds of instruction and motivation. When one teaches a class of students equally, that is to say, with an eye on what they presumably have in common, one cannot do justice to the very bright individual or the less intelligent, to the student with a highly prepared apperceptive mass and the one who is taking the first groping steps in the subject. The ideal curriculum would be a tailor-made curriculum—tailor-made to fit each student's individual needs, his past history, his ambitions and capacities. If we had adequate resources, each student would become the centre of a special course of studies; his curriculum would be built around his special needs and gifts. As far as possible, therefore, the college should try to individualize the curricu-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lum. As each student meets the general requirements, he should meet them in specific and special curricular ways, devised by a sensitive guidance system, and other forms of consultation. William James once said that there was not very much difference between any two human beings, but that whatever differences exist make all the difference in the world. It is that personal and individual difference which is lost sight of when one curriculum is mechanically imposed on all students.

Perhaps of greatest importance is the third expression of students' rights, something for which students do not fight hard enough. This is a central and continuing concern with the character of teaching on the college level, including the right to evaluate their teachers on the basis of their classroom performance. It is no secret that the worst teaching in this country takes place on the college level. In most liberal art colleges, teaching is almost completely neglected because of the questionable assumption that anyone who knows anything can teach it. This is certainly not true. The greatest educational crime on the college level is boredom, and unfortunately too many students are the victims of it. The subject matter of a liberal arts education is so intrinsically exciting that there is no excuse for boredom. It is not a matter of difficulty or rigour. Actually students are aware of this. Even when they find the teacher rather harsh in his methods and exacting in his standards, students rarely complain if they learn something from him and if they are reached by the appeals of the subject matter. There is nothing that brings teachers and students more closely together than a common interest or enthusiasm in the subject matter and problems of a course. Let a teacher succeed in this, and all other virtues will be added to him. He has no discipline problems. Teaching becomes not a task but a joy. When students praise a teacher for good teaching, it does not necessarily prove that he is actually a good teacher. For sometimes students are taken in by a teacher who woos them, who courts popularity, and sells himself, so to speak, rather than the subject matter. But when students complain that they are not learning anything, when they complain about poor teaching, they are almost always right. An inescapable responsibility lies with the college to give them instruction from which they can learn something, to find teachers who are not boring, and who can make the subject come alive. Students will be surprised to learn how readily their complaints about poor teachers will be received by chairmen of departments, by deans, and other administrators. Unfortunately, for one reason or another, students are timid about making vocal their complaints about poor teaching. It is here that they need to be encouraged to assert their educational rights.

ALL my reflections and observations here flow from my conception of the nature of a university. There are fundamentally three generic conceptions one may hold of a college or university. Although there are important differences between the college and the university, for

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

present purposes I shall disregard them and consider them as integrated in a system of higher education. First, is the view that the university is a training or vocational centre to prepare students either for jobs or marriage, as an institution tied closely to the needs of industry or government or other social forces powerful enough to influence the curricular offerings presented to prospective students. In this view, the university serves society by becoming a servant of society.

A second conception of the university regards it as an instrument of social action either to revolutionize society or to conserve society on behalf of the ideals espoused by the strongest group which can make its will prevail on the university. In this view, the university serves society by becoming its master, by imposing its ideals of excellence upon society. The view takes various forms. One form has a strong advocate in Robert M. Hutchins, formerly President of the University of Chicago. He holds that the university must fashion the ideals and values by which we should revolutionize society. These values and ideals not unnaturally turn out to be those of Mr Hutchins. Mr Hutchins's conception of the university was repudiated by the faculty of the University of Chicago in 1944 on the grounds that his values were vague, and that, more important, in a democracy no institution has the right to impose its values on the community.

Another form of this view is that the university must adhere to the ideals of 'the most progressive' class in society, first reconstruct the university in the light of the needs of that class, and then reconstruct society in order to abolish all classes. In effect this makes the university a battlefield for members of the faculty to get their values accepted as the official line of the university, and then ultimately of society. The upshot would be educational chaos, and in all likelihood would be followed by a return to authoritarian rule. The university that regards itself as a sanctuary in which it can prepare the ideological weapons for revolutionizing society will soon lose its traditional privileges and its academic freedom.

Finally there is the more traditional conception of the university, modified in light of present-day needs. This is the conception of the university as a community of scholars and teachers and students, bound together by the ties of civility and intellectual respect, pursuing either separately or together, but in any case, voluntarily, not the truth but the *truths*, not the good but the *goods*, not the beauty but the *beauties*, in short the multiple visions which inspire the life of mind. Such a university evaluates critically the traditions of yesterday in order to increase the power to mould more freely the traditions of tomorrow. It serves society not by becoming a servant of society or its master but by opening the doors to the discovery of new truths and new knowledge, and new forms of excellence in every field. This idea of a college or university has been imperfectly realized in the past. It is this ideal which I believe we must seek to strengthen today. It is this ideal which

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

we must counterpose to the nihilists and irresponsible partisans of the cult of direct action and violence, whose goal is the destruction of the university as the first step toward their fancied salvation of society.

Those who accept this third conception of the university must dedicate themselves in whatever time they can spare from their teaching and studies not only to the struggle against these misguided students but against their allies, small but influential, among the faculty who work secretly with them. In the end, although students may wreck a university, the faculty alone cannot save it. It needs the help of those students who believe in the free mind in a free society, and who know that their primary purpose in college or the university is the acquisition of an education. For them and for their teachers, whatever secondary ends the university may have, its central end is the quest for truth, not the conquest of political power.

CENTRAL ASIAN RESEARCH CENTRE

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

A quarterly review of Soviet writing on the Soviet Central Asian and Kazakh SSRs and the adjacent countries

No. 3 of 1968 includes articles on:

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION IN CENTRAL ASIA AND KAZAKHSTAN: PART II

RECENT SOVIET WRITING ON INDIA

SINKIANG: THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE

Annual subscription: 60s.; single copies 15s.

MIZAN

A review of the policies of the Soviet Union and China towards the developing countries of Asia and Africa, with separate Supplements summarizing press reports on the Middle East and Africa (SUPPLEMENT A) and South-East Asia (SUPPLEMENT B)

The May/June issue includes articles on:

SOVIET INTEREST IN MIDDLE EAST OIL

THE USSR AND THE PHILIPPINES

Annual subscriptions (six issues): MIZAN: £3;
SUPPLEMENTS A and B (optional): £2 2s. each

Orders may be placed direct with CARC, 66A King's Road, London, S.W.3, or their agents, Messrs. Luzac & Co. Ltd., 46 Great Russell Street, London, W.C.1. Sole distribution agents for MIZAN in the USA: International Publications, 303 Park Avenue South, New York, N.Y. 10010.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nationalism Revisited

GROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL CHANGE

Harold R. Isaacs

DESPITE the world's painfully obvious need to order its affairs in larger units, the nation remains the most persistent form of political organization and one of the most powerful elements in the shaping and holding of every individual's group identity. It is surely one of the central paradoxes of our current history that the nation, steadily becoming less and less effective by itself as a unit of power or as a means to human advancement, has at the same time become increasingly more pervasive as a decisive factor in contemporary world politics, and more and more universal as a source of self-esteem or the lack of it for people caught up in the vast confusions of change in our time.

The issues of nation, nationalism, nationality, and national consciousness appear around us now in an immense variety of shapes and forms, whether as political fact, fiction, goal, idea, myth, state of mind, or emotional drive. This confusion is fully reflected in the confused scholarly literature on the subject which appears in as many different guises and aspects, and uses as many different definitions, it often seems, as there are authors. The meaning of *nationalism*, as a governing idea or attitude or political movement, is more or less uniformly seen. The usage of *nationality* differs sharply, reflecting the wide variance in the way it is used in different environments to mean either membership in some distinguishable group or citizenship in some particular state. Most definitions of *nation* include some version of a more or less homogeneous people sharing common beginnings, a common history, and a piece of territory. There is a blurred area at one end of the spectrum where clans and tribes become nations according to this or that specification, and all sorts of other distinctions at the other end where nations become states. The search for order among all this clutter led one eminent student of nationalism to conclude: 'The simplest statement that can be made about a nation is that it is a body of people who feel that they are a nation; and it may be that when all the fine-spun analysis is concluded, this will be the ultimate statement as well.'[1] This essentially psychological or emotional setting of the subject most closely meets my own requirements, for my concern is with the impact of political change on group identity and particularly with the nation (or nationality or

[1] Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), p. 102; see also Leonard Doob, *Patriotism and Nationalism* (New Haven, 1964), pp. 4–9.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nationalism or whatever measure of national consciousness) as one of the prime elements of which every man's basic group identity is made.

By political change I principally mean the great and obvious ones: the shift from colony to nation, the collapse of the old power systems, and the rise of new ones at national, regional, and intercontinental levels. I am concerned primarily with the many other less obvious or less visible transformations that have come more slowly in the wake of these changes, the breakdown or relocation or rearrangement of the many mythologies and assumptions and styles of behaviour that governed the patterns of relationship within the displaced power systems in the past. The plainest of these are the superiority-inferiority patterns of races and cultures established and maintained during the two or three centuries of Western white-world dominance. It is in this context that I have been trying to learn how members of particular groups were experiencing this impact of political change on their sense of themselves and their relationship to others, and this has drawn me into an exploration of what I have been calling every man's *basic group identity*.

By 'basic group identity' I mean the set of identifications which every individual shares with others from the moment of his birth: his ethnic being, his family and group name, his colour and physical characteristics, the history and origins of the group into which he is born, its whole culture-past providing him with, among other things, his language, religion, arts, modes and styles of life, and inherited value system. It lays upon him his nationality or whatever other condition of national self-awareness in his group. He is endowed, finally, with the total structure of his family's culture, with all its intersecting, concentric, and multiple enlargements, the social-economic threshold of the family through which he enters upon life, the geography, politics, and economics of the country of his birth, and all the impinging circumstances of his time.

The primary function of this basic group identity is to provide a person with some measure of supporting self-acceptance and self-esteem. Like money or health, group identity presents no problem when it is assured, when the self-acceptance it generates is an unquestioned premise of life. It is only when it fails to supply a man with a basis for some sense of prideful association of himself with others, or, worse, forces him into a pattern of self-rejection, that it becomes a problem and, sooner or later, a matter of crisis. A group identity's success or failure in this respect is shaped by many things, occurs at many different levels and in many different ways and is influenced by many different conditions. My proposition is that chief and probably decisive among these are the *political* conditions, i.e. the condition of power or powerlessness in which his group exists. How dominant or how dominated is the group to which the individual belongs and how, therefore, is he able to bear himself in relation to others? This is the cardinal question, and it is essentially a question of politics or power. This is precisely

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the point at which group identity and politics meet. It is the starting-point of much notable history, of many notable lives. This has always been so, but never more so than in the present when all power systems are changing, all group relationships being revised, and all group identities forced to rearrange themselves to meet the changing circumstances. Among these, alongside class and caste, hardly any circumstances have been more transformed or transforming than those of the changing conditions of nationality or nationhood through which people have been moving in these tumultuous years.

The history of our century has been developing mainly in the form of the explosive appearance, disappearance, and reappearance of nations, changing their placement and displacement in relation to each other and to the general distribution of resources and power in the world. This volcanic rearrangement of power relations has produced no larger coherence, no workable new order of things in which the dangerous anarchy of national separatism could be absorbed. Neither the Western attempts at world organization in the League or the UN, nor the dreams of socialist or communist internationalism, have fulfilled their promises. National interest has remained paramount in all affairs, for big and small alike. Not even the super-power blocs which succeeded the empires after two world wars could keep their satellites in orbit for very long against the pull of centrifugal force generated out of national separateness. Europe is dominated by the superannuated nationalism of de Gaulle and still fears the ever-threatening resurrection of the nationalism of Germany. Super-powerful America cannot successfully control the behaviour of its clients—whether in tiny Santo Domingo, in Seoul, or in Saigon. Super-powerful Russia, unable to hold Yugoslavia or little Albania or to dominate the policies even of dependent Cuba, has been driven to use armed force to keep its nearby satellites in orbit, but the weakness of its gravitational pull, already demonstrated in Poland and Hungary, is not likely to be overcome by its current occupation of Czechoslovakia or the threat of similar action in Rumania. Nor could communist Russia remain long in tandem with communist China, that re-emergent world power which is not so much super-communist as super-chauvinist.

The break-up of the old empires which began after 1918 shattered central and eastern Europe into assorted national fragments which have not to this day been brought into any relaxed new pattern of relationships. Through wars and revolutions, they have beat on with their separate pulses, even surviving decades of communist power in the Soviet Union and later in eastern Europe, where such issues as Czech-Slovak and Serb-Croat antagonism and the 'Macedonian question' are as alive today as they ever were in the days of the Habsburgs and the Hohenzollerns. In the West we have the reappearance of nationalisms relatively submerged for much longer periods of time now breaking surface again as serious factors in the politics of their countries: the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Welsh and the Scottish in Britain, the Flemish and the Walloons in Belgium, the Quebec French in Canada, even the Bretons in France.

Political upheavals during the inter-war years made 'stateless' or 'displaced' persons out of millions of people who suddenly discovered, as Hannah Arendt has pointed out, that nationality—in its most literal sense of having a country to belong to and live in—had become almost the only link between an individual and the rest of humanity, and that to be without it was to be cut off from all other people, indeed often from life itself.

In the two decades since the war, hundreds of millions of people have become nationals of nations that had for the most part never existed before, certainly not in the forms and with the boundaries they now acquired. In a world without any more coherent order to share in, colonial peoples who needed to throw off the yokes of hated foreign power had no choice but national power to put in its place. In most of these 'new' nations, however, the first task of the new men of power is literally to create new national identities, to provide a new sense of enlarged community that their fragmented peoples will recognize and accept. Since few colonies had been shaped with any regard to any previous condition of national cohesion or ethnic homogeneity, most of these new nations are made up of uncoalesced and usually hostile racial, tribal, regional, and linguistic groupings. Bursting like big and little stars from exploding galaxies, each one has spun off in its own centrifugal whirl, straining to hold intact its own separatenesses.

Still another variety lies in the experience of some groups of people long deprived of any nationhood, left rejected and alienated in different kinds of limbo, and forced, finally, to seek new national solutions to the old problem of their apartness. Thus it was with Europe's Jews, zionism, and Israel. Thus it was with America's Jews, who found their national solution in becoming *Americans*, a national identity that promises not to be diluted by the fact that they also remain Jews. Thus, also, American Negroes, who have not been able as yet to resolve their duality because the opening American society has not yet opened wide enough to admit its Negroes as it has so recently come to admit its Jews, driving some Negroes once more to give a new national cast to their search for a better way of knowing who they are and where they belong.

I would not presume at this point to try to impose any order of definition or classification on these infinite varieties of experience. My undertaking here is more modest. It is clear that as they go through the process of wrenching change, the elements of everyone's group identity sort and re-sort themselves out into different weights, play different relative roles for different groups, and under the varying pressures of external circumstances produce different levels of intensity of problem or crisis. I propose here simply to illustrate some of these differences by tracing the particular element of nation or nationality as it appears in the patterns of group identity and political change as I have

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

observed them in six groups. These groups represent minorities of different sizes in changing situations, and examples of national identity problems in two majority groups, one in an ex-colony, the other in an ex-imperial power. These are: educated Untouchables in India glimpsing the prospect that they can escape their identity as Untouchables by becoming *Indians*; American Jews in Israel trying to become *Israelis*; Chinese in Malaysia struggling with the problem of becoming *Malaysians*; post-colonial Filipinos trying to discover what it means now to be a *Filipino*; post-imperial Japanese trying to shape a new nation to take the place of the one that was crushed in 1945; and Negroes in the United States seeking ways of becoming integrated *Americans* or else finding some other answer to the pain of their separateness in the society.

India's Ex-Untouchables

UNTOUCHABLES IN INDIA, kept in a condition of total debasement from dimmest pre-history until now, have finally been forced by the pressures of political change to seek some new basis for their existence.

As I have reported at some length elsewhere,[2] the educated Untouchable in India is a man who above all else, and more perhaps than any other man in the world, wants to blot out his past, erase his history and origins from the minds of his children, and to begin life for them on some wholly new footing and with a wholly new identity. The power system in India changed enough with independence to make him an ex-Untouchable in law, but the society has not yet changed enough to begin making him an ex-Untouchable in fact. Widened channels of education, however, have given ever-increasing numbers of ex-Untouchables the chance to raise their sights and seek improved conditions for themselves. Perhaps 3,000,000 of the total 70,000,000 Untouchables in India have set out on this path, moving up a steep pyramid from elementary literacy to university education at the highest levels. To these educated individuals the government offers employment above and beyond the traditional occupations of their castes. But as the educated ex-Untouchable comes up out of the pit on to the open ground of society, he finds that everybody is still living by the rules of the caste system which condemned him to remain at his subhuman level for so long.

Ex-Untouchables have sought escape from caste, therefore, either by quitting Hinduism altogether—as Ambedkar's Mahar followers did by embracing Buddhism in 1956, even as great numbers had done much earlier by becoming Muslims or Christians—or by passing, trying to become caste Hindus by self-election and concealment of their past identity, an attempt which soon comes to grief on the hard rocks of community custom in Indian life; or by becoming and being accepted by caste Hindus as a touchable caste themselves, a shift that has occurred a few times for some groups, but only after generations of gradual transfer from one level to the other. Their final option is to begin to

[2] *India's Ex-Untouchables* (New York, 1965).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

see that caste will be superseded in India only when and if all people, caste and outcast alike, do in fact embrace a common identity larger than caste and shared in fact by all as *Indians*. This remains only the flickering gleam of an idea larger than touchability or surviving caste. It marks a path on which only a few people in India have embarked or gone very far. 'When anybody asks me', said one ex-Untouchable, 'I say I belong to this nation, India, I'm an *Indian* . . . I do really feel like an Indian. I consider myself one with my country.' For him and millions of others like him, the question remained whether the rest of the people of his nation were, or ever would be, one with him.

American Jews in Israel

THE JEWS WHO HAVE ESTABLISHED Israel present a peculiarly dramatic illustration of the interaction of group identity and political change, for here Jews are trying to solve in the most specifically political way—by creating their own state—the problems of Jewish marginality and rejection in Gentile society which reached their ultimate dimensions in Hitler's Europe. The re-establishment of the Jewish state is an attempt to put a political boundary around Jewish separateness, to establish a national frame for the many parts of Jewishness. The reappearance of Israel does not solve but gives new form and new substance to old questions, new formulae for the ancient national-ethnic-religious brew of which Jewishness is made. By coming together from seventy countries after 2,000 years, the Jews of this generation in Israel have not made it any easier, but more difficult, to define what a Jew is or what Jewishness means.

For most of these Jews, however, this difficulty of definition has little or nothing to do with nationality. The great bulk of them never did possess the nationality of the countries from which they came. The nationality of Russian or Polish Jews was 'Jewish', not 'Russian' or 'Polish', and none of the Jews who came to Israel from Morocco, Yemen, or Iraq, or Egypt were ever 'Moroccans', 'Yemenites', 'Iraqis', or 'Egyptians'. The Jews who migrated from eastern Europe to England, Canada, Australia, and South Africa never quite became 'Englishmen', 'Canadians', 'Australians', or 'South Africans'. But the Jews who went to America did, within two or three generations, become *Americans*, and six million of them now remain wholly committed to their identity as Americans and equally—and perhaps more than in Israel in the religious sense of the word—committed as Jews. This became, for the small group of some 10,000 American Jews who have chosen to settle in Israel, the core of a crucial difference between them and all their fellow-immigrants in the new Jewish state.

The dilemma of identity into which this plunged most of these American Jews has also been described at some length elsewhere,[3] and I will therefore not dwell on it here. It revolved quite explicitly until the

[3] *American Jews in Israel* (New York, John Day Co., 1967).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

middle of last year around the issue of *nationality*, i.e. the literal and legal problem of choosing to remain American citizens or becoming Israelis. This particular aspect of their dilemma was greatly eased by a decision of the United States Supreme Court last May which abrogated laws penalizing Americans with loss of citizenship if they served in foreign armies or voted in foreign elections. But this left untouched many other more deeply rooted difficulties faced by these American immigrants in their effort to bridge their American and Jewish identities. It was precisely the values and circumstances which had made it possible for American Jews to become Jewish Americans that made it difficult for so many of these American Jews to become Israelis. These touch on such deep and crucial matters as the nature of politics, the relation between church and state, and even more, perhaps, between religion and nationhood, and of choosing among the rival satisfactions offered on the one hand by a limited national-religious parochialism and, on the other, by the promise of an unlimited and diverse pluralism.

The Chinese Malaysians

THE CHINESE IN MALAYSIA, like Chinese everywhere, are possessors of a Great Past. As far as their view of themselves is concerned, this alone not only places them at the opposite end of the spectrum from India's ex-Untouchables, but also in a class by themselves and distinctly above all other peoples on earth, certainly far, far above the Japanese, whose tradition is far junior to theirs and heavily derived from Chinese sources in almost all its important beginnings. This view was not only sustained by Chinese themselves through their long periods of humiliation by foreign power, but has also been shared to a certain degree by a great many westerners from the time of Marco Polo down to the present. As I have shown elsewhere,[4] it has been unadmiringly seen by some as insupportable Chinese arrogance and self-love, or admiringly by others as a valid and enviable legacy from the long Chinese past. In individual Chinese there are many highly varied forms of this self-awareness, and these are especially mixed now that the communist regime has successfully reasserted Chinese power and aroused respect and fear in the rest of the world.

The Chinese communists and Mao Tse-tung himself are eclectic to a degree in the way in which they link themselves to the Chinese past, but the link is explicitly made and vigorously exploited. How Chinese of different generations in China are assimilating these changes, we do not know. Chinese abroad, no matter how far removed or opposed they may be to the new regime, are attracted or in some way stirred by the impact of revived Chinese power and importance. However they may view the communist manipulation of cherished essentials of the Chinese heritage, they clearly share in the pleasurable sensations provided by the re-establishment of what was, from ancient times, *Chung Kuo*, or

[4] *Scratches on Our Minds: American Images of China and India* (New York, 1958).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Central Country, or, in truth, the centre of the world. In any case, whether in response to the present power revival, or in continuing attachment of some kind to the remoter cultural past, whether out of highly educated knowledge of this tradition, or out of a partly educated or even uneducated awareness of its existence, it is plainly here that Chinese self-esteem is most deeply rooted. This seems to be true among Chinese of all kinds and classes, and especially so among Chinese overseas, even among many who are of the third and fourth generation out of China.

The major political changes that have come to China and South-East Asia in the past two decades have given peculiarly greater importance to the emotional and political alignments of the overseas Chinese in South-East Asia, and nowhere more so than in Malaysia, where some 4,000,000 Chinese are grappling with the brand new problem of acquiring the brand new political identity of *Malayan* or *Malaysian*. In Malaysia the Chinese are not the relatively small minority they are elsewhere in the region, but comprise nearly half the total population, and the most dynamic and energetic half at that. The other, larger half, are the Malays whose top leaders—sultans, princes, and related aristocrats—are politically dominant in the country, but whose mass is still largely illiterate, economically and socially backward, and apathetic. The shape of the new relations between these two groups will determine the shape and fate of Malaysia. These relations will determine the further internal evolution of Malaysian society, and will bear with great and even ominous weight on the way Malaysia will respond to the large new surrounding pressures, the expansionist pressure of neighbouring Indonesia, with its great size and its appeal to Malay 'unity', and from the other direction, the tangible and intangible aura of the new Chinese power stretching its influence over everyone's view of the future. The pattern of tenuous alliance and latent conflict between Indonesia and communist China also appears in Malaysian politics, where a fragile coalition links Malay and Chinese leaderships, the one bedevilled by a pro-Indonesian Malay opposition, and the other by pro-communist Chinese. These two in turn cautiously and tentatively relate to each other across the same barriers of mutual mistrust and rejection that lie between Malays and Chinese in general.

This apartness is based on a whole spectrum of things, recent and remote. It only begins with the staple explanation that in Malaya the merchants and traders are the 'alien' Chinese, and the poor farmers and fishermen are the 'native' Malays. The truth of the matter cuts far deeper and is rooted in profound differences of cultural past, history, and style of life. These differences are so great that contrary to their common practice elsewhere Chinese have intermarried rather sparsely with Malays. The demanding rigidities of Islam have had much to do with this, but even the babas—the descendants of earlier Chinese immigrants who began the migration several centuries back, and who adopted the Malay language, dress, food, and even sometimes

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

took Malay mates—have generally remained unmistakably and identifiably Chinese. The greater proportion of more recent immigrants, who began to come as labourers in the last century, remained much more apart, keeping to their own communities, establishing their own schools, educating their own children, keeping their own language, customs, and separate identity. They saw themselves rather as temporary exiles from China, kept close ties with their kin there, sent money back, and planned to return themselves, if only to die or be buried there. Inevitably as time passed and many prospered, the British-controlled Malay states became 'home', but never in the same sense that China remained their homeland. A small number in the Straits Settlements followed the older immigrants in becoming British subjects or 'protected persons'. The great majority, however, remained politically as well as culturally tied to China. There was no such thing as a 'Malayan' nationality, and in so far as there was ever any question of it the Chinese in Malaya mostly remained Chinese citizens. They helped finance the Chinese revolutions of 1911 and 1925–27, and supported the resistance to Japan when it invaded China in 1937. When the Japanese invaded Malaya itself in 1942, it was the Chinese who organized armed resistance while most Malays passively welcomed and co-operated with the new conquerors. This had its aftermath in bloody clashes between Chinese and Malays when the war ended, and in a Chinese communist guerrilla insurrection and terror campaign that continued into the mid-1950s. By negotiation and settlement with the British, the Malay political leaders and princes finally united their sultanates in the new Federation of Malaya, and became an independent nation in 1957. The chief internal social problem of the new state was the redefinition of the place of the Chinese in the new system and their relationship with the Malays.

The Malays regarded themselves as the only true 'sons of the soil' and the Chinese essentially as 'aliens', and built certain preferential advantages for themselves into the new constitution and new political system. These included restrictions on Chinese citizenship, land ownership and ownership in certain specified enterprises, and quotas (at four to one) on key places in the civil service and on scholarships for higher education. They saw to it that by careful weighting, the rural Malay districts would permanently dominate the Chinese urban areas in the new parliament. They made Malay the national language and moved to eliminate or control the Chinese schools, and proceeded to spend large sums of government money to build elaborate mosques which were obviously for themselves alone. In short, the new regime offered its Chinese citizens and inhabitants a form of second-class citizenship, and indicated its readiness to accept the participation of those Chinese who accepted this subordinate place in the new scheme of things. The Chinese leadership—essentially its conservative segment representing the sizeable economic stake of the Chinese in the society—cooperated in setting up this new system in an

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

effort to find some new basis for future accommodation and a new status for Chinese Malayans. But as might be expected, this created many new tensions and conflicts, particularly over language and control of schools, and also broader political orientations. These issues were not relieved but simply extended when the enlarged Federation of Malaysia was created in 1963, bringing in Singapore and the Borneo territories of Sarawak and Sabah. They were responsible, three years later, for the secession/expulsion of predominantly Chinese Singapore.

Obviously there are many ways in which both Malays and Chinese differ not only from each other but among themselves. The Chinese, for their part, vary in the degree of their Chineseness and differ sharply in their political and emotional alignments. One of the most important sets of these differences appears between the Chinese-educated and the English-educated Chinese. The Chinese-educated, and this takes in the great majority right up to the most recent school generations, are products of the privately supported Chinese school system which focused wholly in language and curriculum on the Chinese background. This included exposure to Chinese history and literature and, in the last few generations, the successful spread of the use of *kuo-yu*, the national Chinese language, or 'Mandarin', as the common language of educated overseas Chinese. It has also inevitably included exposure to the major currents of political influence from the homeland, of the Kuomintang from Sun Yat-sen's days up to 1949, and more recently the competing influences of Peking and Taiwan. This competition encouraged the older and more cautious operators of these schools to lapse into an official neutralism about homeland politics, and this had the effect of deepening still further the commitment to the underlying Chinese tradition common to all. Until quite recently, for the great majority of young Chinese this educational experience had the effect of centring their sense of themselves on China, on their Chinese origins, on Chinese classical and historic tradition, and, inevitably, on their present and continuing link with their Chinese homeland. In the present situation this has led to political orientations which on the conservative side lead to accommodation and cautious waiting, and on the radical side to political activity aimed at creating a Malaysia that will eventually be associated in some satisfactory alignment with China.

The English-educated—estimated at anywhere from 10 per cent to 25 per cent according to how you count them—are generally those who moved at a very early age into the English-language stream, usually through mission schools and government-supported schools designed to supply the ruling regime with a supply of English-speaking employees and junior civil servants. Many retained the Hakka, Hokkien, or Cantonese dialects learned at home as children, but many lost even this limited speaking acquaintance with the ancestral tongue and remained entirely illiterate in Chinese as they proceeded to become English-speaking, English-reading, and English-writing. They completely 'lost' the China their brothers were gaining in the Chinese schools

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and gained instead the history of the British Empire—*England über alles*—and fragments of the world of Drake, Elizabeth, Shakespeare, Raffles, Nelson, Wordsworth, and Tennyson. They acquired not merely a language but a body of knowledge, a way of life, an outlook, and a political orientation that carried them at a sharp tangent away from their Chinese-educated brothers. This is a difference made up of many things, many of them bitter, ironic, or paradoxical, but the hard essence of the matter is that to the Chinese-educated China remained the most important place in the world; to the English-educated it did not. The English-educated did not lose their Chineseness, but it no longer included the total commitment to their Chinese background, history, and origins which their Chinese-educated brothers acquired and fight to retain. Hence these are the Chinese who more than any other seriously seek a way of integrating as *Malayans*. Malaya has more truly become their homeland, and they want, some of them desperately, to become fully qualified participants in its affairs.

In this aim they are deeply and painfully frustrated, in the first place by the barrier that the Malays put in their way, but even more, one suspects, by the blocks they discover within themselves. No matter how much less 'Chinese' they may be than their Chinese-educated brothers, they remain very much Chinese vis-à-vis the Malays. They may perhaps feel that British, or Western, culture is worthy of respect and capable of commanding a major degree of assimilation on their part, even as Chinese. But they are quite unable to see Malay culture, or a Malay-dominated culture, in anything like the same light. They can sometimes see a faint hope of joining with their English-educated Malay and Indian counterparts to build a new society based on the language and values absorbed from their English education, but this hope remains a feeble one, given their present numbers and circumstances. On the other hand, they cannot see themselves becoming a part of the currently dominant Islamic and conservative Malay society which, despite its own great fragility and peril, continues to offer them nothing more than an unacceptable second-class status. Indeed, as they see themselves through these prisms, Chinese and Malays find it almost impossible now to see each other on any common ground.

The Post-Colonial Filipinos

THE COMPLEXITIES OF CREATING a new national identity out of a long colonial past are well illustrated by the Philippines. The group identities that appear most visibly on the open surfaces of everyday Filipino life are those relating to the various regional identities—Tagalog, Visayan, Pampengeno, Ilocano, etc.—which still have the most meaning for the majority of Filipinos. There are other deep and strong feelings less directly expressed among Filipinos about their various ethnic mixtures, about having Spanish or Chinese antecedents, or having this or that shade of colour of skin, or this or that kind of eyes or nose. These are the issues of identity most vivid to the great mass

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Filipinos. Among many intellectuals and writers, however, there has been a growing concern with the need to define their Filipino identity by resolving the layers of Filipino history, of its Malay, Spanish, and American parts, among which they have begun to search for an identity they can feel is distinctively their own.

Some of these searchers seem troubled by the fear that they are a people who have always taken on and worn the features of others, that nothing authentically *Filipino* is there. Out of this has come an impulse to look with new eyes at the remote 'Malay' past. The peoples of the Philippines come from the same 'Malay' or related aboriginal stock that peopled most of South-East Asia in the prehistoric past. In the Philippines this ancient stock and its culture have been best preserved among the mountain tribes. Until recently these hillsmen were looked upon by the Christian Filipino lowlanders as pagan, primitive, and savage. Now the hill people are beginning to be regarded by some as older, purer brothers, untainted by Spanish or Chinese infusions, or by any of the multiple borrowings of foreign ways and creeds. There is now a government Commission on Integration whose job it is to restore to the mountain peoples their rights and dignities as citizens of the republic, though no one is sure whether the aim should be to assimilate or to pluralize. There is a certain cult of romantic glorification of the tribal arts: dance troupes dance their dances, scholars collect their artifacts, and artists carve and paint their rough-hewn lines and bright colours. This new view of the distant past has made its way also into the realm of high policy, the 'common Malay stock' becoming a major theme in the rhetoric surrounding the abortive Maphilindo pact which linked the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaya for a few weeks in the summer of 1963.

As a new source of self-esteem, a resurrected 'Malay' past may leave something to be desired. The Malay peoples of South-East Asia seem to have been less able than any other Asian people to resist invading alien religions, Islam in Malaya and Indonesia, and Catholicism in the Philippines. The new arrivals found some Hindu underpinnings, brought long before from the outside, which had been superimposed on the animism of the indigenous cultures. Some of these survived more or less intact, as in Hindu Bali and in Java, but both Hindu and animist backgrounds showed through mainly in the way the new dominant beliefs came to be held and practised. Whatever may be the meaning of this greater permeability, it would seem at least that all the 'Malay' peoples have to dig a lot harder to uncover their own distinctive past greatnesses than, for example, the Indians or the Chinese. Indeed, some Filipinos with whom I discussed the question of their distant ancestors seemed not only not to draw pride from the association, but appeared to blame them for the meekness and weakness with which they received, accepted, and buckled under to foreign conquering forces, whether of arms or of creed or both.

The Philippines, in any case, were much more thickly layered than

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the other colonized areas of South-East Asia. The British and Dutch colonial systems left bad enough alone and thus allowed much more of the former cultural systems and practices to survive. During their 300 years' rule, the Spanish reshaped much more of what they found and this was done primarily through the Catholic Church. The Church became the principal instrument of Spanish power and placed its heavy imprint on the whole culture in a host of visible and invisible ways. Revolution, when it finally came in the 1890s, was anti-clerical and anti-Church, and although the revolutionaries voted for separation of Church and state (by a single vote), the Church survived the abuses of its friars and hierarchy, the revolution, and even the replacement of Spanish power by American. Neither an independent national Church started by the anti-Spanish revolutionaries, nor the Protestant creeds introduced by the Americans, seriously dented the hold of the Church on the population, which has remained more than 80 per cent Catholic. This history made the Philippines 'the only Christian nation in Asia', of which the older generation was generally proud; it raised them above all the other heathen peoples of Asia. But now it makes some of the younger generation wince, because it is what makes them, they feel, 'un-Asian', and keeps them separated from their true blood-brothers.

Besides the pervasiveness of the religion, the Spanish impress was laid hard on every other aspect of the country's life, starting with its very name, which honours a Spanish monarch, and the name Filipino that the people now go by and the individual names many of them bear. It shaped the country's customs and folkways, its dancing, dress, and indirectly but powerfully affected its languages. Although only a tiny proportion of the people ever spoke Spanish, its accent and vocabulary were absorbed by the major Filipino tongues to such an extent that many Filipinos who never spoke any Spanish nevertheless speak English with what sounds very much like a Spanish or Latin American accent. It is in keeping with the strong Latin American aura that overhangs even some of the most Americanized precincts of Filipino life. People attribute many of their ways to the Spanish influence, the authoritarian family system, *mañana* habits, florid styles of temperament, speech, and dress, and notions of 'pride' and 'honour'. Perhaps most important of all, it was from the Spaniards that the Filipinos acquired their own aristocratic upper class, the land-owing *mestizos*, who in contrast to the Eurasians everywhere else in colonial Asia became, in accordance with the Spanish practice established in Latin America, part of the ruling class. They remain, next to the 'pure blood' Spaniards still in evidence, the most prestigious segment of the upper class in the Philippines to this day. If middle- and upper-class Filipinos are proud of anything at all, they are proudest of those features of their own life and society which they acquired, or can claim to have acquired, from Spain.

From their American period, which lasted about fifty years, Filipinos

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are most likely to say that they acquired their system of universal education, which gave them the highest literacy rate of any colony in Asia and the highest proportion of educated women, a new set of political ideas, and a set of political institutions built on American models. From these, with all their remarkable imperfections, they somehow acquired the strong sense of a stake of their own in their society which made them the only people in South-East Asia to resist the Japanese invasion. From these also comes the high degree of political stability and government by electoral consensus which the Philippines have enjoyed almost alone among the newly independent nations. They also acquired a mangled English as a *lingua franca* spoken by an estimated 40 per cent of the population, and a substantial slice of the urban population has acquired a thin veneer of the super-market-billboard-radio-TV-cars-Coca Cola-soap-sex-deodorant syndrome that passes in so many places for the typical externals of the good American life.

These different threads are woven together to make some of the more notable designs one can find in Filipino life now. The formal nationalist tradition, the heroes, martyrs, holidays, observances, are all associated with the strongly anti-clerical 1896 revolution against Spain, while among its informal values, the society rates most highly its legacies from Spain, including its Roman Catholicism. There is no formal nationalist tradition at all attached to the period of American rule, while currently at the more informal levels of attitude and feeling, especially among younger intellectuals, there is strong hostility and rejection coupled with great ambivalence in relation to the American influence. It is difficult to resist the analogy which would suggest that the authoritarian grandfather has fared much better than the permissive father. Among those seeking to reassert the distinctive Filipino identity, no one is suggesting that the Catholic Church close its doors, and when it comes to expressing national feeling by changing names, Dewey Boulevard becomes Roxas Boulevard. The painful difficulty is that there is a Yank inside these young Filipinos who cannot go home, no matter how much they rail at him to do so. I heard one mature professor bemoan the fact that the American colonizers undertook to establish a system of mass education; had they ignored it, as the Dutch did in Indonesia, Filipinos now, he thought, would be having a simpler time establishing patterns of their own.

Every so often, amid much hand-wringing and talk about the lack of any clear definition of Filipino identity, someone tries again to suggest that all cultures are mixtures of many near and far influences, absorbed and changed by the genius of the mixers, and that neither the Spanish nor the American layers are the same things in the Philippines that they were in Spain or America. This is true, even obvious, but does not satisfy the seekers. They still want to discover what that unique 'genius' of their own might be. Many Filipinos already wear their coat of many colours gracefully, but many will not wear it more proudly

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

until they have rewoven the many threads of their history into some new design which they will be readier than they are now to recognize as their very own.

The Post-Imperial Japanese

THE MYTHS OF JAPANESE HISTORY play a large and obvious part in Japanese self-esteem. This is found mainly among members of the older generation, but even the most radical among the young Japanese are likely to say they are 'proud' of Japan's 'tradition', or at least to identify this tradition as an essential ingredient of 'Japaneseness'.

Admittedly this 'tradition' is regarded in different ways. As a fellow-inquirer acutely remarked, those aspects of the Japanese past that are valued and admired by young people in Japan now are called 'Japanese' and 'traditional', while those that are disliked and rejected become 'feudalistic' and are not described as being distinctively 'Japanese' at all. In the same way, what they like or embrace in the present-day culture they call 'modern', while anything in it they do not like becomes 'Westernized', or 'Americanized', or simply 'capitalistic'.[5] In general, however, it seems safe to say that most Japanese in one way or another enjoy the sensations there are to be gained from feeling that they are of a people with a long recorded history, and can have a sense of greatness conveyed by their historic myths, of beauty transmitted by their ancient arts, and even of romantic swagger borne by their folklore and transmitted, more currently, by their Samurai films. The pride and pleasure they extract from this past is modified at various points, and one of the most important of these seems to be a strong sense of the special parenthood, or at least mentorhood, of China, a relationship that goes back a dozen or more centuries. This is what gave an almost patricidal quality to the emotions felt by some over the assaults on China that Japan began to make seventy years ago, and this is what supplies that unique feeling of guilt that some Japanese feel about China and about none of the other victims of Japan's abortive attempt to make itself master of all Asia.

While Japan's remoter history seems to remain a more or less stable element in Japanese self-awareness and self-esteem, it is this more recent history—of the last hundred years or so—that figures more dynamically in the group identity problem that now presses in upon so many Japanese, especially the youth. The heart of this problem is their need to redefine the identity of the Japanese nation, for it is through the concept of the nation that everything in the Japanese culture-past and culture-present comes into focus. The Meiji transformation that began in 1868 created a nation that generated new kinds of power, put ancient myths to work to serve new ends, and which set out under the leadership of its armed forces to challenge Western mastery in Asia. Within scarcely half a century it came astoundingly close to achieving its military

[5] Deborah S. Isaacs, 'A Research Report on Some Young People in Changing Japan', unpub. MS. (December, 1963).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

objectives. But it failed to achieve and lead a real mobilization of Asian nationalism. Its military power alone, based on very narrow resources, was not and never could have been a match for that of the United States, and Japan went down. As it was, Japan's attempted conquest did trigger political revolutions long overdue in most of Asia, but they did not come to a head until Japan itself was crushed. All things considered, it was from any standpoint one of the most extraordinary near-misses in the history of power struggles.

What was crushed by the defeat of 1945 was the nation created by the Meiji reforms, a semi-mystical system of total authority rising through all of the hierarchies of the society to the Emperor at the summit. Japan was transformed by the swift and deliberate embrace of modern technology into an instrument of power, and by the shrewd use of the old myths and new drives into a system for total mobilization of the minds and energies of the people. This is the structure that was shattered in 1945, and since then the Japanese have had to deal with the problem of reassembling themselves as a group. This focuses on the nation, the pre-war generation trying to salvage the one they knew, the wartime generation continuing to be gripped by the paralysing sense of having been betrayed by what they had believingly accepted, and the post-war generation vainly seeking larger coherences to replace the nation as the object of their allegiances. The process of change in Japan, taking place alongside and within the remarkable economic reconstruction and social transformation of the post-war decades, has been centred on the nation, getting away from it, getting back to it, changing it, in some way re-creating it, in any case trying to fill with something new, or at least something different, the empty space created at the centre of Japanese life by the defeat. The striving for supra-national substitutes has turned out, especially for the post-war youth generation, a grasp at empty air. They have found their reidentification neither in international pacifism nor in international communism, the former being cynically used by the latter, and the latter itself breaking spectacularly into its separate national parts, forcing even the most radical Japanese back on a new 'Japanism', a new 'national communism' of their own.

This process of rediscovery and reshaping of the Japanese nation is taking place at many different levels and appears in contemporary Japanese life in many forms, from the open reavowal of the existence of Japanese 'national interests' and power and the restoration of flag and anthem as national symbols, to the flocking of millions to the Shinto shrines on traditional occasions. The gloss of Japan's ancient history is being made to shine again in new ways. But even more importantly, the task of reinterpreting its more recent history has begun. Some conservative writers have embarked on a bold effort to re-establish a more self-justifying view of Japan's wars of conquest in Asia and the Pacific during the first half of this century. Far from being a history of purely militarist aggression for which all Japanese should feel ashamed,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

runs the argument, it was in fact a war of liberation in Asia and must be seen, through the dust and rubble of the defeat, as one of the great crowning achievements of the Japanese genius. In the discussion this opened, one can begin to see the fallen Japanese reintegrating their past with their present and beginning in this way to put their national parts together again.

Black Nationalism in the United States

THE IDEA OF BLACK NATIONALISM has recently been regaining currency as an answer to the problem of Negro separateness in American society. It appears, as it has many times before, as an expression of despair. After more than a decade of great change, raising great hopes for some successful measure of integration, the American civil rights revolution has almost come to a halt at the edges of the spreading ghettoes and deepening poverty of the central cities. The exhilaration of the victories which ended legal segregation of Negroes in the public domains of American life has given way to a certain smothered and angry hopelessness. The swelling ghetto mass lives in a state of highly combustible apathy. Many young Negroes, both of the ghetto and the middle class, are caught up in the Fanonist appeal to violence as a cathartic and as a ticket to true manhood. Many more, of all ages and classes, are experiencing a return of that old and crushing conviction that the American open society, which has opened in recent years to so many other kinds of people, will never open wide enough to admit *them*, that they will never be able to live as free men in the land of the free, and that since America will not let them *in*, their only choice is to opt *out*.

Despair is nothing new among Negroes in America. Neither is opting out. For a long time Negroes opted out mostly by turning on themselves all the hatred and rejection generated by the all-powerful white world outside. But in almost every generation in the history of the United States as a nation, there have been some Negroes who have sought to opt out quite literally, i.e. to migrate and to create a nation of their own. The long history of such efforts includes the migrationist movements of the pre-Civil War decades when Negroes looked for new homelands in Africa, South America, the Caribbean, and Canada; those of the post-Reconstruction years when small scattered attempts were made to find in the American south-west the freedom which had not come with the end of slavery; the spectacular 'back-to-Africa' movement of Marcus Garvey in the 1920s in the backwash of the receding hope that a war fought to make the world safe for democracy was going to make America a safely democratic place for its own Negro citizens; the smaller outcroppings of the '49th state movement' and the attempt of the Communist Party in the 1930s to win Negroes to the idea of 'self-determination in the Black Belt'; and in more recent years the demand of the Black Muslim movement for 'two or three states' of the United States in which to establish a new black nation. None of

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

these movements ever produced a significant migration of substantial numbers of Negroes. Liberia, founded by free Negro migrants in 1820, was created by a white-inspired colonization movement, not by militant black migrationists. Scattered Negroes have migrated to become expatriates in Europe and more recently in Africa. But the great mass has remained rooted where it was planted in American life, holding fast to the fact that W. E. B. DuBois never tired of stressing that 'there is nothing so indigenous, so completely "made in America"' as Negro Americans are. They have remained doggedly intent on making, keeping, and improving their place right here. This remains the situation today, when despite the great muddled impasse and the great frustration of the moment, great changes are taking place, greater perhaps than any except in the time of the Civil War, in the status of Negroes in the American society.

This may be why the idea of actual migration—leaving the United States for some other part of the world—continues to be heard only at the outer margins of the current black militant movement. There are still small groups of followers of Marcus Garvey who call on Negroes to return en masse to Africa. But independent Africa apparently offers no greater attractions to Negro Americans than colonial Africa did. With rare exceptions, the new Negro separationists in America propose to do their separating—or somehow solve their problems—on American soil. This includes the idea of partition, some of the more radical fringe of the current militants adopting some version of the Black Muslim formula for the creation of 'a separate, free, independent nation for black people' on the territory of three or five of the Southern states.

As it is now used by Negro militants, the term 'black nationalism' has many different meanings, or more often no clearly defined meaning at all. It is not yet the rallying cry of any single large movement nor the label for any coherent or explicit political programme for separation. Some individuals use it as the other side of the coin of 'Black Power', that other more widely heard but equally imprecise slogan of the hour. Both are used to express a feeling so far little supported by any detailed plans or serious attempts at organization. They serve mainly to express the mood of desperate and angry counter-assertion among younger and more radical Negroes. They also offer new, though still unlocated, points of departure for some less radical middle-class Negroes who are finding that their own lives cannot become tolerable until life becomes more tolerable for the group with whom they are inescapably identified.

The ultra-radical black extremists, whose voices now are magnified far beyond their tiny numbers, translate 'black nationalism' into the 'national liberation struggle'. They seek to identify themselves with international ultra-revolutionism of the Peking-Hanoi-Havana-Algiers varieties, to become part of the vanguard of the great struggle that is going to overthrow capitalism and imperialism, especially in its principal, American variety. This provides an elaborate political rationalization

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for what remains essentially a nihilist fantasy; the 'revolution' becomes an approaching racial Armageddon for which 'the die is cast'. What these angry black ultras mainly want to do is to burn the place down, or at least express themselves by threatening to do so. In this context, however, much use is made of the colonial analogy, the idea that America's 20,000,000 Negroes are its colonial subjects, that the Negro struggle against American white mastery in America is the same as the struggle of other non-whites against European white mastery in Asia and Africa. Indeed, as DuBois suggested nearly seventy years ago and many others since, the analogy covers much common experience and many similar emotions. Many common threads link the rise and fall of white empires in Asia and Africa with that of white supremacy in the United States. But in so far as a nationalist struggle has to have political goals, these have to relate to national emancipation, the overthrow of foreign rule and its replacement by national self-rule. In the American setting this outlook runs into some obvious difficulties. The essentially national-political goals that South Africa's 80 per cent majority blacks can set for themselves are not available to America's 10 per cent minority blacks, unless one is willing to settle for migration or can find any reality in the prospect of a black-white partition of American territory itself.

None of this concerns the American black ultras at the moment, as they have no interest in any reality solutions. In so far as they are concerned with political goals, they want, they say, to launch a 'guerrilla war' in American cities as one way of meeting the late Che Guevara's call for 'two or three new Vietnams' as the best way of bringing down the American imperialist monster. In this Maoist-Fanonist fantasy there are no serious politics, only a limited but nevertheless serious capacity to commit violence that could provoke massive white repression and widen the polarization of white and black in American society.

The more moderate extremists in the Black Power movement do not want the violence of the ultras; they want what the threat of such violence might wring from the white society. They use the term 'black nationalism' loosely and sometimes interchangeably with 'Black Power' to describe the various kinds of separation they now believe they must have. Some of them want this separation for ever, some want it to build positions of strength from which they will be able to opt back into the society later on better terms. What they all share, however, is not so much a conversion to a new faith in separation as a loss of their old faith in the prospects of integration. They are withdrawing, psychologically and physically, from the battle for effective inclusion in the American society. This is producing the often bizarre spectacle of some Negroes rebuilding the walls which other Negroes spent their lives fighting to destroy. Black militancy now calls for the tactic of the 'black caucus' to separate Negroes as a distinct group in all kinds of organizations and institutions. The aim is to give new substance to

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

separate racial enclaves within the society. Its ironic outcome, which too many whites would probably be glad to help bring about, could be the creation of a new set of peculiarly American Bantustans, a new form of American apartheid.

Negro separationists indignantly reject the South African analogy, arguing that they are already caught in a white-imposed and white-controlled segregation which has left the great mass of Negroes in unrelieved and worsening poverty and degradation. They seek, they say, a black-imposed and black-controlled separation in which they will be able to help themselves to improve their own conditions of life. They advocate 'black-controlled communities' in what are now the central city ghettoes, and there have been suggestions for establishing this new Black Power in communities elsewhere in the country, wherever there are pockets of heavily concentrated Negro populations. All of this is to be financed by funds from the white majority provided by way of reparations for past deprivation. Floyd McKissick of CORE gives a national cast to his programme for a 'parallel society' by half-jokingly invoking the example of Indonesia, a nation of many islands scattered over a vast area of sea. The black nation in America, he suggests, would consist of black islands called Watts, Harlem, Hough, the South Side, Newark, etc., dotting the vast sea of white America.

What forms this new Negro separationism might take and what direction the American society might move in as a result of black or white action or inaction in the next few years is a matter for bleak speculation which we will forgo here. The despair reflected among the so-called black militants is shared to no small extent by growing numbers of middle-class Negroes who find themselves less and less able to keep dreaming the integrationist dream, less and less able to define what might take its place. This is a mood of despair deepened by the bleak bluntness of the Kerner Commission Report, the assassination of Martin Luther King and of Robert Kennedy, and the slowness of society in coming round to do what must be done to face the crisis of the cities, of poverty, and of race, which now dominates American life. In the events of the next few years, the long-drawn-out identity crisis of Negroes in America will approach some new point of definition, some new resolution of that duality, *Negro* and *American*, of which DuBois wrote so vividly in his oft-quoted phrase of long ago. Negroes in America have been placed yet forever displaced, rooted yet held rootless, included yet relentlessly excluded, this duality making them national and alien at the same time. Through all their long history in the United States, they have been struggling to throw off this duality and have known much more defeat than victory in this effort. This has led some Negroes to stop trying vainly to become *American* and to try to become something else that would simply be *Negro*. But now all they had to do was to discover or decide what a *Negro* is. In this crucial connexion, in considering the meaning of black nationalism in America, the key word to fix on is not *nationalism*, but *black*. For

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

whatever new revolution in American affairs they may or may not bring about, the new black militants of this generation in America have already sparked a profound revolution in the way Negro Americans see themselves as *blacks*.

Here, I believe, lies the true heart of the matter. Respect and acceptance from others is the obverse of respect and acceptance of oneself. The struggle to achieve a self-respecting identity as humans among fellow-humans has been and remains the deepest, strongest, most lasting and ever-driving force that has moved Negro Americans of every generation. Defining this identity is the problem that haunts every Negro American, be he moderate or radical, a success in the white man's world or a victim lost in the black world of the slums, a prisoner in the ghetto of the mind or in the rat-infested actuality. All the great literature produced by Negroes, all the poetry, all the song, all the pain and all the struggle, all the tangle for clarity, for relationship, for acceptance by self and by others—all of this has revolved around the central question of identity, like a planet whose light and warmth are felt but which has never been seen or named. Like many movements before it, the present Black Power radicalism is engaged primarily in a fresh effort to find answers to long-unanswered questions.

This is the essential meaning of the elevation of the word 'black' to ordinary and common and, inevitably for the time being, aggressive use. It has a long and complex history and deep psychological roots.[6] It swirls in and out of the long-standing ambivalence over the term 'Negro', the deeply cut and never-healing sores of debasement and rejection stemming from slavery and from the white world's image of the black man's African origins and Negro personality itself. From this, with time, came the substitution of the old euphemism 'coloured' and the almost total avoidance of the term 'black' as the term of shame, anger, violence, vituperation, distaste, or disgust. The term 'Afro-American' was first introduced in the 1890s as part of an earlier attempt at self-assertion by Negroes. It persisted fitfully until recent years, when the African emergence brought it wider currency and wider acceptance among more radical Negro Americans. Negro radicals down through the years have often tried to restore the word 'black' to common usage and 'blackness' to some more self-respecting and self-accepting plane of awareness. In his great years as editor of *Crisis*, DuBois pushed the word hard at his strongly resisting readers. It has fallen to the current Black Power movement to be the first to succeed in re-establishing the free use of the term 'black' in the vocabulary of Negro self-expression.

This is no small victory, but it brings with it no small burden. The term 'black', used as noun or adjective to describe a person or a group, carries with it the inescapable stamp of physical definition, of racialism. Whatever the intention of the user, it has the effect of attaching to a purely physical characteristic a quality common to a group which is far from uniformly black in actual colour. What haunts the choice of this

[6] See *The New World of Negro Americans* (New York, 1963).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

word as the primary symbol of Negro identity is the difficulty of knowing what precisely to attach to it as a common characteristic shared by all Negroes. It is too much like trying to discover what it is that attaches to all white men by virtue of their whiteness. Marcus Garvey in his time used 'black' as the key word of aggressive self-assertion and separation. He used it, moreover, in its specifically racialist, physical meaning, for he spoke for race purity, appealing to the black poor against their mulatto betters, as well as to all Negroes against whites. As *négritude*, a state of blackness uniquely endowed with special stores of the richest stuff of life, this physical characteristic was elevated into a slogan and a dream by the French West Indian poet Aimé Césaire more than a generation ago. It was a concept which more hard-headed American Negroes and Africans from non-Gallic Africa found difficult to accept, partly because of its poetic vagueness, but mainly because of its insistence on physical-racial roots for mental, emotional, or cultural characteristics, a notion which fighters against white supremacy had been going to a lot of trouble for many years to refute and deny. Among some Negro Americans this idea has reappeared recently, euphemistically disguised as 'soul'.

At the present time, the term 'black' is serving its users not as the bearer of any explicit positive content but as a powerful counter-assertion, good enough in and of itself as a challenge to all the shrinking self-debasement and self-denial of Negroes in the past. Up to a point it can serve as a symbol for a shared history of oppression and rejection and of struggle to overcome it. But it leaves the problem of Negro group identity still far from satisfactorily defined. It leaves Negroes who are not literally black, as most Negro Americans are not, with the need to resolve the relation of their relative blackness to all the other legacies of their mixed inheritance. The effort at definition goes on, an effort begun long ago and shared by Negroes of every generation, of every kind and persuasion. Hence the heightened efforts to regain for Negroes a sense of a past in which they can take pride, to restore to the history books and school textbooks and children's story books accounts of the role played by black men in their own history and in every chapter of the American story, accounts unknown or ignored by the white writers of white texts for white children in a white world in which Negroes existed only as non-persons. Hence also the new search for some redefinition of links between Negroes in America and Africans in Africa. Hence the attempt to discover how Negro children can find, at home, in school, in the communities where they live, a sense of being which will provide them with that necessary measure of self-acceptance that every person needs in order to relate adequately to his fellows.

Most people, especially if they are Americans, find this in some selected aspects of the shared and mixed heritage they possess. The question is whether Negroes can in fact find it in some racially distinct social or individual separateness, or must find some other answer to the question of who and what they are. This remains the unfinished

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

business of the Negro identity crisis, a long time in the making and with a long time to go in the solving. The goal of the Negro's struggle for identity in America has been to resolve his duality, to shake the blur into some single or coherent image of himself as a person and as an American. This is not peculiarly the Negro's problem, as James Baldwin has reminded us, quoting Henry James: 'It is a complex fate to be an American.' The label 'American', Baldwin goes on, has remained 'a new, almost completely undefined and extremely controversial proper noun'. As Negroes get on with the business of deciding who and what they are, they will also be deciding to no small extent who and what Americans are.

A good way to keep informed about European and World Affairs is to read regularly the journal of the German Society for Foreign Affairs:

EUROPA-ARCHIV

Zeitschrift für internationale Politik
Begründet von Wilhelm Cornides

EUROPA-ARCHIV, now in its twenty-third year of publication, contains articles and documents on international relations and a current chronology of world events as well as a monthly bibliography of recent publications in the field of international relations

Articles in recent issues:

Felix Oboussier	Euratom und der Kernwaffen-Sperrvertrag
Lothar Ruehl	Frankreichs "Mai-Revolution" und ihre Folgen
John Erickson	Konventionelle Kriegführung in der sowjetischen Kriegstheorie
Manfred Schreiterer	Aussen-Wissenschaftspolitik als Faktor der modernen Aussenpolitik
Werner K. Tillmann	Die lateinamerikanische Wirtschaftsintegration nach Punta del Este

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION (24 ISSUES): DM 65, PLUS POSTAGE
SPECIMEN COPIES ON REQUEST

EUROPA-ARCHIV, VERTRIEB
6 FRANKFURT AM MAIN, POSTFACH 3685

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

'ATTACK OR DEFEND . . . .' —SHOLOKHOV EXAMINED

Patrick Waddington

'"WOMAN'S magazine stuff." **Attack or defend this common British attitude to** *Destiny of a Man*.'

This is the question which on 1 July this year bewildered, affronted, or delighted 50 candidates in the Cambridge Board Advanced Level Russian literature paper. They had not expected this. The Sholokhov was one of seven set books, and half the schools had studied it. The modern alternatives were Bunin and Nagibin, the one somewhat highbrow and the other altogether too recent for critical analysis. But Sholokhov, for all his popularity of choice, was still a Prescribed Author, someone to be approached with a certain amount of awe and a great deal of cautious respect. Many, indeed, preferred the option they were given to consider rather why Sholokhov had chosen Andrei Sokolov to typify his generation; but 27 candidates—a quarter of the total entry—decided to stand the hazard. Their essays were for the most part fascinating.

Destiny of a Man, variously referred to by candidates in this examination as a 'story', a 'novel', and a 'play', would occupy about a third of a number one size Penguin Book. In proportions, scope, and intent it is in no way comparable with *Quiet Flows the Don*. The two works have, however, been compared, and not only by Advanced Level candidates. *Destiny of a Man* was written for the readers of *Pravda*,[1] and seems to be primarily the reply of a patriot and a conservative to the liberalizing thaw now quickened by the 'secret speech'. One was 'for' or 'against' Dudintsev, 'for' or 'against' Ehrenburg, Evtushenko, and the rumoured activity of Pasternak at Peredelkino. Nevertheless there is a certain *post facto* truth in this remark by Dennis Ogden: 'Every so often there appears a literary work which, as it were, sums up the experience of an entire people at a decisive moment in its history. One such work is *Destiny of a Man*.'[2]

The sociological importance of the work was emphasized by many candidates. One boy, rejoicing in a resonantly English name, but clearly with ancestry somewhat nearer to the Urals, declared with unusual violence that Sokolov was typical of Soviet Man: his patriotism and moral strength of purpose epitomized his country's noble achievements. A Polish candidate said he considered the story as primarily a history book. Several people saw it simply in terms of Soviet propaganda,

[1] It was published, in two instalments, on the last day of 1956 and the first day of 1957.

[2] *Daily Worker*, 25 February 1965.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

though one girl managed to interpret Sokolov as an 'international example of a victim of the cruelty and suffering of World War Two, and the fact that he is Russian is immaterial'. One prim, well-primed young lady objected to the essay-title: 'I cannot possibly agree with this statement. It is completely prejudiced because of the necessity in the Soviet society to write to party dictates . . . and does not consider the artistic qualities of Sholokhov which shine through these restrictions.'

Now apart from its inappropriateness to the aims of the reactionary Sholokhov, this last quotation is uncannily informative. It is widely assumed (and candidates are being taught, or not discouraged from assuming) that since a particular style of writing is *necessary* in the Soviet Union, we are *prejudiced* if we judge it by conventional standards, and should be grateful for such artistic merits as may appear. This, of course, is the fruit of half a century of Soviet logic: he who is not for us is against us; he who discriminates is anti-Soviet. He who attacks *Destiny of a Man* is attacking the Soviet Union; he who praises *Doctor Zhivago* is praising Kerensky, the Whites, the Tsar. Literature is politics and so is literary criticism.

In a less than usually oblique assault on this position,[3] Vladimir Tendryakov has complained that students are made to learn whether Evgeny Onegin was a progressive character, but not that he is a superb creation. 'I sometimes conclude that literature would be best not taught at all.' The social and political nature of criticism is of course not new in Russia, as students, say, of Dobrolyubov will know to their cost; but Soviet criticism of this kind is old and stultified, and many writers born under Soviet rule are now impatient of it all. During the second destalinizing wave, the novelist Viktor Nekrasov (*non vates*, later said Khrushchev) was allowed to publish some extraordinary travel notes on Italy and America in that journal of the vanguard, *Novyi Mir*.[4] He relates how Pasolini, himself well to the left, had complained of Soviet cinema and literature as being too 'naïve and sentimental' for progressive Western tastes.

> 'Soviet artists', he said, 'are passing through a complex period of crisis. . . . They are seeking to define their position now the age of Stalin is past, and trying to skip what we know as decadence. This is right; . . . but they are in fact discovering the movement which preceded it, by which I mean romanticism, in the sense of innocence and purity.'

We could not now be satisfied with this, and it seemed that in the Soviet Union in particular this mood was out of place.

> 'The age of Stalin was truly tragic for all of us; but now, technological advances and the wonderful feeling of optimism which they have provoked pose awfully serious problems for the whole of

[3] *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 28 February 1968.

[4] November 1962. This was the issue which stunned its readers by the publication of Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> mankind. Moon rockets are not only a source of colossal pride for the Soviet Union; they also compel us, I would say, to see the world's suffering, ignorance and poverty in a new light. The position, then, is a difficult one. What we expect from Soviet writers is the creation of truly tragic works, if necessary bitter and even savage works, works in which all of this can be expressed.'

Nekrasov's answer to Pasolini is admirably sober and undogmatic. It is clear that by repeating the Italian's argument at such length he is, in fact, himself attacking Soviet romanticism: he commonly adopts this technique throughout the notes. Nevertheless, his reasoned reply is the best explanation we have for the popularity of Evtushenko and *Ballad of a Soldier* (which Pasolini had chiefly in mind); it also sheds an interesting light on the ambiguous prestige of Sholokhov:

> Everything [Pasolini] considers to be tragic is well known to us; but I assure him that to talk about it, still more to write about it, is not as easy as all that. For it is not simply a question of one man's tragedy, nor even of hundreds or of thousands of men; it is the tragedy of an entire people. And if our literature has not yet begun to speak genuinely about that complicated, bitter, and contradictory period that is known as the cult of the personality, then it is only a question of time. Soviet literature cannot pass over the tragic events of our lives. . . . As Tvardovsky [has] said, 'in art and in literature, as in love, one can only tell lies for a time; sooner or later the time will come when the whole truth will be told'.

The romantic cult of the Patriotic War was encouraged by Stalin in an attempt to divert attention from his own brand of patriotism at home. Soviet writers and artists are so imbued with the indisputable heroism and suffering of their people that the consequent emotional simplicity of their works is inappropriate to an analysis of their people's shame and guilt. Socialist realism is now a Soviet romanticism.

Some of the truth was told, of course, by Solzhenitsyn, whom Sholokhov condemns: for Sholokhov is unrepentantly romantic, and *Destiny of a Man* would doubtless still be his answer to those progressives he so much despises. One candidate in the examination, a soldier, put it very well:

> During his purge against freethinking writers, Khrushchev held up *Destiny of a Man* as an exemplar of Soviet literature. Sholokhov makes no bones of his loyalties: he survived Stalin, found a way to express himself profitably, and followed it. Let no Western critic confuse this with the primrose path of woman's magazine fiction, the writer of which forgoes all claim to serious attention under no compulsion greater than greed or lack of talent. Pasternak made his name as a poet of nature and love before Stalin. He was established as a champion of the individual, and could not go back on that reputation without extinguishing his talent. Sholokhov was the celebrant of the Red victory. We cannot repudiate his sincerity, for a number of Western gentlemen set a delicate foot

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the bloody quagmire of Soviet Russia and pronounced it exhilarating. When the Stalinist night fell, Pasternak ceased to write; Sholokhov wrote *Virgin Soil Upturned.*

The opening of *Destiny of a Man* reminded the candidate of Turgenev. 'Sholokhov's style, however, is indisputably masculine; the femininity of Turgenev and the school of Stendhal accords ill with the Soviet/Nazi "strength through joy" ideal.' Sholokhov was consciously preaching to the young: not, like Henty, to glorify war, but rather to demonstrate its shame. 'Character is little defined, schmalz abounds, but in the final analysis this is the loss of twenty-five million souls.' For this candidate, as for several others less articulate, the book was a considerable achievement.

IS *Destiny of a Man,* then, simply a historical sermon? Is it, after all, impossible to criticize the story by literary criteria and find it wanting? A most perceptive young man from Essex, wishing to avoid the natural desire to be cynical at what for him was insipid and melodramatic propaganda, underlined the value of *Destiny of a Man* as a social document, a record of the incredible stoicism of the Russian people in the face of endless suffering. 'It may be', he concluded, 'that its ideas still seem to us false and contrived, but that would then merely be literary criticism'. This astonishing statement is perhaps best explained by a brief summary of what the story is all about.

It opens with a lyrical and slightly over-extended description of spring in the Upper Don. The narrator is waiting to cross a river when there arrive a man with a slight stoop and a boy of 5 or 6. The man, whose eyes are full of mortal sorrow, is Andrei Sokolov. He now relates his story. He was born in 1900, served in the Red Army during the Civil War, lost his parents and his sister in the famine of 1922, and did battle with the kulaks. He then settled down to marriage with a woman far better than himself who understood his ragings and his drunkenness. They had a son and two daughters, and Sokolov began to sober up. The son was very clever; they managed to scrape up enough money to build a little house; and all was very pleasant and peaceful. The war broke out. Sokolov, for long a lorry-driver, was called up to the front. Stubborn in his will to duty, he pushed aside his wife as she was saying they would never meet again on earth. His gallant exploits did not last for long: on a particularly daring sortie in his lorry he was captured by the Germans and taken to a camp. During a stop at a church several of his comrades were shot because one of them, a believer, could not bring himself to defile the temple of God; Sokolov's dislocated arm was set by a doctor 'doing his great duty even in the darkness'; and, with another comrade, Sokolov strangled a would-be betrayer. After a round of camps and an attempt to escape, he ended up as chauffeur to a major in the Engineers—but not before he had refused, almost dropping with hunger and thirst, to drink to the victory

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the German armies, whereupon the commandant in question had told him he was a true Russian soldier. Sokolov eventually escaped with his fat major and was complimented on the prize. Hearing that his wife and daughters had been killed, he volunteered for the front, where he hoped to find his son Anatoly; but this was not to be, for Anatoly was killed in the hour of victory. Settling on demobilization with some friends, Sokolov met up with Vanya, a little orphan who thought he was his father. And now, following some petty driving offence, they are moving to another province where—they can only hope—life may begin anew. The narrator turns his face away so that Vanya shall not see the tears.

In all of this the action, brutal and tragic, and the language, gritty and taut, contrast strangely with the overwhelming tone of emotional exaggeration. Apart from details already mentioned, exception was taken by many candidates to Sokolov's heart beating faster at the sound of Russian artillery than it ever did for Irina; to his crying nightly on the pillow, wet with tears in the morning; to his lighting a match to admire the sleeping Vanya; and to the greatest of all the blows that befell him: that his son should be buried in foreign, German soil. One girl distinguished shrewdly between the realism before the war and the 'pure romanticism' of the war itself. She quoted the scene with the German commandant: 'Sokolov is heartbroken to think that if he is shot then he won't be able to get the food in his hands to his comrades. For a man half-dead with hunger one would think that his first thought would be for his own belly, not his friends', however kind he is.'

Another girl, agreeing wholeheartedly with the criticism of Sholokhov implied in the title of the essay, was irritated by the careful way in which his hero knocks out his German boss and strips a drunken NCO of his uniform, and by his parting from Irina at the station, where he sees her bending forward against an imaginary wind, her hands clasped on her breast and her wide eyes full of tears. For this girl the whole thing was unreal: 'The book is devoid of any serious character development, the hero himself being just a figurehead, a symbol of the ideal Soviet citizen, so patriotic and positive in his aims . . . who suffers so badly yet remains firm, and comes out of every situation so well.'

Another candidate referred to Sokolov's 'almost laughable courage' (which might, he thought, arouse women's emotions); others pointed out the constant good man/bad man aspect of the story; and the words 'sloppy' and 'nauseating' were used more than once.

One girl, however, admitted candidly that *Destiny of a Man* was her favourite book (of those she had studied at school). 'Perhaps', she said, 'it is because I am sentimental and it does just what it set out to do, appeal'. Another's hackles rose at the implication that only women should weep. 'The critics are illogical', she wrote, 'if they think that because women like a good cry, therefore all stories which

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

evoke tears are necessarily fit only for women'. (This point is curiously also made by Andrei Sokolov.) In many essays, indeed, the battle of the sexes was found to be a more rewarding subject than the Battle of Berlin; and much time and energy were lost on a too literal understanding of the question.

PERHAPS understandably, it was the young men who were most drawn to expatiate on the shortcomings of feminine magazines. For one Forces' candidate it was simply a question of exact comparison. The ending of the story was not happy; the characters were not dashing ladies' men; the opening, on the difficulties of travel in Russia in the spring, would probably bore the girls; and the later descriptive passages were too vivid, brutal, and gory to lull their drowsy sensibility. There were tears and adventure, it was true, but all in all the story would not lead to an increase in a magazine's circulation. In several answers emphasis was predictably laid upon the unladylike behaviour of the anguished soldier unable to relieve his system in a church; but attention was also strangely drawn to an alleged incompatibility with women's magazines of incidents such as Sokolov's despair on learning of the death of his wife and daughters and his realization that he had been talking to dead people in his dreams of freedom from captivity. One candidate thought it was the boy, incredibly taking Sokolov without question for his father, who turned the story into a woman's teary tale, 'pulling on the heartstrings'; women, moreover, were unlikely to realize that this was all propaganda. Another wrote his entire essay around the theme that *Destiny of a Man* was real and women's magazines were not. At one school, a boy maintained that no woman would ever enjoy Sholokhov's blunt writing—an opinion not shared by female candidates. A colleague of his, while allowing the language to be suitable, and the whole to be rather reminiscent of an old Hollywood weepy, found the tough reality of Sokolov's suffering to be very remote from the romantic illusions of ladies' journals. Another schoolmate, spurred by the provocative question to take an independent line, preferred the British upper lip, whether stiff or cynical: *Destiny of a Man* had all the ingredients of the 'sloshy sentimental stories' in which our womenfolk so much 'revel'—'love, tears, death, tragedy, heroism, and the ability to withstand the tragedies of life'.

THE question was of course deliberately provocative, an attempt to get away from the conventional requirement to 'compare and contrast'. Perhaps it was only to be expected that its true implication would escape a number of candidates completely. Most people, in fact, stayed firmly on the fence, in true examination style. They had never dared to attack a Set Book, oh dear no, and they were not going to risk it now. This was apparently some sort of devilish trap: put your foot in it, and down would come the examiner's jubilant teeth. Far better to say that while there was, it was true, a welter of emotion in *Destiny of a Man*,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this was, of course, a Work of Art. An extreme form of this tendency was seen in a lad who had translated the epic from end to end. While translating, he found it tediously reminiscent of 'the wartime comics which I had read when younger. I found nothing new in it, and it was not until I read through my final translation without stopping that I realized just how rich in emotional expression this novel is.' It was an insult to call it women's stuff.

Most candidates, indeed, found many things to praise; and in spite of reservations, the majority thought the story both readable and impressive. That this was sometimes due to awe is indisputable; but several answers were from the heart. A serious young Londoner, to whom the notion that *Destiny of a Man* was fit for a woman's magazine had 'never even occurred', was dazzled by 'the brilliant writing of a Nobel Prize winner, of a book equal to *Tikhii Don*, though the course much shorter'. Of all the answers praising Sholokhov, the best was written by a girl. The question, she decided, was 'not particularly complimentary' to women, suggesting as it did that what they liked to read was 'over-sentimental, over-dramatic, badly written and constructed, and trivial'. She was not prepared to argue whether this was an accurate assessment: she was no ardent feminist. But it was certainly not applicable to *Destiny of a Man*.

> Sholokhov in this book has ample opportunity to over-sentimentalize. Sokolov's parting from his wife and family, his reception of the news of their death, his visit to Anatoly's coffin, and his finding of Vanyushka, are all open to sentiment. The author's treatment of these passages is, however, moving and restrained, while profoundly sad.

And her essay ended with a slap in the eye: 'This attitude of contempt for *Sudba cheloveka* is quite unfounded, and could only result from a very superficial study of it.'

Another girl, finally, made this dignified conclusion:

> There is a presence which runs through the whole story. It is the nobility of a human soul, forced to suffer the degradation of war and imprisonment; the sorrows and tragedies of human loss; the rallying spirit of the kindness to a waif; and the power of the soul in overcoming all and remaining sane, and, though bruised, whole. [This is] a story of bereavement, pain, suffering, work, deprivation, and of kindness, equanimity, courage.

In the last analysis, the most interesting feature of these essays was, however, the insistence by most candidates on the moral and sociological standards by which Soviet literature should be judged. In contradistinction to Tendryakov, it seemed natural to them that Soviet writers should preach a didactic message; and for many of them, unlike Nekrasov, a romantic and even a melodramatic atmosphere was essential for this purpose. They had not, apparently, studied Solzhenitsyn. Some saw in the story man's destiny to be loved; others—incredibly—even thought

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Sokolov as a puppet in the hands of cruel and inscrutable Fate; but most were aware that Sholokhov is no determinist. The enemies are plain, and patriotism is of paramount significance: not for Sholokhov the shooting of his hero as a suspect spy—*he* returns with a living testimonial; not for Sholokhov betrayal by one's 'comrades'—*they* are Christians or non-Party members. The Russianness of Sokolov is everywhere accented: he is a 'true Russian soldier' (why?); he falls and kisses Russian ground; and he is 'a Russian of inflexible will'. His devotion to the moral code of the builder of communism in Russia is total and unquestioning.

How, then, shall we judge a Sholokhov? What will be his fate? There are, it seems, two answers. For one girl candidate it was wrong to dismiss *Destiny of a Man* as 'woman's magazine stuff'

> if for no other reason than that it shows a revealing light on the attitudes of Soviet Russia . . . a society in which it is praiseworthy to accept without consideration the causes of a war in which millions of lives are lost. Yet while the story may be interesting in this respect, it has little literary merit. . . . Sokolov has suffered practically all the disasters that could befall a man living at that time. . . . The main intention of the author, one feels, is to make us see what a pathetic but noble figure his hero is, and yet it is in piling up the misfortunes that Sholokhov defeats his aim, so that instead of being able to admire this hero, we simply look on him from a detached point of view and wonder what misfortune will come next. A hero such as this can only exist in a world of childish sentimentality. . . . [In spite of its admitted merits], this story can never appeal to anyone who is able to make his own moral judgments, or who is able to see through superficial idealism, and unimaginative story-telling.

There is independent thought to gladden the examiner! The last word, however, in the interests of academic impartiality, shall be with that southern English patriot for whom the subject was just one more sign of the times: 'I am afraid', he declared, 'that if this *is* the common British attitude, then as a nation we are going sadly astray.'

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Documents : Soviet Union

WRITERS' PROTESTS

A letter to the editorial board of Izvestia *on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of Stalin's death by Lidia Chukovskaya.*

JUDICIAL trials follow each other in quick succession these days: under all sorts of pretexts, openly, covertly, semi-covertly, the Word itself, both spoken and written, is being put on trial. A book written at home and published abroad; a magazine printed at home but not by a licensed press; a collection of documents denouncing the illegality of a court of law; a shout in a public square in defence of an accused—all these things are on trial. The Word itself is being persecuted as if to give credence to the old truth so beloved of Leo Tolstoy: 'A word is an act.' And, truly, the word is an act, and a shattering one at that, since it is being punished by years of prison and camp, since for years, nay, decades, great poetry and great prose—novels, verse, poems and short stories—have been barred from reaching the reader, desperately needed as they are. I would have said, 'needed as bread', if their piercing truth were not needed more than bread. Perhaps precisely because the word of truth is inaudible and cannot become a book and, by becoming a book, part of the human soul; that the word is driven underground and abandoned—it is perhaps precisely for this reason that we feel so acutely the artificiality and the tenuousness of certain words which are being printed and do reach their reader.

The other day I came across a short poem in a magazine. It struck me. Puny as it was, it expressed a line of thought which is very popular nowadays and very wrong at that. It opened with a relevant question:

> The enormous account of days past,
> Has it been really settled?

and it ended with this comforting conclusion:

> Yes, that long account
> Has been fully paid off and wept away.

It was the comforting character of the conclusion that touched me on the raw. Comfort is the last thing we need now. What we need most of all is an analysis of the past, an analysis that would harry our memory and our conscience. According to the author, after all that we went through, our moral balance is all right, thank you; everything has been tidied up. What is there to talk about?

But there is plenty to talk about. The human dignity of a writer

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and the quality of his work must be judged by his attitude to the Stalinist period of our history, to that past which is clawing to pieces our present days.

There are inevitable, yet at the same time unpayable accounts. To write about the account as having been settled, when it refers to our recent past, is sheer blasphemy. What sort of price-list is there to fix the cost of Norilsk and Potma, of Karaganda and Magadan, of the cellars of the Lubyanka and Shpalernaya? How and in what currency are we to pay for the tortures and the deaths of each one of the innocents—and there were millions of them: *how much per head?* And who has the right to say that the account has been settled? Perhaps it would be wiser not to look at our balance at all. The settlement of such an account is beyond the powers of any one of us, if only for the simple reason that mankind has not yet learned how to bring back its dead to life.

And who is to pay for the betrayed trust of people in the famous seven words, 'With us people aren't gaoled for nothing'? The belief that since men like Ivan Denisovich are behind the barbed wire, they are bound to have been enemies? We must admit it: the machinery of provocation used to work faultlessly in the past—all the broadcasts, public meetings, newspapers; it used to work so precisely and smoothly that, at times, even decent people became bitter persecutors of the innocent. Women used to denounce their husbands; children, their fathers; friends, their best comrades. They too, these deceived human beings, they too were victims of sorts . . . Victims of an organized lie. Surely the words spoken of another era are applicable to them, too:

> Well, martyrs of dogma,
> You, too, are victims of the age.*

How are we then to pay for this enormous, planned destruction of souls, for the degradation of the pen, for the corruption of the word? In one way, and in one way only: by truth, stark and unadorned. Yet truth has been broken off half-way; the Stalin butchery is being once again concealed behind a screen of fog, and the screen has been daily becoming thicker.

The longing for the most elementary justice has remained unquenched. The widows of the victims have been issued with certificates stating that their husbands had been arrested for nothing and had been posthumously rehabilitated in the absence of any chargeable offence. Good. Similar certificates testifying to the absence of a chargeable offence have been issued to those prisoners who were lucky enough to survive. Excellent. They have come back. But where are those who were the cause of all the events of the past? Those who fabricated offences in millions of cases? Those who concocted one science-

* Lines from Pasternak's 'Lieutenant Schmidt' referring to Tsarist gendarmes and officials.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fiction story after another, all called 'investigations of crimes'? Those who ordered the press to slander the accused? Who are these people, where are they, and what are they doing today? Who has assessed their crimes and when and where has it been done? These crimes were committed in complete security, methodically and leisurely, day in, day out, year in, year out. And what sort of certificates have been issued to these criminals, and, if so, by whom?

Apparently, none. Otherwise it would be impossible for a man responsible for the death of several poets to be now in charge of publishing poetry; for a writer known only as an author of denunciations to be elected to the Presidium at a public meeting; for an old man responsible for the deaths of Vavilov and Meyerhold to receive an official pension for his honourable life-work. Fog, nothing but fog . . . .

The account has been wept away, wiped clear by tears, the poem says. True, oceans of tears have been shed. But they were shed secretly, into the pillows . . . The Day of the Railway Man, the Day of the Airman, the Day of the Tank Soldier, we celebrate all these. All right! But where is the Day of Mourning for the innocent victims? Where are the communal graves, where are the memorials with the names of those destroyed, where are the cemeteries which families and friends would be able to visit on anniversary days with wreaths and flowers? And, finally, where are the lists of those who commissioned denunciations, those who carried out those commissions, those who . . . ? But enough! Anything but calm and grief is unseemly at the graveside.

Do not misunderstand me. I am not talking of revenge. I am not talking in terms of an eye for an eye. Revenge bears no attraction for me. I am not talking about new criminal trials, but about the judgment by public opinion. Although the informers, the butchers, the provocateurs have fully deserved being executed, our people do not deserve a diet of new executions.

May the death of innocents produce no new butchery, but clear thoughts and lucid words.

I want the machine which used to turn a flourishing life into a cold corpse to be fully investigated, screw by screw. I want to hear it condemned, and condemned aloud. We must not write off the account or stamp it with the comforting word, '*Paid*'. We must disentangle the knot of cause and effect, loop by loop. Millions of hard-working peasant families sent to certain death in the Far North labelled as *kulaks* or *sub-kulaks*! Millions of townsfolk sent to prisons or camps or to death labelled as spies, saboteurs, wreckers! Whole nations accused of treason and driven from their homelands!

WHAT brought about this unprecedented catastrophe? This complete defencelessness of people in the face of a devouring machine? This unique coalescence or coagulation or alloy of organs of state security (violating laws night and day, hour after hour) with

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Prosecutor-General's office (the task of which was to ensure observance of laws, and which obediently shut its eyes for years and years), and, finally, with the press (the task of which is to ensure justice but which, instead, in a planned and methodical way used to disgorge monotonous slanders against those persecuted—millions upon millions of lies about the 'unmasked arch-enemies of the people who had sold out to foreign intelligence services')? When and how did it happen, this most dangerous of all chemical unions known to science? How did it become possible? There is an enormous amount of work here, for a historian, a philosopher, a sociologist—but first and foremost for a writer. This is the main job now—and an urgent job. We must appeal to people, old and young, to begin on the enormous work of interpreting our past; then, but only then, will the path leading into the future become clearer. And today's trials of the Word would not have taken place, if this work had been done in good time.

The murder of the Word of Truth—it, too, stems from way back, from the accursed Stalin's times. It was one of the blackest misdeeds committed in the course of whole decades. The loss of right to think on one's own in Stalin's times shut the door on all doubts, on all questions, on the cry of alarm, and opened the door to the conceited, shameless and brazen mass lie. The lie repeated hourly prevented people from learning what was happening to their fellow-citizens in their own country: some were ignorant in a simple-minded, naïve way; others, because they were anxious not to know. And those who knew or guessed were doomed to silence under the threat of death the next day—not trouble at the place of work, unemployment or privations, but common physical extermination.

Such was the honour accorded in those days to the Word: one was killed for it . . .

Out of the graves of innocents, I said, must not grow a new butchery, the execution of their killers, but a lucid thought. What sort of thought? Perhaps this one?

Well, since we have survived . . .
go ahead!
Judge us: we plead guilty!
The truth and the lie,
The victories and the defeats,
The shame, the bitterness, the honour,
The darkness and the light out of the darkness—
All that has been ours.

No, that is not the right thought. It is a tempting idea, but we cannot accept it. It complicates the knot even further instead of disentangling it. The truth and the lie are not twins, and nobody has yet succeeded in being both darkness and light at one and the same time. In every concrete situation somebody was shedding light, while somebody else

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was extinguishing it. And even worse: somebody was the butcher, and somebody else was the victim.

Or take this:

We were once young and proud,
And our youth was made of steel,
There was not a disaster strong enough
To overcome us,
There was not a war
Which we did not win,
There was not a crime
Of which we have not been accused.

There are two untruths in that one. First, a disaster which we did not overcome, and from which we did not save the country, did occur. Its name is Stalinism. Secondly, as to crimes of which someone is allegedly accusing someone else *now*, I would like to know: Who accuses whom? I have not heard much of any crimes of which our present day has been accusing our past.

But the idea has sunk in and has been taken over:

All that happened to us,
Did happen indeed!

And not one step further.

Yet the idea that 'What happened to us, did happen' ought to give birth to a simple, lucid idea known generally from the beginning of time, but one which we have to learn and to absorb anew. A century ago Herzen repeated it day in, day out in *The Bell*: no free speech—no free people; no independent speech—no country able to reform. 'Loud and open speech alone can satisfy man', Herzen wrote. 'Only a conviction which has been uttered is holy', wrote Ogarev. As for silence, to them it was a synonym of slavery, 'the bending of one's head'. Herzen spoke of 'a complicity by silence'. 'Silence props up despotism.'

The trials of the last few years, of the last few months, have called forth a loud rebuff among people of all ages, all professions. The renunciation of modern violations of the law demonstrates the accumulated indignation of people against themselves, against their own past and against yesterday's bonds. Behind the young shoulders of the accused in recent trials we, the older ones, saw a sequence of shadows. Behind the lines of the manuscript, deserving of being printed and yet not going to press, we saw the faces of writers who did not live long enough to see their manuscripts become books. And behind today's newspaper articles we see yesterday's gloating heralds of executions.

'The liberation of speech from censorship'—such was one of the slogans of *The Bell*. The last time *The Bell* appeared was a hundred years ago, in 1867. A century gone by! Since then censorship has become less visible, but more ubiquitous. It has at its disposal dozens

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of methods, apart from the blue pencil, in order to bury alive an unacceptable manuscript.

May the Word be released from all the chains, whatever their name. May silence perish: it always propped up despotism.

And may our memory live for ever, indestructible, whatever the assertion that the account has been settled. Memory is a treasured possession of man: without it there cannot be either conscience, or honour, or mental effort. A great poet is memory made flesh. Let me quote four lines of a poet who refused to give up her memory, not only while still alive, but even beyond the threshold of death:

> Because I am afraid, even in blessed death,
> To forget the rumble of the Black Marias,
> To forget how the accursed door used to bang,
> How the old woman howled like a wounded beast.*

Memory of the past is a reliable clue to the present. Ought we to write off the account, to let the past overgrow the present with the weeds of the muddle, of the knowledge of things unsaid, things unthought? No, never!

However, even if memory were to betray us, today's trial of the Word and the dry crackle of press articles would bring to us the familiar smell of old-time poison.

But today is today, not yesterday. 'The complicity of silence' has ended.

Lidia Chukovskaya.

A letter to the Secretary of the Soviet Writers' Union, Konstantin Fedin, by the editor of Novy Mir, *Alexander Tvardovsky, written some time after the publication of Solzhenitsyn's novel* The Cancer Ward *in* Novy Mir *was suppressed.*

DEAR K. A.,

I am writing to you after our discussion at the Secretariat—we have had so many!—on the questions raised by Solzhenitsyn's letter.

This is not an official report to the First Secretary of the Board of the Writers' Union—not that I have any wish in this case to distinguish between the gifted writer Fedin and his official function, but I want to write as simply and informally as though we were talking, as when we talked in the Barvikhin woods, or at your *dacha*, or elsewhere.

To start with the most important: who and what are we really talking about when we touch on the still unresolved 'Solzhenitsyn question' which gives rise to endless prattle—prattle which does nothing but harm to the Secretariat—in literary circles as well as outside them?

Most people will agree that Solzhenitsyn stands out particularly sharply against our literary background, and attracts the warmest sympathy in some quarters and an unusually ruthless hostility in others.

* From Anna Akhmatova's 'Requiem'.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Without at the moment going into which is the predominating opinion, I simply want to make this point as proof at least of how unusual a figure he is.

One unusual thing about his career as a writer is that he made his debut as a mature man and a completely mature, independent artist. Writing about the manuscript of *Ivan Denisovich*, K. I. Chukovsky—an experienced old man who, as they say, knows what is what—headed his report 'A Literary Miracle'.

S. Ya. Marshak, whose judgments carried so much weight in the literary world, published an article in *Pravda* about this truthful book, so full of confidence in life. K. M. Simonov, writing in *Izvestia*, welcomed the appearance of this new and remarkable talent on the literary scene.

I will not enumerate the established writers at home and abroad who welcomed this first novel with enthusiasm—I will mention only two names: yours and Sholokhov's.

Your high opinion of the manuscript, submitted by an unknown writer to *Novy Mir*, played its part in shaping his destiny: when the question of its publication came up, I stressed it in writing to the then Secretary of the CPSU's Central Committee (as we know, *Ivan Denisovich* was published with the knowledge and approval of the Central Committee).

M. A. Sholokhov also spoke with warm approval of the novel at the time, and asked me to give the author a hug for him.

Among the younger and more numerous generation of writers who came to literature from the trenches of the Fatherland War, I could mention Baklanov; a sentence of his struck me: 'After the appearance of Solzhenitsyn's novel we clearly cannot go on writing as we have been writing up till now.' Baklanov was not, of course, 'writing off' a whole period in Soviet literature, but he was expressing more than just his own mood.

Solzhenitsyn, incidentally, outstanding as he is, is not unique or unprecedented in our literature. We should not forget the courage of Ovechkin's *Weekdays*, which appeared in *Novy Mir* as early as 1952 and marked a turning point. Nor the freshness and sharpness of Tendryakov's approach to reality in *Ne ko dvoru* and *Tight Knot*. Nor Baklanov's new and deeper treatment of the war theme in *Pyad zemli*. Ehrenburg in his memoirs repeatedly touched, perhaps for the first time, on past events which were supposed to be unmentionable. There are other examples as well. It is not for me to draw attention to it, but it would be false modesty on my part if I were to forget that some chapters of *Distances* and *Tyorkin in the Other World* (never published in their original version) were known long before Solzhenitsyn. But I am dealing now with the immense impression created by Solzhenitsyn's first novel.

True, there were writers who ascribed its huge success merely to its sensational subject—camps—and a leading member of the Writers' Union said: 'In three to four months this wretched story will be for-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gotten.' But this did not happen. The 'wretched story' was very soon to bring its author an ever-growing popularity at home and abroad and, whether we like it or not, he has become known as one of the most important writers of today: I have grounds for saying this and it will not be denied by those of our colleagues who have travelled more widely and followed the foreign press more closely than I have. Whereas Dyakonov's story, for instance, although it deals with the same subject as Solzhenitsyn's, is indeed forgotten—for all the notice taken of it now by either critics or the public, it might never have been written.

THE fact stares us in the face that Solzhenitsyn's story is not just an individual work, remarkably talented but with no significance beyond itself. This is one of those apparently light-weight, unpretentious books which change the climate of literature and have very far-reaching consequences. There have been such cases in our classical literature—I need not remind you. And we should recognize that Solzhenitsyn's example is already having a beneficial influence on our current literature—a fact which should cause us nothing but joy.

I maintain that recent fiction, as important for its ideas and its art as Zaltygin's *On the Irtysh* and *Salted Carrion*, and Aitamanov's *Goodbye Hussars*, owes much to Solzhenitsyn's prose. They are in no way imitative but they apply, to a different subject and in their own way, that same principle of truthfulness, of facing facts instead of shying away from them—and thus achieve an infinitely higher artistic level than the sort of ephemeral writing which smoothes reality over and waters it down to conform with current policy.

I have had occasion to say it before and I repeat it now: the most objective analysis of these works would only bear out my own observations as the publisher of all three writers.

When I speak of the writers' contrasting attitudes to Solzhenitsyn, I have no wish to ascribe the hostility or even malice of some of them to envy, although this is inevitable in any artistic milieu whenever one of its members achieves a great and unexpected success. The point is that, unlike Baklanov, some writers prefer to go on writing in the old way—they are used to it and it is easier. But even these writers must see that readers will no longer read them in the same old way—even those readers who may, in talking about him, be on the side of Solzhenitsyn's hostile critics. To put it in a nutshell, he has greatly complicated our life.

Please do not think that I regard Solzhenitsyn as a perfect and faultless artist who is above criticism. But we can talk about this some other time.

What matters and is very urgent now is to understand that he is not at the centre of attention just as himself—however valuable he is in himself—but because owing to complicated circumstances he stands at the crossroads of two opposite trends in our literature—

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

one backward-looking, the other forward-looking and in keeping with the irreversible movement of history.

This is the position, and the clearest illustration of it is the dragging on for many months of the 'Solzhenitsyn affair', as the subject of the many closed and open meetings of the Secretariat has come to be known.

IT has to be faced that the handling of this affair does credit neither to the Board nor to any of those on whom, as one of Chekhov's characters puts it, 'everything will depend'. One trouble—and it underlines the barrenness and frivolity of the whole proceedings—is that attention, disapproval and indignation have been wholly centred on the form of Solzhenitsyn's 'letter' to the delegates to the Writers' Congress, on his way of addressing them. The form is wrong, I agree. But however bad it is, we should not discount the content. For the content is there, the points are clearly and neatly made—and to the best of my memory, no attempt has been made to prove a single one of them false, invented, self-interested, damaging to the cause of Soviet literature, etc. Why? For the simple reason that they are basically undeniable—I, for my part, would put my signature to them with both hands. And you know that I am no exception in this, although I have not so far written or signed any 'document' concerning the 'letter', because I believe that all the questions arising from it should be settled in the normal way by discussion within the Board.

You also know the opinions I have expressed—again and again—here, at the meetings of the Board (they are in the Minutes) and in your presence at the Central Committee—on such subjects as censorship, and that I have spoken of the treatment of Solzhenitsyn perhaps more strongly than Solzhenitsyn himself.

Surely it is clear that to make any decision about the 'letter', taking into account only its form and treating the content as non-existent or negligible, is impossible. Do you not agree, K.A.?

Another trouble has arisen from the forlorn attempt to solve by 'secret' methods a question which has already had wide social and political repercussions, overshadowed the debates—most of them meaningless—at the Writers' Congress, received international publicity and is still a highly controversial subject in literary circles as well as outside them. To resolve what is already referred to as '*the* problem' by the existing methods of the Writers' Union, and in general by trying to charm it out of existence in the privacy of the literary Establishment, is impossible. The only results are recriminations in private and silence in public, so that people cannot help wondering what the leadership of the Writers' Union can be thinking of and what it is capable of saying before a large audience or in the press in order finally to conclude the 'affair'.

It seems that while Solzhenitsyn is ready at any moment to state his grievances against the Writers' Union in public or in the newspapers,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Union, which rejects his demands, can do nothing of the sort—evidently because it cannot count on the sympathy and approval of either readers or writers. Is not that how it is, K.A.? I am afraid it is.

Your own recent attitude to the case is particularly disappointing. You say: let Solzhenitsyn first make a radio or press statement rebuking the West for the anti-Soviet sensation raised over his 'letter'. Otherwise his novel *The Cancer Ward* and his short stories (which, incidentally, have been printed and reprinted abroad, and not only in many bourgeois countries but in all the socialist ones as well) will not be published and we will not protect him—member of the Writers' Union though he is—against the slanders widely circulated about his past. In other words, not only shall we do nothing about any of the things he complains of in his letter, but we shall condemn Solzhenitsyn himself to political ostracism—even though not a single point of substance in the letter which is his *cri de coeur* has been denied by anyone. That this suggestion should come from you, K.A., an eminent Russian writer, a friend of Gorky and heir to his tradition of literary leadership, is to me strange and incomprehensible. You cannot, after all, join Sholokhov in his plainly stated proposal to 'prevent Solzhenitsyn from touching a pen'. This would be all the more depressing after the well-known utterances by which the author of *Quiet Flows the Don* has so much demeaned himself in the eyes of his readers and admirers. It is sad enough that Fedin and Sholokhov—instead of setting the example of a worthy attitude, free from petty administrative considerations, towards a fellow artist—should on this occasion tend to share that of certain of our colleagues on the Board, whose own attitude is understandable and not surprising.

To start with, your insistent demand that Solzhenitsyn should 'express his attitude to the West', 'give a rebuff', etc., as an absolute condition of surviving as a writer and a citizen, comes strangely from you, because it points in *that* direction, it belongs to practices long since rejected and condemned: 'Confess!', 'Dissociate yourself from!', 'Sign!'. Such 'confessions' and 'rebuffs' as those recently printed in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* over the signature of G. Serebryakova, A. Voznesensky and others do us enormous harm, because they create the image of writers who are morally undiscriminating, lacking in personal dignity and entirely at the mercy of 'directives' or 'demands'—which, incidentally, are one and the same thing. Do you really think that such confessions serve the interests of the Writers' Union, that they strengthen its authority? I cannot believe it.

While continuing to insist that Solzhenitsyn should 'brand the West', 'dissociate himself from it', etc., we forget his unequivocal statement at the open meeting of the Secretariat:

> 'Abroad' is being used as though 'abroad' were a highly respected court of appeal. I have never been abroad, I do not know what it is like and have not the time left to find out. I cannot understand how one can be so sensitive to opinion abroad and so

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> insensitive to public opinion in our own country. All my life I have trodden my country's soil, all I hear is her pain, all I write about is that.

Nor can we discount the fact that modern Western trends are no temptation to Solzhenitsyn the artist and that he cannot possibly be accused of trying in any way to earn the good opinion of the West.

But to proceed, I was asked to 'use my influence with Solzhenitsyn', to persuade him to speak out against 'Western' reactions to his 'letter'. To start with, my influence with him is not so great. He is in no sense a 'beginner', a 'young writer'—incidentally, he is 50 this year—and he knows what he is about. Secondly, we should remember that 'Western comments' in this case are of various kinds. The 'rebuke' meant for ill-wishers and enemies of Soviet literature cannot be addressed to our friends abroad, those for instance who have written about Solzhenitsyn's 'letter' in the communist press. What can we insist on Solzhenitsyn doing in the circumstances? That he should 'brand' these commentators like the others?

Recently, however, in keeping with the principle of 'secrecy' adopted in regard to '*the* problem', it has no longer been a question of Solzhenitsyn writing to the newspapers, but of his 'expressing his attitude' to the 'West' in a letter to the Secretariat—a letter of which the West itself will never hear but which will be added to the file in order to satisfy even the most hostile members of the Secretariat, open the way to the publication of his novel and his book of short stories, and protect him against slander.

To think that the solution of this whole complex problem should depend on this one, never to be published 'document'. That we should come to this—that a 'document' of a couple of pages is more important to us, writers, than a completed 600-page novel which, according to most of those who know Solzhenitsyn's manuscripts, would be the pride and ornament of our literature today, that a 'document' is more important than the destiny of a writer whose remarkable talent is not denied even by his bitterest opponents!

THINKING of *The Cancer Ward*, I am reminded of a passage in an old but wise book: If a book inspires you, if it fills you with courage and noble aspirations, then judge it by these feelings: it is an excellent book and must have been written by a master.

Indeed it is. I can only add that Solzhenitsyn's sincere conviction that he has cured himself of cancer gives his book the tone of a truly inspiring affirmation of life, even though its subject-matter is so unartistic, dealing as it does with a threat to mankind perhaps second only to nuclear war. Those who like 'reading between the lines' and 'interpreting symbols' have for some reason overlooked the courageous and optimistic symbolism of the end, where the hero leaves the 'cancer ward' on a wonderful spring day and his release

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into life coincides with changes for the better which were already taking place before the Twentieth Congress.

'My peace of mind is dearer to me than the fate of my books', wrote Solzhenitsyn in his last letter to me. And I believe, K.A., that the publication of this novel would be even more in our interests than in those of the author. The point is not only that it is a crime to keep such an important work from his already wide and devoted public, or that the novel is already circulating, perhaps in thousands of copies, among the more determined of his readers. I know from reliable sources that it will soon be published (if it has not appeared already) in France and Italy. We cannot overlook this—the last thing we want is another Pasternak affair—but there are other reasons, nearer home, as well. The novel, the first eight chapters of which were to appear in the January issue of *Novy Mir* and are in galleys, heads a queue of other important and valuable works which are being held up (although their publication has not been forbidden by anyone): *100 Days* by K. Simonov, A. Beck's *New Appointment*, E. Drabkina's work on the last years of Lenin, *Winter Journey*, and others I could name.

The publication of *The Cancer Ward* would not only be a literary event in itself; it would also remove this bottle-neck—as when a car at the head of a traffic jam moves on. It would certainly benefit Soviet literature in its present, frankly speaking, critical and depressing state, and it would dispel the atmosphere of 'hushing-up', bewilderment, uncertainty, passive waiting.

Everything now depends on you, K.A.: on you alone, because the Board would of course back you up if you were to say, with however many reservations necessary, what was in fact said when *The Cancer Ward* was discussed by the Board: that its publication should be left 'to the discretion of *Novy Mir*'. In other words, I beg you to return to the proposal which you have since rejected: that of the communiqué which at your suggestion I drafted and you, at the time, edited and *ipso facto* approved. The draft is in the 'Solzhenitsyn file', I will not quote it in full—this letter is long enough, though I do not seem to have said a tenth of what I could and should.

These were concrete proposals at the time, and I still think that their adoption would do good and serve our interests in every way:

1. Immediately print an extract from *The Cancer Ward* in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* with a note saying that it is being 'published in full by *Novy Mir*';

2. Direct *Sovetsky Pisatel* to prepare a collection of Solzhenitsyn's works with a preface giving the facts about his past;

3. Print the preface in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* or *Literaturnaya Rossiya* with an explanatory note.

Your responsibility in this case, Konstantin Alexandrovich, which bodes so ill for the future of our literature, is very great and I do not suppose that you assume it lightly. I cannot see you cheerfully writing the concluding pages of your *Bonfire* while being directly involved in

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sweeping under the carpet the work of a man who is, after all, your fellow artist, a writer watched with sympathy by great masses of readers and whose importance in our literature today it would be hard to overestimate.

Based on his published works, Solzhenitsyn's popularity grows at an astonishing rate as his unpublished manuscripts come to be fairly widely known. As you know, he cannot be blamed for this. It is difficult to know the size of the manuscript editions of *The Cancer Ward* and of *The First Circle* which is not even finished.

It should be borne in mind that in some cases the manuscript of an unpublished book arouses sharper interest than it would if the work were published, and that there is no guarantee against additions being made to the author's text.

DEAR K. A., I am not at all so naïvely self-confident as to imagine that my arguments will bring tears to your eyes, change your attitude to the 'Solzhenitsyn case' and bring you to a different decision from the one you have taken. But I have no doubt that you will be brought to this by circumstances, willy-nilly.

'But what can I do?' you once asked me when I said that the demands we were making on Solzhenitsyn were unjust and impossible for him to satisfy. It was at a meeting where we sat side by side—I do not remember what I answered but I do remember your words; you sounded puzzled and displeased with yourself and with all of us.

There is only one thing to do: act according to your own mind and conscience. I can hardly suppose that you are subject to pressure or compulsion from outside. The times are over, thank God, when the 'finger pointed' and specific problems in art and science were decided without reference to what people who knew them inside out, thought or said. Whatever we are like, good or bad, we and no one else have to decide on literary problems. We need not wait for 'direct instructions'—they will not come, which is a good thing we could hardly dream of in times past, and we must take advantage of it, putting aside our fears but not our responsibilities.

It is always hard to tell which is more dangerous: to make a decision which may turn out to be wrong or to decide nothing for fear of a mistake. In military matters, even a wrong decision is thought better than inactivity through indecision. In our case, quite honestly, at the worst it would be better to make a mistake by permitting them to try to avoid a mistake (as though one could!) by forbidding. As things are now, I believe that the real danger for you is to give the sanction of your name either to a shameful decision or to a no less shameful indecision.

Besides, strictly between ourselves, you know as well as I do that there is not a single case in the history of world literature of the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

persecution of a gifted artist, even by another gifted artist, proving a success.

I have known you as a writer ever since, as a boy, I read your *Transvaal* (by the way, I do not remember your apologizing when, some time in the late twenties, the book was attacked as 'defending the kulaks').

I have known you personally for a good 30 years. I often heard from Marshak and others who knew you in your Leningrad days that 'Fedin is a man of honour, always ready to stand up for a just cause and to help a comrade'.

I had proof of this myself when things were very bad for me in 1954 and you spoke up for me 'at the very top'—your words were quoted to me by people who were present at that memorable meeting.

Yet now I am forced to speak harsh words to you, and perhaps to hurt your feelings, as I have already done at our recent meetings in connexion with this 'case'. But you must know that a dog who barks is not a dog who bites. I am plain-spoken and perhaps do not always watch my tongue, often to my own disadvantage.

But I am incapable of striking a calculated blow from undercover. I do not go in for the tricks and intrigues which are known among us as 'diplomacy', and 'tactics'.

If I spoke harshly last time we met, in the presence of Markov and Vorontsov (I had the impression, incidentally, that both would gladly support you if you took up the proposals I repeat in this letter), it was because I could not understand your outburst against Solzhenitsyn.

How can we talk like that about a man and a writer who has paid for every page and every line as we, who judge him, have not. He has been through the greatest trials of the human spirit—war, prison and mortal illness. And now, after his successful debut as a writer, he faces trials perhaps no less hard: pressures which, to put it mildly, have nothing to do with literature; outright slander; the banning of any mention of his name in print, etc. What are we honestly to think of the use, for the purpose of indicting him, of a manuscript play written in the hell of the concentration camp more than 20 years ago by the nameless prisoner Sch. 232—not by A. Solzhenitsyn, member of the Writers' Union: a play found among his papers, confiscated by 'special' authority and reproduced and circulated as allegedly his latest work!

Yes, I disapprove of the form of his letter, but I cannot as a human being attack him, knowing the degree of despair which brought him to take this step.

Two days ago I was sitting at my desk, reading this letter, when I was interrupted by a call from *Goslitizdat*: 'In Volume V of your collected works you have an article on Marshak in which you mention Solzhenitsyn's name. Our instructions are', etc.

Needless to say, I refused to take out the passage, even if it meant that the volume would not be published. But what on earth is going on!

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As I have said, I have not much hope of my letter having any practical result.

I may have put something in it in the wrong way and perhaps not all of it is equally uncontroversial. But it was my duty to my conscience to write it.

I do not count on an answer—I know you are busy. However, this is not the point: it is in the 'case of A. Solzhenitsyn' that an answer, that is to say a decision, is months overdue.

We must put an end to that case, Konstantin Alexandrovich.

With my deepest respects and very best wishes,

Yours,

7–15 January 1968 *Tvardovsky.*

PREUVES

publie dans son numéro d'AOUT–SEPTEMBRE

ANDRE PHILIP
Les quatre problèmes de la France

PIERRE URI
Rebondissements

ANNIE KRIEGEL
Aux origines françaises du communisme chinois

MAURICE CRANSTON
La pensée de Michel Foucault

EMMANUEL BERL
Le sismologue appliqué

CLAUDE METTRA
L'Europe bourgeoise et les maladies de la culture
Une grande enquête dirigée par
FRANCOISE CHOAY
La Ville et l'Imaginaire

PREUVES: 23, rue de la Pépinière—PARIS (8°)
Le N° de 96 pp. illu.—France: 4.20 F.—Etranger: 4.60 F.
C.C.P. PARIS 178–00

Un ancien numéro sera gracieusement envoyé sur simple demande comme spécimen

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE MOSCOW CORRESPONDENT: A COMMENT

Robert Conquest

MOST OF THE SIGNIFICANT points about the difficulties of reporting from Moscow, and about the variability and the reliability of the reports, have been made. May I, rather, in a general way run over the whole question as it appears to one who has never faced the correspondents' problems, and has merely been happy to use their hard-earned information and complain that there was not more of it?

To comment on your symposium on reporting from Moscow* means revealing one's qualifications or disqualifications. So first I should say that during the whole period in which I have myself been writing books on Soviet themes I have not been to the USSR, and that, moreover, I have relied very largely, though not quite entirely, on printed sources.

Your distinguished correspondents have frankly pointed out the disadvantages of working from Moscow. I am naturally more sensible of their advantages, and in particular of what Robert Korengold so rightly emphasizes—the irreplaceable 'tingle' of the country, the feel, hard to define but obvious in the best reporting, which is simply not available to the researcher outside.

The debate on the advantages and disadvantages has always been in terms of the correspondent not seeing the wood for the trees and the man outside not seeing the trees for the wood. A dialectical solution at a higher level, with each making use of the other's insights and the other's sheer hard work, is plainly the thing. For it seems obvious that each of them is doing a full day, and could not cope with the other's job in addition, or not very easily.

The research writer outside has, of course, various advantages. He can avoid subjects which require more than the officially established facts. And he is in any case working to a schedule which means that by the time he is published the facts have become fairly plain—an unfair advantage over the daily journalist.

Presumably, too, while the Soviet press and publications are more readily available in the USSR, facilities for filing and analysing are largely wanting. And we can add that now, as in the forties, there is not in Moscow the comparative availability of information which marked the Khrushchev period. (But on the other hand, the skilled reporting which then gave us such accurate information as Michel Tatu's report of the first meeting of the RSFSR Union of Writers, later confirmed in so much detail, would not have been possible but for the

* See *Survey*, No. 68.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

apprenticeship to silence, the learning of the potential crevices in the anti-veridical monolith, which had long preceded it.) In any case, it is clearly advantageous to the man outside that, while the Western press in Moscow is hampered more than it has been for years, at the same time (as your own pages so often show) a far larger amount of first-hand documentation from Soviet citizens appears, 'smuggled' out, in the West.

In general, if the man in London or New York reads enough of the official output, the 'leaked' documents, the dispatches of Western reporters and the books of first-hand experience (and reads in the right way), he can make the imaginative transference necessary to historian and leader-writer alike. Gibbon, or Bury or Jones know more about, or at any rate are able to tell more about, Justinian's reign than Procopius. The accumulation of information not available to the man on the spot here takes place in a perspective of time. But this applies to some extent to a perspective of place as well. All the same, we should note that it is Procopius himself who provides an important part of what later writers know. The researcher is to some degree parasitical on the journalist.

THUS THE NON-VISITOR has certain ways of compensating for his inevitable gap. Above all, he can make use of the men who are (or have recently been) on the spot to give him the missing 'feel'. If their actual dispatches do not convey all that they can provide, nevertheless they come out on leave, and may be spoken with, and every couple of years one of them leaves his post and gives his ideas in fuller form.

The only question is, which correspondents will best serve as surrogates for first-hand experience? And here, of course, one can say no more than that it is a matter of judgment. A reasonably sound judgment can only be based on a critical reading of accounts of earlier and comparable periods of Soviet life, or, preferably, on earlier direct experience of Russia, or at least of comparable societies.

As your contributors make clear, there have always been a number of correspondents in Moscow whose reporting has been wholly misleading, even allowing for all the difficulties. Either like Duranty they had careerist, or like Werth ideological, motives which led them to misrepresentation. (Diplomats like Davies and researchers like the Webbs were indeed equally misleading.) And one can add a further distorting factor—sheer incompetence. The idea that a correspondent should have special qualifications for the Moscow (or any other) post is not strictly adhered to even now by various newspapers. They may, and do, send a man who is not merely opinionated but prematurely so, as far as knowledge of the subject is concerned. Nor is it necessarily the case that the career journalist, promoted by chance to a post like Moscow, necessarily has the humility to work at giving himself the background information, to read the histories and so on. I remember,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in Bulgaria after the war, where I spent a few years as press attaché, how visiting journalists, including the best-known foreign correspondents of the day, had not even provided themselves with the rudimentary knowledge of the country to be obtained by looking at the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (the only true exception was Mr Sefton Delmer)—there were no resident foreigners on the press corps. This is not strictly comparable with the situation in Moscow now, as these men were only in the country for days or weeks. But such attitudes lead naturally to a situation in which, on a longer stay, they equally neglect the more solid preparation then required.

Still, when it comes to the better served journals, it seems that the main weakness is on the editorial side in London or New York, examples of whose lack of grip have been given by your contributors.

In the West, informed circles are now far less subject to important error than in the thirties. A vast body of useful research and reporting lies behind that. All the same, errors (and even the same errors as in the thirties) do persist. For anyone concerned with the truth has to face the fact that all the old methods of disinformation are still working. In the past few months I have read an account by a delegation of British industrialists to the Caucasus with reports on the normal, British-style operation of the Soviet trade unions—this was just after Shelepin, a non-trade union member, had been appointed head of the whole body. We have seen a description by a group of prominent British lawyers of the model criminology at a model detention centre described as evidently typical—just as in the good old days when the West knew of Bolshevo and not of Kolyma. And it is not so long since we had the spectacle of a Press Lord being shown a pile of grain in Kazakhstan and instantly becoming a front-rank Khrushchev fan, in spite of the almost immediately following admission from Moscow that famine had been averted only by imports of Western grain.

Moreover, it is a depressing thought that much of the truth about Soviet affairs becomes widely known in the West only because of the admissions, or the actions, of the Soviet regime itself. Khrushchev's secret speech did not substantially alter the views of anyone who had any knowledge of the Stalin period; but it was a revelation to many—to too many—supposedly educated and concerned people in the West. Again, the recent events in Czechoslovakia have clearly told our public more than any amount of general analysis.

All of us, correspondents and scholars alike, are engaged in the same struggle for truth. The role of the regime in this is the opposite—to attempt to prevent knowledge of a large part of the relevant material becoming generally known or understood. In our various ways we are attempting to provide the Western public with information vital to its reaching sound conclusions on foreign policy matters. It is a task in which the various approaches are not competitive but complementary.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

VIEWS AND REVIEWS

POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The Individual and Power Relations

Joseph Frankel

RECENT events in Poland and Czechoslovakia provided striking examples of reactions to the same basic problem, the problem of Party rule. In Poland writers' and students' demands for liberty were denounced in a massive campaign as a 'zionist' plot. In Czechoslovakia demands for far-reaching changes led to foreign intervention.

But how well do we realize what is *the problem*? What is the human dimension behind the ideological formulas of the protagonists or the abstract categories of the Western analysts? How is the question of the character of Party rule refracted at a personal level? It is extraordinarily difficult to break the barrier to reality within the framework of abstractions, simply by an effort of imagination which is rooted in the experience of the familiar and in the ignorance of the exotic. Only *belles lettres* can help in understanding, by providing the necessary link between Western imagination and Eastern realities of power. But if there is one subject which until recently has not yet found its mirror in literature, it is the question of how the exercise of power affects the character of the human relations between the individual members of the communist power *élite* and society in general.

The literature of communist disenchantment (Koestler's *Darkness at Noon*, Serge's *The Case of Comrade Tulaev*, etc.) was focused on the ideological angle, the 'betrayal of the ideals', and not on the communist establishment as a social phenomenon; Milosz's *The Captive Mind* was still primarily concerned with intellectual rationalizations; Djilas occupied himself with the *theory* of the 'new class'. It is only in the last few years that this taboo subject began to be described by the observers from inside, observers who happened to be writers. Five recently published novels,[1] written from the vantage point of the insiders, have this unusual subject as their central focus, and provide

[1] Piotr Guzy, *Krotki zywot bohatera pozytywnego* (Paris, Instytut Literacki, 1966); Tomas Stalinski, *Widziane z gory* (ditto, 1967); Leopold Tyrmand, *Zycie towarzyskie i uczuciowe* (ditto, 1967); Jerzy Putrament, *Malowierni* (Warsaw, 1967), and Ladislav Mnacko, *Taste of Power* (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967). Most of these books are *romans à clef* and subsequently some of the real-life characters are indicated in brackets after the fictional characters. I am not, however, discussing the real-life prototypes and am restricting myself to the fictional characters.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

us not just with the abstract bare bones of the problem, but with its human dimension in flesh and blood. What we have here is not just ideological apology or denunciation, nor model-building or system-analysis, but the individual behaviour of the actors. And since communist regimes accentuate the political dimensions of human existence and highlight political behaviour in a stark, unadulterated form, they can serve as an admirable illustration of *homo politicus* in action. The five novels help us to see this more clearly.

Their artistic merits vary (the one by Piotr Guzy is undoubtedly the best), but this need not concern us here. All the novels are similar in scope: they exclude the broader and lower social strata, the peasants and the workers, and concentrate upon the people directly involved in the power game, the leading members of the Party *élite* and those who live at the periphery of power. Since books on controversial political topics tend to be heavily biased, especially when enjoying the licence of fiction, it is remarkable how closely the five novels, written by authors with such different political backgrounds, coincide in their judgments and descriptions. It is also remarkable how uniform is the conclusion arising from the picture given in these novels. It simply is that in the regimes in question the sweet smell of political success results in a very bitter taste of power.

Guzy is a post-October 1956 Polish exile who wrote his book in London. Tyrmand wrote his novel in Warsaw and submitted it there for publication; his recent defection was caused by a ban on the publication of his writings in Poland. Stalinski is a pen-name of a writer who lives in Poland and whose book has been published by the Polish *émigré* magazine in Paris, *Kultura*. Putrament is a member of the Central Committee of the Party and one of the most zealous loyalists of the regime. Not long ago he was severely castigating those Polish writers who at the extraordinary meeting of their Union in Warsaw were protesting against the banning of the play *Dziady* by the national poet of Poland, Adam Mickiewicz.[2] Mnacko is a communist writer from Czechoslovakia who 'chose freedom' in Israel after the June 1967 war, and who returned home shortly before the Soviet invasion.[3]

Putrament analyses 'a gallery of leading Party people who, between 1950 and 1956, made a virtual U-turn in their political beliefs', and concentrates upon the members of the Politbureau and the journalists; Guzy describes a major in the security police in a small provincial town faced with his day of reckoning during the liberalization period; Tyrmand's main characters are journalists and artists only indirectly connected with power or with specific political events; Mnacko's hero is a provincial satrap who died just in time to avoid his final downfall. The similarity as well as the severity of the tensions is striking: individuals are threatened with crises in all positions, places, and periods.

[2] See *Survey*, No. 68.

[3] He is now in Vienna.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE most obtrusive element in the political landscape is the top Party *apparat*, which wields the monopoly of power. Its wielders seem to be utterly separated from the remainder of society. They mix with representatives of the workers and peasants only on such formal occasions as when receiving the salute during parades, in the powerless Diet, and on other purely formal occasions. In all five novels a protagonist comes into contact with the workers only once, during a strike, and with the peasants only as a colourless mass in the countryside; otherwise their relations are restricted to people directly serving them: bodyguards, drivers, waiters, etc.

The Party *élite* appears to be constantly fluctuating and changing, some people dropping out and others being drawn into it. It operates on the basis of a gigantic threat system. Nobody is immune from its menace—the system is based upon hierarchical relations in which persons at lower levels depend for survival upon the protection of those higher up. With the fall of a member of the Politbureau, all his protégés follow him unless they have the acumen to sense the change in good time and seek other protection, or manage to save themselves by determined dissociation and condemnation. The system is quite ruthless and the security apparatus plays in it a central role. It has incriminating records in its files on everybody, even the top leaders.

As Mnacko's hero says, 'there is no friendship in politics'; survival often depends upon being instrumental in the downfall of another person. The network of relationships becomes so complicated with the often only surmised threats of blackmail or promises of reward and the unforeseeable reactions of all those involved that survival for any length of time depends upon great skill and effort. In fact so difficult and complicated is life that Borowicz (Starewicz), the hero of Stalinski, deliberately refuses to follow the multitude of variables and permutations and sticks to a simple, cautious behaviour. He finds a degree of precarious safety, which is temporarily lost, in the antagonism of the two members of the Politbureau ranking next to 'the Chief' (Gomulka), and is always conscious of the danger of 'being caught in the draught' if this disagreement ceases. He is ultimately saved by 'the Chief' himself, who, after a distressing period of disgrace, elevates him to the secretaryship of the Central Committee.

Improvement in one's position, anticipation of threats, and securing suitable protection and allies are the conditions of survival and naturally occupy much of the vital efforts of all the participants. Physical elimination, long-term imprisonment, and torture are repeatedly referred to as the features of the earlier period, especially the 1945–46 post-war purge. In the fifties the stakes are lower, since the harm that befalls the victim is less, but the diminished threats linger in the minds of the individuals more strongly than in reality.

A truly Hobbesian war of all against all is the rule—nobody can

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contract out of the power game, nobody can find refuge with friends or even within his own family since, owing to the physical deprivations and the lack of security and privacy, relations between man and wife are often strained and infidelity is frequent.

The recurrent changes of policy and the purges have broken up particularist affiliations—there is no indication in any of the novels of reliable affinities based upon common origins, childhood friendship, or even participation in the same detachment during the resistance. The natural inclination to pursue these and similar links usually degenerates into fear of blackmail and suspicion of betrayal. Links between the generations are tenuous. The generation of the pre-war revolutionaries had been decimated during the war and under Stalin; those who joined the Party during the war often have a fundamentally different attitude to the system; the break between them and the post-war generation is great.

Two major consequences stem from the constant struggle for survival: one is a natural selection process of the members of the Party *élite* which is based upon qualities necessary for survival; the other one is a creeping paralysis of the whole system. As Putrament himself described his characters in a review of the reviews of his book,[4] their main characteristic is that they are unpleasant. They are also weak, vaccilating, thoughtless, frightened, mean, in various combinations. There is not one really likeable human character among them; the only possible exception is the hero, Ligenza, and the only episode with any human tenderness is a brief section describing a few days in the country which Ligenza spends with his mistress. And even this idealized character is really quite repulsive, his main preoccupations being limited to empty doctrinal rhetoric and personal and political intrigues.

The road to power is best analysed by Lichtner (Swiatlo), another character in Putrament's novel, who stipulates that in order to succeed in the power game, one must avoid the temptations of drink, women, and, most difficult of all, fame. The general callousness to human relations, the idea that they must not come between the individual and the Party, is taken for granted. Moreover, power is wielded in secret, without any responsibility. Lichtner soon realizes the weakness of the ostensible wielders of power who become scapegoats for the recurrent failures of policy, and make his way through the trumped-up trials of Stalinism. Once caught in the mesh, he has to continue—any other course would lead to his downfall; he ultimately resolves his dilemma by defection.

The best picture of corruption through power appears in Mnacko. His ' Great Man ', a born leader with human foibles but great determination, introduces communist rule with rough but effective measures, such as coercing the countryside by beating up rebellious women or by

[4] In *Zycie Warszawy* (15–16 October 1967).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cutting off electricity. Nevertheless, his intentions are good and his popularity high. Gradually, however, he becomes separated from the people and estranged from all his friends, even his loving wife. He ends up surrounded by bodyguards and having no other contact with reality than through them. While the 'Great Man' is ruthless and often brutal, Mnacko leaves some doubt whether we should put the worst interpretation upon his meanest actions to his closest friends.

Guzy leaves no such doubts in his portrait of a veritable monster, a major in the security service. A born sadist who consistently pursues the motto 'I always say do not trust, do not trust anybody', he treats people as enemies to be subjugated; to him all people are like beasts, and he relishes their fear. He comes to a bad end, with the Party, to which he devoted all his life, bringing him to book. Through his artistry, Guzy achieves a portrait which is not only credible but also, unexpectedly, arouses our pity, though not our sympathy.

The paralysis due to the threat system is again best portrayed by Mnacko. The 'Great Man' starts with high ideals and immense energy but becomes gradually enmeshed in a dangerous political rivalry. The purges eliminate or remove all the honest men from his environment and he becomes increasingly afraid of doing anything in case he should become vulnerable to his rival's criticism. Eventually he loses even the last vestiges of power, although he dies early enough to avoid the final disgrace and to be given a state funeral. The 'Great Man's' socially active period lay in the early post-war years. In later years he and the top people in the other novels do not appear to engage in any useful public activity apart from the eternal power game and the rearrangements and revulsions arising from each successive change of policy. Instead of being in control of the power system as might be expected, they seem to be its slaves. They could be likened to puppets except that it is impossible to define the puppeteer. It certainly is not the Soviet Union; the closest although admittedly vague description would be the regime itself and its inertia.

Life does not stop. Activities go on—journalists produce papers, authors write books, film directors make films, people scrounge for the scarce goods and amuse themselves in the crowded amusement places. The political system seems, however, to have entirely lost any trace of dynamism. The cumbrous bureaucratic machinery has almost seized up—operating through the normal channels, it achieves few, if any, results, and then only in routine matters and after long delays. As a body afflicted by the hardening of arteries extends its capillaries and develops by-passes, so does Polish society. There is the traditional patronage, or Polish 'protection', the expedient of asking people to exercise influence on one's behalf which leads to complex systems of creditor-debtor relationships and of horse-trading and bargaining. There is the occasional bribe and blackmail. There is finally the bed. The influencing of men in power through their wives and mistresses is, of

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

course, a traditional historical pattern at the top level, but in Poland it seems to have spread and ramified even into the lower strata of social relationships. Guzy's 'hero' does not hesitate to offer his not unwilling wife to people upon whose good will he depends. A similar pattern arises with one of Tyrmand's heroes, while one of his middle-aged female characters exercises great influence through her ex-lovers occupying positions of power in various places. Tyrmand presents such a bewildering ramification of sexual relations in such a close relationship to patterns of power and influence that one is led to the rather unexpected conclusion that promiscuity serves the useful purpose of multiplying the woefully few channels of social communication. According to all the writers, it is widely practised, although, as may be surmised, not only for its socially useful aspects.

PARADOXICALLY, despite the ideological nature of the communist regime, ideology seems to play a minimal role in it, as it is depicted in the novels. In Putrament's novel the heroes are people of 'little faith' and 'little loyalty', and this fundamental line, which provides the title of the book, was not severely criticized even in Poland.

The role of communist ideology diminishes with time. The earlier idealism was followed by the Stalinist repression in the thirties. The old guard was decimated during the war and the Stalinist terror. The novels portray the few survivors as the only idealists or at least practical workers genuinely concerned with social welfare. Putrament's Swiderski and his more ambiguous main hero, the sincere but rather confused journalist Ligenza, are examples.

While 'for the old, power was their indispensable though often unpleasant means for the realization of ideals; for him [Lichtner-Swiatlo] it became only a selection of pretexts in the struggle for the objective, power'. In Stalinski's book the hero, Borowicz, retains his loyalty to the Party despite the fact that he is considered a traitor by both sides: the die-hards and the rebellious intelligentsia. Remaining a convinced communist, he accepts the injustices and dangers of the system and concentrates upon practical schemes to extricate himself; he does not condemn the system and he gratefully accepts his final elevation to the Central Committee secretariat, determined to do his best for the regime, and convinced that this is for the good of society. The same is true of the shadowy figure of Gomulka, appearing under different disguises in the novels of Putrament and Stalinski.

It is, of course, difficult to be sure whether these few idealists are motivated by the ideals of a regime ostensibly concerned with the good of the working people, or by the power-political considerations which indicate that the iniquities of the regime should be covered up to avoid its disintegration. The latter is a recurrent theme to which must be added the natural fear of revenge from the victims or their friends and relations. The monstrous Karolek, Guzy's security man, is concerned mainly with avoiding the responsibility for the atrocities he had

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

committed, but also with maintaining the regime as a whole. Motivation in others is even more mixed. For instance, Mnacko's 'Great Man' does not divulge the iniquities of his enemy, Galovitch, and thus remove a dreaded rival, out of fear that this would debilitate the whole regime. Likewise, the attempts at liberalization in the fifties generally petered out owing to the reluctance to admit mistakes and to get rid of the culprits. Putrament, whose novel ends at the very start of the thaw, convincingly describes a meeting of the Supreme Council of the Union of Economists at which, taking the official cue, nobody supports the criticism of the leadership put forward in a spirit of sincerity by one foolhardy member, although most of them feel as he does. Behaviour and motivations are so confused that it is often impossible to disentangle the mixture of personal fears and interest, of concern with the regime as a power structure, and with ideology. It is significant that ideology or its ideals are rarely mentioned in the novels.

With a few exceptions, the leaders not only do not pursue any ideals or believe in any ideology, but fail dismally even in the more down-to-earth and mundane task of ensuring greater social welfare and a better life. Caught in a continuous series of economic crises, all that they can do is try to exercise some modicum of control to tide over the immediate problems of the day. Planning ahead is not believed in or mentioned by any of the main characters. They do occasionally refer to the ultimate advance but only vaguely and with hope rather than conviction; at best this is a very remote prospect which is scarcely likely to give meaning to their political activity.

Thus in terms of its objectives, political life under Gomulka or Novotny appears as utterly sterile. The task of the regime is to concentrate upon self-perpetuation and takes the form of an eternal game of power politics, a series of contests and intrigues among the members of the ruling clique. The only machinery existing for revision of objectives, reinterpretation of ideology, and of any dynamism, is the top leadership of the Party; shaken by the tremendous dangers it had encountered during the liberalization period in 1956, it is concerned mainly with avoiding changes so as not to endanger the regime. Thus, paradoxically again, a state which is theoretically ideological is governed by an undiluted interplay of power politics.

One must allow of course for the obvious limitations of the material provided by the five novels. But they are a highly suitable source from which to study the behaviour of the 'political man', since, apart from the artistic endeavour to create a work of art, each novelist purports to analyse the political problems of his period as well as human behaviour conditioned by them. I believe that the primary purpose may have been more political than psychological and that human relations are only of secondary interest and concern. But this may not be so in all cases. One can imagine especially Guzy or Mnacko being fascinated at the outset by the personalities of their heroes. However true this may be, all the authors are interested almost exclusively in

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the interaction between power politics and personal behaviour. Possibly this focus obscures or foreshortens other aspects of behaviour so that the emerging picture falls short of real life.

THE predominant motivation of the individuals involved is the struggle for survival. This has a generally brutalizing effect. People cannot afford to follow their conscience, to profess truth, or to pursue the dictates of friendship. They are constrained to play the game according to its rules and these are generally the lowest common denominator, the ways of those most callous and brutal.

None of the protagonists in the novels finds a way to contract out of the nightmarish power contest. Material discomforts, particularly the overcrowded housing, impede secluded private life within one's family. There are no associations or institutions within which the individual can express himself and find solidarity with others, outside the control of the Party. Perhaps the limitation of the novels to the milieu of the power *élite* somewhat distorts the picture. Possibly professional, expert or purely academic work, however poorly remunerated, agricultural work, and Church life, provide an escape at least for some.

Although there are no substitutes for the obligatory, inescapable participation in the power game, drink, sex, pursuit of material rewards and of fame offer adjuncts which, however, give only partial satisfaction and, at the same time, dangerously detract from power considerations. Drink is an all-pervading element in the power *élite* depicted in the novels. It must be psychologically indispensable to provide some relaxation from the constant and continuous pressures. While all drink, some get drunk much more than others, and some positively drink themselves to death; this is the case with Guzy's monster-hero and with Tyrmand's sympathetically outlined film-maker, Mikolaj.

With the material sources of pleasure severely restricted, it is understandable that people take as much pleasure as they can from the source which is freely available, namely, sex. A few episodes depict tenderness or even love between the people involved, but generally it is a hectic, heartless, and promiscuous activity, often degenerating into real ugliness and brutality. Sexual relations are extremely important to nearly all the characters—they seem to provide at least a modicum of normalcy and sanity, and therefore meaning to their lives. They can, however, also lead to degeneracy and to dissipation of energy, as with Mnacko's 'Great Man'.

In Poland, which faces continuing shortages of consumer goods, the provision of the necessities of life and the search for at least a few luxuries are time- and energy-consuming occupations. Some of the scarcer goods and services have become coveted status symbols to which many of the characters, especially those of Tyrmand, aspire. There is the question of an apartment, a matter of central importance in the impossibly crowded city of Warsaw, and of the scarce and

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

costly furniture and fittings; importations from abroad are valued, especially attractive clothes for the wives, and foreign-made suits for the men; and motor-cars, especially powerful ones, are highly prized. Perhaps most highly prized is the privilege of going abroad, particularly on assignments of long duration and which allow for high standards of living. All these constitute important objectives which do not differ essentially from the good things of life necessary to keep up with the Joneses in the West, except that they are very scarce and hence tremendous efforts are necessary for their achievement.

Social relations also play an important role. The Poles, who are sociable people, enjoy a whole gamut of these, from exchanges of confidences with a drinking-companion to the snobbish satisfaction of having one's party patronized by VIPs. There are vacations in holiday resorts and conversations in coffee houses. In Tyrmand, the younger set dance to jazz, although they enjoy it less now it has become legal; the forbidden fruit had tasted better. Improvisation, making do with what is available, together with a bit of flamboyance, give satisfaction. Humour and political jokes are enjoyed and offer an outlet for anti-Russian sentiments and grievances against the regime, a safety-valve which prevents these feelings from being excessively pent up. The press rigidly follows the Party line, but several of the journalists appearing in the novels are made bolder rather than more inhibited by the pre-publication censorship, since they can try out some of the less orthodox ideas and obtain advice before their publication, reducing the risk of subsequent rebuke and of serious consequences.

None of the novelists depicts the pleasures of the theatre and cinema, books and the arts, except Tyrmand, who analyses the satisfactions and frustrations of artistic creativity by contrasting the self-fulfilment of the rebellious hero, the film-maker Mikolaj, with the dissipation of talent by his counterpart, the careerist journalist Andrzej. Both ultimately fail: the nonconformist suffers and finds no outlets, while the conformist stunts his talent.

If not fully repressed in his freedom of thought and expression, the individual is confronted with a constant dilemma of having to satisfy two different publics and two conflicting sets of demands. On the one hand, if at all close to public life—and all except the lowliest are in this position—he must seek the approval, or at least avoid the disapproval, of the powers that be. On the other hand, if he seeks social approval he must satisfy the liberal critics of these powers. This dilemma of life is not, of course, unique, but under a communist regime it is so greatly accentuated that it cannot be escaped.

In all, the individual thus has rather limited opportunities to find psychological satisfaction. The only reasonably happy and well-adjusted people are those who either have reached the very bottom so that they can fall no further, or have opted out of the power game to take up an extremely lowly and hence relatively safe position. We find only

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

two people reasonably content in Mnacko's novel—the hero's son, who disavows his father and spends his life as a labourer mending roads, and the well-born and once beautiful woman Lisa, now an ageing, hard-working barmaid. Among the main characters, only Stalinski's Borowicz survives his crisis with an ironical 'happy ending'—he is looking forward to a career as the secretary of the Central Committee and still happy to go on serving the Party before he is caught in the new 'draught', which as things stand may happen at any moment (Borowicz-Starewicz is Jewish). Mnacko's 'Great Man' died in time to be saved from final disgrace; Tyrmand's conformist and rebel heroes are both left extremely unhappy and confused; Guzy's hero ends up literally as well as symbolically on a refuse heap.

The most fundamental aspect of this type of regime is its all-pervading dehumanizing effect, prevailing upon the individual to rank all personal values and convictions lower than the dictates of politics. Some individuals, indeed, degenerate completely, as exemplified in an extreme form by Guzy's hero. Not all characters, however, succumb; human nature is resistant. As the Czechs and the Slovaks have recently shown, it is also resilient and ready to assert itself as soon as outside pressures subside.

In the West the escape of the individual from public into private life may have led to many unhealthy repercussions (Hanna Arendt reminded us in her *Human Condition* that private in Greek is *idiotes*); but the complete immersion of the individual in political life, on the communist pattern, has even less to commend it. If one takes a broad philosophical view of the interaction between the individual and the political system, reading these novels makes one remember Karl Popper's strictures on Plato and the dangers of an over-political approach to human relations and social institutions. The twin failings of political apathy and the corruption of power have been institutionalized in the communist regimes. Czechoslovakia's attempt to escape from them led to Soviet intervention; in Poland the manifestation of similar sentiments by writers and students in February–March 1968 was suppressed internally.

SOVIET POLICY AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

George Heitmann

THE 1967 Arab-Israeli war had a gestation period of some three weeks, about the time necessary to write and publish the first history of the conflict.[1] Days of high emotion make good copy, and the latest

[1] Robert J. Donovan, *Israel's Fight for Survival* (New York, 1967) had its first printing in June 1967 and would appear to be the first published history of the conflict.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Middle East crisis has already brought forth its flood of words.[2] Thoughtful analysis, however, requires time to mature and for passions to cool. Understandably, the rush to publish gave rise to words most charitably measured in quantitative terms. 'Anxiously awaited' would not, therefore, be the phrase most spontaneously prompted by the announced arrival of two new books on the June war. Both Theodore Draper's *Israel and World Politics*[3] and Walter Laqueur's *The Road to War 1967*[4] are, however, superior to their predecessors, and the latter, especially, is very good indeed.

Border skirmishes, terrorist outrages, and other proof of the lack of cordiality in Arab-Israeli relations can be expected to occur with more or less predictable regularity. More serious outbreaks of hostilities are no less surprising, but their exact timing can never be completely anticipated. The most recent violent episode in the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict was not altogether unforeseen, although its occurrence precisely in the late spring of 1967 does require explanation. At the same time, an analysis of the immediate events leading to the June war has significance only in the broader context of the historical origins of Arab-Israeli animosities. Nadav Safran has most eloquently summarized the contextual setting of the Palestine issue:

> . . . Fundamentally both Arabs and Jews have an unassailable moral argument. A person who cannot see how this is possible does not understand the essence of tragedy; much less does he realize that his position serves only to assure that the Palestine tragedy should have another sequel, and yet another.[5]

The Arab-Israeli war did not allow many observers the luxury of 'neutrality in thought, word, and deed'.[6] But emotional detachment is not a prerequisite of analytical objectivity. What is required is that our biases do not lead to the suppression of unwelcome evidence; and, more subtly, that our preconceptions do not unwittingly lead us to ignore points of relevancy that are not compatible with our emotional and intellectual commitments.

BOTH Theodore Draper and Walter Laqueur are primarily interested in that series of events beginning in the middle of May and culminating some three weeks later in the outbreak of war. Draper and Laqueur share common sympathies, and, as would be expected from

[2] At least a dozen books on the war have thus far been published in English. They range from such serious reporting efforts as Randolph S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, *The Six Day War* (Boston, 1967) to the novel by Morris West, *Tower of Babel* (New York, 1968).

[3] Theodore Draper, *Israel and World Politics* (London, Secker and Warburg, 1968).

[4] Walter Laqueur, *The Road to War 1967* (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968).

[5] Nadav Safran, *The United States and Israel* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963), p. XVI.

[6] These were the words chosen by State Department press officer Robert McCloskey to describe the official US position. Draper assures us that 'this remark was an inadvertence never intended to represent US policy'. See Theodore Draper, 'Israel and World Politics', *Commentary*, August 1967, p. 40.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

authors of such distinguished reputation, neither can be charged with intentionally distorting the evidence. The weakness in Draper's analysis, however, is that his emotional attachments cloud, at times, the depth, perception and scope of his vision. He does not seem fully to 'understand the essence of tragedy' that underlies Middle East suspicions and hostilities. Laqueur, on the other hand, has produced a book so relatively free of bias as possibly to be found objectionable to partisans of both the Arab and Israeli causes.

Both authors are in broad agreement as to the identity of those principal events that carried the Arab-Israeli confrontation from gesture to action. In the middle of May 1967, reports of a threatening concentration of Israeli forces on the Syrian border were confirmed to President Nasser by the Soviet Union. The alleged military build-up was denied by Premier Eshkol, and this denial was supported by United Nations field observers. Nasser reacted by requesting the withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force in Sinai and by ordering Egyptian troops to Israeli frontier positions. The troop withdrawal request was presented to UN Secretary General U Thant who reported that he could see no alternative to that of compliance with Egyptian demands. On 23 May, a few days after the requested dismissal of UN forces was received by U Thant (16 May), Cairo Radio broadcast a speech, made the previous day by President Nasser, in which the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba was announced. One week later (30 May) King Hussein of Jordan arrived in Cairo for meetings with the Egyptian president. Reconciling past enmities, the text of a new Egyptian-Jordanian defence pact was announced the same day. As the crisis mounted, efforts to initiate effective UN action floundered in an atmosphere of acrimonious exchange. At the same time, British and American expressions of support for the international waterways status of the Gulf of Aqaba and the controlling Straits of Tiran were not translated into action. On 5 June Israel opened the Sinai offensive.

Such are the basic facts of the 1967 Middle East crisis. Facts, of course, require interpretation before they acquire any real meaning, and Draper and Laqueur are in reasonably close agreement as to essentials. There are, however, some differences in emphasis. The reported Israeli military build-up on the Syrian frontier is particularly emphasized by Laqueur. It was this troop presence that Nasser in his resignation speech of 9 June identified as precipitating the crisis. Nasser recalled that he could not 'accept . . . silently . . . [the] premeditated plan against Syria' [7] which had been confirmed by Soviet intelligence.[8] Premier Eshkol countered that there was no unusual concentration of Israeli troops on the Syrian border. Eshkol's denial was supported by U Thant in his statement to the United Nations in which it was declared: 'Reports from UNTSO observers have confirmed the absence of troop concentrations and significant troop movements on both sides of the [Israeli-Syrian]

[7] Address of President Nasser to the Nation, 9 June 1967.
[8] Ibid.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

line.'[9] It should be stressed that this apparently erroneous intelligence as to Israeli intentions was authenticated to Nasser by the Soviet Union. Furthermore, as Draper reminds us: 'In October 1966 . . . Soviet Ambassador Fedorenko had rehearsed this very bit of intelligence and it had again made its appearance in the Soviet press in February 1967.'[10] we can only speculate as to the motivations of the Soviet Union. Laqueur's explanation is plausible:

> Syria, during the first week of May, was in turmoil. . . . The government had little popular support; it reacted as desperate governments do—with severe repression. . . . What happened next is a matter for surmise, but it is certain that the Russians were consulted. . . . Whether Moscow counselled a diversion or whether this was originally a Syrian proposal, we do not know. . . . It seemed . . . promising to call in Nasser . . . [and] the story about an impending Israeli invasion of Syria could serve more than one purpose: it would give the harassed Syrian government some respite on the domestic front; it might induce Nasser to come to Syria's help under the provisions of the new defence treaty; and it would compel even the 'reactionary' Arab countries to discontinue their attacks on Damascus. This then, as far as can be reconstructed, was the origin of the May crisis.[11]

We do not know whether Nasser believed that an invasion of Syria was imminent. Certainly, Israeli military 'reprisal'[12] operations were not unprecedented. From the Arab viewpoint, Israeli intentions may well have seemed doubtful, even ominous. Given the then existing state of uncertainty, an optimal strategy may have dictated an Egyptian show of force. It is evident that Nasser, by successfully dismissing the UN Emergency Force and positioning his own troops in Sinai, did score a diplomatic victory. It would also appear that Israel was willing to accept Nasser's initial move as a reasonable response in the dangerous game of thrust and parry.[13]

Nasser, however, went one step further. In his speech of 22 May it was announced that 'under no circumstances will we allow the Israeli flag to pass through the Gulf of Aqaba'.[14] The gravity of the crisis was escalated by the imposition of a blockade.

ONE of the most analytically relevant issues raised by the blockade concerns the action alternatives available to Israel and their adoption probabilities as appraised by Nasser. Closing the Gulf to Israeli shipping

[9] As quoted in the *New York Times*, 21 May 1967.
[10] Draper, op. cit., p. 31.
[11] Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 79–80.
[12] 'Reprisal' might carry with it the connotation of being a justified retaliation. This meaning is not intended. Whether Israeli military penetrations into Arab territories were justified depends largely upon one's point of view. After a long period of regular exchanges of border fire, etc., the question of who did what first becomes rather obscure, if not totally irrelevant.
[13] See Laqueur, op. cit., particularly ch. 4.
[14] Speech of President Nasser, 22 May 1967.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would have been economically damaging. More important, however, were the probable political and military repercussions of a successfully maintained Egyptian blockade. It is doubtful if complete non-response was ever considered as a viable Israeli policy alternative. Breaking the blockade was imperative for Israel. This could be accomplished either through outside intervention or by direct military action. Israel temporized for several days. There was no unanimity as to the most appropriate course of action. Foreign Minister Abba Eban cautioned against haste and advocated exhausting all diplomatic channels before taking more drastic action; the military, most conspicuously symbolized in the person of Moshe Dayan, favoured a more direct response. The position of Premier Eshkol appeared ambivalent.[15]

It is interesting to speculate as to the probabilities Nasser assigned to the Israeli selection of policy alternatives.[16] It is doubtful that Nasser thought capitulation to be likely. Outside intervention, however, was not an unreasonable expectation. If Nasser heavily weighed this possibility, then closing the Straits of Tiran was a politically sound strategy. Israeli reliance on outside assistance would have constituted a prestigious diplomatic *coup* for Nasser. At the same time it would not necessarily have reflected an Israeli weakness that would have demanded further Arab exploitation. Nasser could have gained much the same kind of diplomatic victory that he had scored at Suez in 1956 without sustaining any of the accompanying military losses of that earlier campaign. Israel, already mobilized, could accept outside intervention, however, only if it was quickly forthcoming,[17] and this was something over which neither of the principal actors had much control. Outside pressures to alleviate the crisis did not sufficiently materialize and war became inevitable.

Draper and Laqueur offer a different and more widely accepted explanation. Nasser imposed the blockade in the full expectation that it meant war. This is consistent with his public statements[18] which, apparently, both authors are willing to accept as accurate reflections of intent. Nasser, however, grossly miscalculated the military capabilities of his opponent. Perhaps, as Draper and Laqueur suggest, Nasser and the Arab world had come to believe their own propaganda as to Arab

[15] Premier Eshkol, in an interview in *Ma'ariv*, 4 October 1967, gave a detailed account of the events preceding the decision to go to war in which he would appear to have played a more decisive role than his critics would have us believe. See Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 143–44.

[16] Nasser, in his speech at Cairo University, 23 July 1967, has obligingly provided some probability estimates of his assessment of the likelihood of war at various stages of the crisis. These estimates are retrospective and may not coincide with the relevant prior probability assignments. See Laqueur, op. cit., p. 107.

[17] The Churchills particularly emphasize the point that Israel, without a large standing army, and heavily dependent on its reserves, cannot remain in a state of full mobilization for any long period of time without experiencing severe economic repercussions. Such factors, while not overriding, must certainly have been considered in reaching the decision to go to war. See op. cit., ch. 3.

[18] See, for example, President Nasser's speeches of 26 May, 29 May, 9 June, and 23 July 1967, as well as his press conference of 28 May 1967.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

invincibility. This explanation is plausible. Certainly the history of nations would be less replete with bloodshed and gore if miscalculations of relative military strengths were not common. This explanation, however, does raise a critical question which, although recognized by both authors, is never completely and satisfactorily answered. If Nasser fully expected war, why was the the Egyptian army and air force so ill alerted for its outbreak? [19] Also, it may be inquired, did the Soviet Union equally miscalculate as to the outcome of the war?

WE have been considering the June war within the narrow context of an Arab-Israeli confrontation. The Middle East crisis, however, had repercussions extending far beyond the geographical stage of its enactment. The inability of the United Nations to act with effective dispatch was once more evidenced. Within this setting of irresolute impotence U Thant was particularly criticized for his hasty compliance with Nasser's request to withdraw the UN Emergency Force from its positions in the Sinai Peninsula. Draper and Laqueur dismiss these charges as largely unwarranted. Draper points to the dubious validity of the Hammarskjold memorandum as a basis for refusing Nasser's demands, and both authors see little scope for U Thant beyond that of agreeing to what was essentially a *fait accompli*. Laqueur, while admitting that U Thant 'acted precipitately', argues that 'two or seven more days [delay] would have made no difference'; the Secretary General 'is not the main villain—it was not his war'.[20]

Of greater interest and significance were the roles played by the United States and the Soviet Union. Both major powers gave active support to the 1948 UN partition resolution creating the state of Israel. Again in 1956, the USA and the USSR co-operated in successfully de-escalating the Suez crisis. The policy of both countries has been and will remain one of maintaining the status quo in the Middle East. In large measure this shared policy objective stems simply from the fact that both the USA and the Soviet Union currently view the Arab world as the wrong place for a direct confrontation to take place. Preservation of the status quo should not, however, be too rigidly interpreted and there is ample room for diplomatic manoeuvring. For example,

> . . . effective pressure leading to the withdrawal of the American air base in Tripoli would be a Soviet gain that the US could tolerate. Similarly, the Soviet Union has accepted, albeit reluctantly, direct Anglo-American military intervention in support of [past] President Chamoun of Lebanon and King Hussein of Jordan, respectively. But neither the US nor the Soviet Union were able to countenance the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt [in 1956]. Minor gains by one side or the other can be accepted as part of the

[19] The Churchills argue that having decided upon war, Israel played a masterful game of deception which successfully deluded the Egyptians as to Israeli intentions. See particularly, op. cit., pp. 73–75.

[20] Laqueur, op. cit., p. 88.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> diplomatic game, but no sensible player wants to upend the gaming table.[21]

Neither Draper nor Laqueur ascribe more than secondary roles to the United States or the Soviet Union. Laqueur entitles a chapter 'The Impotence of Power' and unemotionally attempts to document the implied thesis. Draper shares the inferred conclusion but finds reason for moral indignation in the fact that 'none of the great, not-so-great, and no-longer-so-great powers distinguished itself in this war crisis'.[22] The United States did support a British-inspired plan to exert international pressure to end the blockade. Attempts were made to enlist the support of the major maritime nations but these efforts were not greeted enthusiastically. Meanwhile, as indicated by a State Department press officer, 'The focus of American effort to solve the Near East crisis without violence is in the UN'.[23] At the same time arrangements between Presidents Johnson and Nasser for the exchange of visits of ranking diplomatic officials, including Vice-Presidents Hubert Humphrey and Zakaria Mohiedin, were being made. Also, personal messages from the US President were dispatched to Cairo and Tel Aviv imploring the exercise of constraint on both sides.

Draper deplores the ineffectualness of US policy in meeting the crisis. Unfortunately, his judgment and relevancy tend to become obscured when it comes to the critical relationship which he sees to exist between the Arab-Israeli and Vietnamese wars. Draper was one of the signers of an open letter appearing in the *New York Times* in which President Johnson was implored 'to act now . . . to safeguard the integrity, security and survival of Israel and its people'.[24] White House Special Consultant John Roche, noting that many of the signatories were vocally opposed to the administration's Vietnam policies, was moved to suggest that the statement might well have been signed 'Doves for War'. Draper, his intellectual integrity seemingly under attack, observes that 'there is no inherent reason why one cannot criticize the abuse of power in Vietnam and the abdication of power elsewhere'.[25] Draper's philosophical position (not necessarily his factual conclusions) is correct enough; it is simply that it is beside the point. Whether the United States actually abdicated power does, of course, require investigation. Unquestionably, the US commitment in Vietnam does have an influential effect on both domestic and foreign policy. This, however, is a constraint that must be accepted analytically. The constraint may be unfortunate, but questioning the wisdom of the American involvement does not have much to do with the Arab-Israeli war. Regardless of the situation in Vietnam, neutrality, and not an 'abdication of power', may well have

[21] George Heitmann, 'A View of the Conflict of Power from Libya', *The Triangle of Power, Conflict, and Accommodation: The United States, The Soviet Union, Communist China*, ed., Jan S. Prybyla (University Park, Pennsylvania, 1967), p. 34.
[22] Draper, op. cit., p. 38.
[23] As quoted in Laqueur, op. cit., p. 171.
[24] Draper, op. cit., p. 41.
[25] Ibid.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been suggested by the magnitude of American economic interests in the Arab world. If this seems too crass, add to it that American intelligence quite accurately predicted the outcome of a renewal of Arab-Israeli hostilities.

Laqueur would have us believe that this was a simple war, its origins 'too uncomplicated to be given wide credence'.[26] He discourages us from 'belief in the conspiracy theory of history' and concludes 'Nasser stumbled into [the war] . . . Israel was unprepared and confused . . . Russian intelligence was incompetent and Russian judgment poor . . . [and] America was powerless to do anything'.[27] Laqueur's analysis may be correct. However, neither Laqueur nor Draper is convincing in further concluding that the war's outcome was a major setback for Soviet foreign policy—that 'every Egyptian or Syrian . . . set-back [was] an indirect defeat for the Soviet Union'.[28] The uncritical acceptance of the argument that equates the Arab military loss with a Soviet diplomatic defeat is very prevalent. This is rather suprising; it may also be diametrically opposite of the truth.

THE claimed loss in Soviet prestige seems to be based on several considerations: (a) the poor performance of the Arab military forces, and particularly of the partially trained and equipped Egyptian army; (b) the substantial loss of Russian supplied military equipment; (c) the 'failure' of the Soviet Union to lend more than moral support to the Arab cause during the several days of active fighting; and (d) the inability of Soviet intelligence to appraise the situation correctly. It is, of course, highly debatable whether the Arab military collapse reflects in any way on Soviet military proficiency *per se*. The extent to which it implies a misjudgment in Soviet diplomatic policy will be considered below in much fuller detail. Obviously, there was a direct economic loss, variously estimated at about $2 billion, that could be attached to the substantial destruction and capture of communist supplied equipment. Although not negligible, it cannot, from the Soviet viewpoint, be considered of major significance. There remains the claim that the Soviet Union in some way failed because of its inability to avert the Arab military disaster. Unquestionably, Soviet statements during the days of mounting tension could have been, and were, interpreted as giving assurances of a deeper commitment than materialized. Certainly, too, Arab expectations were bitterly disappointed when more direct assistance was not forthcoming.[29] It may well be that the non-aligned nations and

[26] Laqueur, op. cit., p. 229.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid., p. 181.

[29] For example, *Al-Rai-al-Am* reported: 'Events . . . have shown the ugly face of the Soviet Union. It sent its missile-equipped fleet to encourage us to enter the battle. Communist radio stations everywhere proclaimed the support of the socialist countries for the Arabs against aggression. But when aggression did take place, the socialist countries remained silent as if the cat had bitten their tongues.' As cited in *Atlas*, August, 1967, p. 8.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Arab states in particular, will view more cynically future promises of Soviet assistance. However, even this not unreasonable expectation does not seem to have been validated by subsequent events in the Middle East.[30] At the same time, as must be well recognized, American interests in the Arab world suffered a severe reversal. If Arab leaders were disappointed in the lack of Soviet response, they were still more vociferous in their denunciation of the United States. And it must be remembered that the United States, if only because of its huge oil interests, has much more to lose in the Middle East than does the Soviet Union.

Although it would appear obvious enough that the Soviet 'prestige loss', if such were suffered, cannot be considered in isolation, there still appears to be a reluctance to recognize fully the significance of the relative change in the Middle East power positions of the USA and the USSR. The official American position with respect to the war was perhaps correctly, and possibly necessarily, one of concerned neutrality. But, as could be expected, this policy was also ineffectual. The American position was not accepted by the Arab world as one of neutrality, and the partiality of the American press, whether justified or not, was not such as to discredit the Arab interpretation. The Soviet position was unequivocable, and if active military assistance was not forthcoming strong support was at least given to Arab condemnations of Israeli 'aggression'.

In a real sense, although their Arab 'allies' (a particularly revealing term) suffered a substantial loss of both prestige and territory, it was the Soviet Union, and not Israel, much less the United States, that emerged the principal, and perhaps only, reaper of the spoils of war. The nature of the Soviet victory is, however, as much unrecognized as it is misunderstood. In addition, there seems to be the general feeling that in so far as the Soviet Union did further its foreign policy objectives, the gains were considerably diminished by the Arab defeat. As indicated above, Laqueur has unhesitantly accepted this equating of Arab and Soviet fortunes. In point of fact, the Soviet gains were made precisely because of the Arab military failure.

As with the United States, Soviet foreign policy has not always been marked by notable perspicacity and astuteness. Yet it would be overly cynical to claim that the relative gains of one or other of the major powers has been primarily attributable to the ineptness of the other. It is doubtful if the Soviet Union clearly anticipated and actively implemented the policy role that it played, often brilliantly, though perhaps unwittingly, in the spring of 1967. Rather, it is to be suspected that the USSR, perhaps even reluctantly, was forced into the action pattern that emerged. But a rational policy, even if non-volitionally

[30] For example, it is reliably estimated that the Soviet Union has largely replaced the losses of arms and equipment sustained by the Arab forces during the June war. If anything, Arab dependence on the Soviet Union has increased in the months following the crisis.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pursued, will lead to consequences that should have been intentionally sought.

The argument here developed is hypothetical in the game theory sense of presupposing a rational player. It is not necessary for the validity of the argument to assume further that the Soviet Union purposefully plotted its policy actions in the manner to be indicated. The strategy of play, as both Laqueur and Draper would have us believe, may well have been forced upon the Soviet Union. The important point is that the objectives that should have been rationally sought were actually achieved and that the means used, in so far as can be observed, were appropriately and effectively employed.

The Soviet Union has been accused of precipitating the June 1967 Middle East crisis. Let us accept this accusation, not necessarily in the sense of whether it can be substantiated, but rather in terms of its rationality. What circumstances would prompt the Soviet Union actively to encourage an Arab-Israeli armed confrontation? In an either/or sense, two possible outcomes of an Arab-Israeli war must be considered. In narrow military terms, either the Arabs or Israel could emerge victorious. Certain consequences could be expected to flow from either of these two outcomes. Since Israeli arms did emerge victorious, let us consider this possibility first. It is not unreasonable to assume that the actual consequences of an Israeli victory could have been anticipated. Arab leaders did and could have been expected to hurl often wild accusations against the United States. Zionist domination of American politics and the billions of dollars of aid emanating from 'Tel Aviv-on-Hudson' would be cited in the Arab press as evidence of a pro-Israel American foreign policy. Such denunciations are not extremes of thought in the Middle East. Shouting mobs would surround American embassies from Damascus to Rabat, and American prestige would be at its nadir. Economically, the flow of Arab oil to the West would be disrupted, and the Suez Canal would be closed to shipping. These reasonable expectations were indeed realized in the aftermath of the June war. The precedents of the 1956 Suez crisis were there for all to observe, and it would have required no particular perceptiveness to predict accurately those consequences which we have seen come to pass. In such an eventuality, i.e. an Israeli victory, the Soviet Union, even pursuing a policy of complete inaction, not markedly dissimilar from the policy actually followed, would register substantial diplomatic gains at American expense. Given the expectation of an Israeli victory, it would be rationally appropriate, from the Soviet viewpoint, to recommend a war instigating policy.

Consider the other possibility—an Arab victory. Could the Soviet Union countenance such an eventuality? An Arab victory, or perhaps more appropriately, the likelihood of such an outcome, would almost necessarily elicit an active US response. Even aside from any moral obligations, it is sufficiently obvious that irresistible political pressures in the United States would preclude the maintenance of American

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

neutrality.[31] In this, the Arab appraisal of American 'neutrality' is undoubtedly firmly based. Active US intervention in the Middle East could only be countered by a direct Soviet-US confrontation, or a serious loss of face if the Soviet Union failed to take action. The option of inaction so successfully employed by the USSR when confronted with an Israeli victory would no longer be open. For in these hypothesized circumstances, a failure to act would be interpreted as weakness. As previously indicated, neither the USA nor the Soviet Union view this the time or the Middle East the place for a direct confrontation. At least in this negative sense, both the USA and the Soviet Union are committed to a policy, hopefully not to be too actively pursued, of preserving the sovereignty of Israel. Seen from the Soviet viewpoint, an expected Arab victory would present the Soviet Union with extremely unpalatable alternatives. Thus, it would seem reasonable to assume that an optimal Soviet policy would be directed to the avoidance of Arab-Israeli hostilities if an Arab victory was anticipated.

This leads to an inescapable conclusion. If the Soviet Union was following a rational policy and did indeed encourage the June outbreak of hostilities, then it was in the full anticipation of an Israeli victory. The question remains, was it possible to foresee that an Israeli victory was imminent? American neutrality was officially maintained and was the policy suggested by intelligence reports which proved highly accurate. It is not unreasonable to assume that Soviet intelligence was equally perceptive in anticipating an Israeli victory.[32] It also seems evident that the Soviet Union did not take any strong actions to dissuade Arab leaders from a war policy.[33] Was this precisely because they expected an Arab military defeat? Certainly, an Arab victory would have proved embarrassing.

The argument presented above should not be interpreted as an indictment of the Machiavellian machinations of Soviet foreign policy. It is doubtful that the USSR did or could use the Arab nations as a sacrificial pawn with such chilling skilfulness. That they were willing to capitalize on and even encourage Arab optimism is perhaps more plausible. That they did gain for precisely the reason that the Arabs failed is a matter of record.

[31] Laqueur considers the impact of the 'Jewish vote' on American politics and concludes it is probably overrated. See op. cit., pp. 190–91. At the same time, in an extremely able and perceptive analysis of 'public opinion and the crisis', Laqueur finds an overwhelming American sympathy for the Israeli cause. See op. cit., ch. 6. Even without concern for a 'Jewish vote' *per se*, it is unlikely that it would have been politically possible for the administration to avoid intervention if faced with the certainty of an Israeli defeat.

[32] Both Draper and Laqueur conclude that the Soviet Union badly miscalculated in appraising the crisis and its probable outcome. Their conclusion, however, is based on the belief that the Soviet Union suffered a diplomatic defeat. The argument developed above casts doubt on the validity of this interpretation.

[33] It can, in fact, be further argued that the obstructionist tactics pursued at the United Nations by Soviet Ambassador Fedorenko critically impaired the possibilities of averting a renewal of hostilities. For example, see Draper, op. cit., p. 37.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOLZHENITSYN'S 'CANCER WARD'—PART II

Manya Harari

THE second part of Solzhenitsyn's novel * more than fulfils the promise of the first. The characters are developed, the story is rounded off and the whole book impresses one by the sheer magnitude of its conception and that seriousness of the Tolstoy and Dostoevsky tradition which is rarely matched in the West and of which the pompous gravity of so much of socialist realism is an absurd caricature.

Solzhenitsyn is incapable of being pompous: he is too good an artist and he is too close to reality, absorbed in its exploration, direct and honest in his approach to it. He is never lost in the details of his crowded world. Its many characters and facets, the innumerable questions he raises—local and general, topical and perennial—are relevant to the few central themes which organize all this multiplicity and impose on it a severe and sometimes deceptively simple pattern.

As Daniel Weissbort said in reviewing the first part**, the simplicity is deceptive because the symbols which convey the message (Solzhenitsyn is a moralist like Tolstoy) 'work on different levels'. The message is never superimposed on the facts: Solzhenitsyn searches them for their explanation and meaning, making us share in the search, and thus arrives at his extremely independent view of the 'truth' in the Russian sense of the word which combines truth with justice. This is no doubt how he did arrive at it—through the need to search for meaning in the realities of war, concentration camp and cancer which faced him in his own life. The individual fact from which he starts always retains its identity but also becomes the image of a wider, sometimes a universal situation.

Thus it becomes increasingly evident as the book runs on that cancer is used as the symbol of the human (not only the Soviet) condition. At the same time he is interested in the reactions of the patients, nurses and doctors to cancer itself. One of the reactions in which Solzhenitsyn is most interested is the degree of self-knowledge or self-deception to which it leads.

In the second part of the book two new patients, Chalov and Shulyubin, join the ward. They make friends with two of the older inhabitants: Chalov with Rusanov and Shulyubin with Kostoglotov. At first sight the two friends in each case could hardly be more different.

Rusanov is a Stalinist official, a snob who shrinks from contact with the herd as from physical pain, a coward devitalized by his fears of destalinization as much as by illness. Chalov is a cheerful villain (the typical 'speculator' denounced in the Soviet press), hail-fellow-

* *Rakovyi Korpus*, Parts I and II (Paris, Y.M.C.A. Press, 1968).
** See *Survey*, no. 68, pp. 179–85.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

well-met with everyone and a *bon vivant* who, seemingly with remarkable bravery, carries on as though he were not ill at all. What they have in common is that both, in their heart of hearts, reject the knowledge that there is anything much wrong with them and the chance of enlightenment which, in Solzhenitsyn's view, comes with that recognition. This wistful ignorance extends to their social attitudes. Neither the representative of free enterprise nor that of state officialdom, theoretically its enemy, sees anything very wrong with a society out of which both, as born exploiters of people and situations, have done reasonably well.

At the opposite pole are Shulyubin and Kostoglotov. Both have faced their physical condition. (Unlike Chalov who, when he first arrives and other patients ask him what is wrong with him, says ' polyps ', Shulyubin replies: ' *to samoe* '—' that very thing '.) Kostoglotov in particular has tried to make a study of cancer (he is the only one of the patients to do so, and disagrees with the doctors on many points as a result). Shulyubin's form of the disease is more painful and humiliating than Kostoglotov's and this seems, in his own eyes, to reflect his spiritual state.

The two men meet in the hospital grounds and have a conversation which begins almost like a Socratic dialogue on the relative happiness of the just and the unjust.

Cancer apart, both have had a hard life. Both are the victims of Stalinism. Kostoglotov, the individualist, has forfeited everything except his life: the chance of marriage, higher education, promotion, possessions, freedom. He fought in the war, spent years in concentration camps and now lives destitute in ' perpetual exile '. Shulyubin, an obscure librarian in a provincial town, started with a promising academic job, but was not enough of a yes-man to make a career—only sufficiently to keep out of prison. For the sake of his wife (who has since died) and his children (who have grown up ' hard-hearted ') he repeated the required parrot-cries or kept silent when he should have spoken. He believes that Kostoglotov, outwardly the more unfortunate, is in fact happier because he ' told fewer lies '.

Shulyubin is devoured with remorse, although his participation in injustice was on a small scale. He never signed death sentences or denounced anyone. He was only a *kleiner Mensch* who, like millions of others, bayed in chorus for the blood of the Kostoglotovs at a time when not to do so would have doomed him and his family to share the Kostoglotovs' fate. His misfortune is that he knew what he was doing.

Kostoglotov suggests that in this he was exceptionally unlucky—most people ' believed ' and are therefore innocent even if ' their hands are bloody '—but Shulyubin disagrees. When the landowner in the old days told the peasants lies, they bowed ' as one man ' but did not believe a word he said. Neither had the Russians taken their masters' word for it that ' their closest friends ', or ' all the professors and engineers ', or ' millions of Russian soldiers ', or ' whole nations from infants to old

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

men' were spies, saboteurs, traitors, enemies who deserved to be destroyed in Stalin's purges. They could not have turned into a nation of idiots. Either, as Pushkin said, 'in our vile age' there are nothing but 'tyrants, traitors and prisoners' or, at best, they had deceived themselves, given up thinking, set up idols to worship—because 'great nations have a law: they must survive' and because terror hung over them 'like a lowering sky'.

It is interesting that this conversation allegedly takes place in 1955, a year before the Twentieth Party Congress and Khrushchev's 'revelations' about Stalin. There have been many arguments since then as to how much had been 'known': Ehrenburg for one was attacked in 1963 for saying that he knew but could do nothing. In Solzhenitsyn's cancer ward young people such as the nurse Zoya have indeed to be told the facts about the recent past by their elders, but the elders clearly knew, and not only those who had been prisoners.

THE sense of collective guilt is no doubt a serious problem for the whole Stalin generation—a problem in their attitude to themselves, to politics, to literature and to their children—and their reactions to it are as varied as those of Solzhenitsyn's patients, from Shulyubin who shoulders more than his due share to Rusanov who has forgotten what he has done or why. The Party's effort to arouse this sense but keep it within prudent limits has largely failed and there has been, instead, a series of attemps to rehabilitate the past. The moral need to face the past, and the political fear of allowing this to be done largely account for the successive 'thaws' and 'frosts' in cultural policy. A dramatic illustration of this was the publication of Solzhenitsyn's first novel, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, at the height of the thaw of 1962, and the hard frost which followed as a reaction. Not that the book—a novel about life in a labour camp under Stalin—revealed anything new or was in any way subversive: it said nothing about physical torture, and the hero, a traditionally patient Russian peasant, had no indignation in his make-up. Most of the readers must have known more than the book told them—but for the first time some of this knowledge was formulated, printed, forced on their conscious minds. The authorities were afraid of this and still more of the 'flood of memoirs already waiting their turn' in various editorial offices. The authorities clamped down and everything was done to preserve and perpetuate double-think. But from the point of view of the liberals (especially among the young, who are not associated with the guilt, but also among their elders) only the admission that 'crimes', not 'errors', had been committed would make it emotionally possible to live with the past and effectively prevent a return to it. If the disease is cancer, then calling it 'polyps' reduces the chances, such as they are, of successful treatment.

The authorities feared, and still do, that the outright condemnation of Stalinism might become an emotional drive to political action, but to

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Western mind, the astonishing thing is how little grounds they seem to have for fear.

After all he has said, Shulyubin asks anxiously whether perhaps Kostoglotov's experience of prison has shaken his faith in socialism. Kostoglotov admits that it did at times occur to the prisoners that private enterprise 'makes life easier'. Shulyubin is horrified by this bourgeois attitude. 'Capitalism', he says, 'was doomed morally before it was doomed economically'. It breeds greedy monsters. True, there are some under socialism as well, but this is because the right kind of socialism has not yet been found.

He rejects the existing socialist alternatives. 'Democratic socialism' is only a political regime in which 'heads are not chopped off', but it fails to go to the root of the matter. Neither would a socialism which succeeded in creating economic prosperity be enough. Socialism cannot be built on greed any more than on hate. On the other hand, 'Christian socialism' is a demand for the impossible. 'The only true socialism, especially in Russia', is 'ethical socialism. This is realistic.' The aim should not be wealth, or power, or prestige, or even happiness—'happiness, also, is an idol'—but goodwill among men, and all policies at home and abroad must be subordinated to this aim.

This is the nearest that Solzhenitsyn comes to formulating a programme and it is clearly not a political one. Neither Pasternak nor Sinyavsky have attempted more. Understandably, in a country where for half a century politics have been preached as the one and only panacea, the beginning of a movement of dissent is away from politics. It is not the system that matters (true, capitalism is condemned: it stands for the bourgeois spirit of greed and selfishness condemned by Christianity and Tolstoy, and which 50 years of propaganda have welded into the image of the West); what matters is decency in human relationships—kindliness and truth among both rulers and ruled. Life must indeed be protected from politics and its values asserted against political ones. But unless more thought is given by the dissidents to the proper, limited function of politics in society, there is surely a danger of perpetuating the existing confusion, whether politics are treated as a religion (as today) or ethics as a substitute for politics.

What is certain is that, as Daniel Weissbort said, Solzhenitsyn's scale of values would appear as eccentric in the West as it does in Russia.

Kostoglotov, who is the nearest to a self-portrait by the author, is shocked by Shulyubin's rejection of happiness as an 'idol'. He has been thinking about happiness for some time. Half in love with two women—Zoya, a nurse, and Vera, a doctor, who are half in love with him—he is undergoing treatment which will save his life at the cost of making him impotent. At first he refused the treatment—it was too high a price—but the doctors tricked him. He accuses Vera of treachery, but, far from being put out, she is scandalized by the importance he attaches to sex. This is part of the modern attitude which she believes

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to be profoundly wrong in its view of men ('Hemingway's supermen', she thinks, 'are subhuman') and still more of women ('Carmen is regarded as the essence of femininity', yet women with her aggressive sexuality are 'men in disguise'). Her reaction shakes Kostoglotov in his belief that sex is inseparable from happiness, which to him is more important than life.

What then *is* more important? This theme has been running all through the book.

Soon after his conversation with Shulyubin, Kostoglotov is discharged from hospital. Cured, at any rate for the time being (but this is more than he had hoped), he comes out into a new-born world in which everything is a delight and where temptation assails him. He spends more than he can afford on a meal of shashlyk and a glass of mediocre wine. Then he follows the crowd into a department store. Almost everything is beyond his means but everything fascinates him—until a well-dressed man about town next to him asks the assistant for a silk shirt size 50 with a collar size 37. At this Kostoglotov is overcome with disgust: to think that, in a world where all these years men have been dying in trenches and in camps, there are still people who remember the size of their collars! He turns his back on the supermarket and goes to the zoo.

What makes the strongest impression on him here is an empty cage. It was that of a rhesus monkey; a note fixed to the bars says that 'a wicked man', out of sheer 'senseless cruelty', threw tobacco in the monkey's eyes and blinded it.

This dreadful story haunts him all day, while he is preparing to leave the town and go back to his friends in the remote province which in his place of exile. Clearly, for Solzhenitsyn, as for Kostoglotov, the problem of the blinded monkey and the problem of Stalin's *univers concentrationnaire* is that of a *crime gratuit*. It is both extremely puzzling and very simple. The last words in the book are:

> A wicked man threw tobacco in the rhesus monkey's eyes. Just like that!

Some concentration camp victims have said that they were helped to survive by their curiosity: 'How could this happen? How will it end?' Solzhenitsyn's curiosity has taken him further than most—to an almost comprehensive view of the world and of human nature. In his quest for life he survived the man-made hell of the concentration camps and he won the battle against cancer. But when he came back into the world the first thing he once again encounters is Dostoevsky's agonized question about the problem of evil.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

IN connexion with the article on Alexander Werth in your July issue, I would like to draw your attention to an interesting detail which throws an additional light on this 'distinguished British correspondent in Moscow'.

In his book, *The Khrushchev Phase*, Mr Werth, in his role of an 'expert on Soviet affairs', referred to Abram Tertz's novel, *The Trial Begins*. He expressed doubt whether it is genuine and declared: 'Having read the Russian original, I am inclined to think it is not.' Mr Werth did not initiate the reader into the mysteries of his linguistic expertise, he only implied that the language of Tertz's story is not the language used in contemporary Russia. Poor Sinyavsky! Perhaps in five years' time, if he survives the concentration camp and is released, he may begin writing in language which will be for Mr Werth more authentically Soviet Russian. . . .

Mr Werth must by now be very wary of figures, literary or statistical, concerned with Soviet camps. The figure of 10 to 15 millions of slave labourers, so contemptuously dismissed by him once, is given as a reliable estimate for the time about which Mr Werth was writing, by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, a genuine Soviet writer, in his novel *In the First Circle*. A genuine Soviet atomic scientist, A. D. Sakharov, a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, gives the figure of 10 to 15 millions as the estimated number of victims who perished during Stalin's terror regime.

Gustav Herling.

Naples.

I DO not think that I have ever before written to complain about a review of a book, but Ann Sheehy's attack in the April issue really is too much. She can, of course, disagree profoundly with Newth and myself on Central Asia, Transcaucasia or anything else. However:

1. We are, it seems, 'not wholly familiar' with the area, as is shown by factual errors. I for one would not claim to be *wholly* familiar with anything, but which factual errors are we charged with? None are mentioned.

2. It is preposterous to attribute to us the view that 'Moscow has *altruistically* established plants' in the area. The word is actually used twice in the review. It is neither used nor implied in the text. It is like saying that 'Yugoslavia altruistically established factories in Macedonia', or 'London altruistically encouraged investment in South

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Wales'. A declared regional and nationality policy existed, and we argue that this presumably had some effect on plans. We also note counter-tendencies, and document the fact that some of the plans were underfulfilled. Does the reviewer really disagree? *Of course* much of the investment actually made benefited the Soviet economy as a whole. So what does *that* prove? Surely Miss Sheehy is not so naïve as to suppose that agricultural and mining 'exports' constitute evidence of exploitation? Much depends on the price, surely.

3. Cotton prices were comparatively favourable, she admits. Ah, but 'we did not make it sufficiently clear' that this was 'necessary'; it had 'nothing to do with the world market price'. Who said anything about a world market price? Not us. Stalin once referred to it, and he is not a co-author. *Of course* Moscow thought it was necessary, or they would not have done it. We explain why. 'Altruism' is not cited as a reason. Politics *might* have been a contributory factor, though.

4. We 'over-rely' on Soviet statistics. In what respect? Did we not warn about the use of these statistics? But we all have to use them, and so, when it suits her, does Miss Sheehy. Just one criticism of an actual statistic would have helped. Yes, there is much 'inefficiency, muddle and waste' and medical services and schools are deficient in many respects, particularly in rural areas. But more so in Central Asia than in Russia itself? Maybe, but we do not really know. Does Miss Sheehy? Our view is that when all-union standards are imposed on Central Asia, this usually represents an improvement (whereas the opposite would be true in, say, the Baltic republics, which were at a higher stage of development).

5. But our 'major distortion' (her words) is that we say too little or nothing about coercion, opposition to exclusive concentration on cotton-growing, collectivization brutalities, purges, action against religion and traditional local culture, Russian immigration and 'lack of democratic freedoms' (*sic*).

The reader of the review would also suppose that we did not refer to published complaints about insufficient industrial investment in Central Asia. Yet all the items mentioned are right there in the book, as every one of its readers would know. There are pluses and minuses. Thus we have the achievement of literacy and suppression of much literature. The weighting of these and other factors is a matter of opinion. Miss Sheehy is perfectly entitled to weight them as she pleases, and to disagree with us. But the minuses are there. To assert the contrary is simply not in accord with the facts.

Might I add that in discussions of the book in America there were two serious and legitimate criticisms. One concerned the *relative* position of the republics, and of the USSR as a whole, in the international national-income 'league tables'. Here we freely admit the possibility that the figures available, including recomputations by reputable Western scholars whom we quote, may well be too kind to the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

USSR. The second was that we should have made more of the demographic data, i.e. the startlingly high rate of natural increase, which we mention but do not stress as much as we should have done. Incidentally, matters are being complicated at present by an unauthorized and unplanned immigration of Russians from areas of labour shortage, such as Siberia, which may be some indication of relative wage-levels and amenities.

A. Nove.

Glasgow.

Miss Sheehy replies:

To take Professor Nove's points in turn:

1. Specific factual errors were not mentioned for reasons of space. Here are three. Tajikistan and not the extreme south of Uzbekistan (p. 24) is the major producer of long-stapled cotton. The Amu-Darya and the Syr-Darya systems are not the only ones significant for water transport in Central Asia and Kazakhstan (p. 25). The Caspian, Aral, Irtysh, Ili and Ural are also important in this respect. The biggest hydroelectric station in Kazakhstan is not the Ust-Kamenogorsk (p. 26), but the Bukhtarma.

2. According to Professors Nove and Newth the republics of Transcaucasia and Central Asia benefited from the fact that 'the Government of the USSR had an industrializing ideology, equated social progress with industry, and paid special attention to the development in formerly backward areas' (p. 45), and 'there is little doubt that *more* (their italics) resources have been devoted to industrialization in the seven republics than would be warranted by any *economic* (their italics) calculation, capitalist or socialist' (p. 46). They do not suggest that in the past industrial investment was designed to alleviate regional unemployment or similar problems. Is it so preposterous in the circumstances to refer to the authors' view of Soviet motives as 'altruistic'?

3. The word altruistic was used only with reference to industrial development. The question of cotton prices was one of exploitation and the point I was trying to make was that it did not seem to me enough to argue that the Central Asian peasant was not exploited just because he got a better price for his crop than the Russian peasant.

4. I have no quarrel over the use of Soviet statistics, but I did feel that the authors had given a somewhat rosy picture of progress in Central Asia by dwelling, for instance, on the number of teachers rather than their quality, about which a good deal can be learnt from studying the local press.

5. My actual words were: 'But the major distortion in Professor Nove and Newth's assessment is the insufficient weight they give to the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

element of coercion.' I did not say that the authors had omitted the minuses, only that they had given them insufficient weight in balancing the good and bad sides of the Soviet record. As Professor Nove says, the weighting of the pluses and minuses is a matter of opinion, and our opinions clearly differ. I am mystified by Professor Nove's objection to my phrase 'lack of democratic freedoms'. Does he think that the peoples of Central Asia and Transcaucasia enjoy them?

Ann Sheehy.

London.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

QUARTERLY NOTES

HOW would George Orwell regard the general consensus which his writings evoke today? What would he think about some of his recent admirers? How would he view the present scene if he were alive?

There is no doubt, as *Time* magazine pointed out, that 'today he would be equally unpopular'. In his time he was made into a political pariah by the 'progressive' *bien-pensants* for his lucid exposition of their cant and their 'smelly little orthodoxies'. Now, reading the reviews of *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*[1] makes one realize that, like so many others before him, he is safely on the way to emasculation through canonization (the actual ceremony will take place in 1984). Particularly striking is the change in the ostensible attitude towards him of the same 'progressive' *bien-pensants* whose type of mentality he despised most and who displayed such marked antipathy towards him in the past. They snubbed him then, they embrace him now. He is called 'a great teacher' in the *New Statesman*; he is praised as 'a generous, inquiring, truthful man' by Mr Raymond Williams; the Hampstead MP, Mr Ben Whitaker, initiates a collection by offering £1 towards the cost of a plaque to his memory, and even Lord Snow pays him a back-handed compliment, saying that there is a tendency—quite marked in recent reviews of Orwell—towards a rewriting of history (unfortunately it is, according to him, 'to the benefit of the Right, not of the Left').

It would seem then, that apart from this phenomenon, deplored by Lord Snow, of the reactionary Western writers stealing the pants of Soviet historians, all is for the best in the best of the Orwellian worlds. The heirs of the thirties have accepted him as a 'teacher' and, if we are to believe *Time* magazine, his standing is high 'with today's young left'.

In fact, to entertain the idea that Orwell would have been pleased with the 'progressive' intelligentsia of today would require a double 'doublethink'. The elderly subjects of Orwell's scorn are still with us; his unmasking of the humbug of the pacifist and fellow-travelling Old Left has not prevented the passing on of some of its mental attitudes to the younger generation. Its shibboleths and pieties have crept into the spirit of the age. One has only to contrast the refreshing, cant-proof, individual style of Orwell with the thoughtless imitativeness, the sanctimonious 'revolutionary' clichés, and the stereotyped 'nonconformism' of the New Left.

What would Orwell write about our present landscape? In an essay such as 'Boys' Weekly' he would have to deal with a different type of periodical, such as *International Times* or *Black Dwarf*. (He might find it amusing that 'Black Power' should find an ally in *Black Dwarf* . . .) He would probably dislike the contemporary trend of mixing personalities, subjects and levels. He was himself quite free from any 'highbrow

[1] Edited by Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, Secker and Warburg, 1968, 4 vols.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

complexes' and was fascinated by various kinds of unsophisticated writings. But he did not confuse the primitive and the serious in thought or politics. He would probably be disconcerted by the increased tendency to obliterate this distinction and contemptuous of those unable to differentiate between the thoughts of Gandhi and Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, or Marx and Mick Jagger. Yet although the last two names were published side by side in a recent number of *Black Dwarf*, Orwell would not have cast the first (rolling) stone at its editor, Mr Tariq Ali. He would have noticed that the philosophical views of Mr Jagger were first sought in a television interview by the editor of *The Times* and four other distinguished members of the Establishment. Most probably Orwell would have described this in an essay entitled *The Lion and the Multi-corn*; as *England Your England* it would of course be concerned nowadays with Mr Robert Maxwell; *Such, Such Were the Joys* would have as its theme the use of cannabis by schoolchildren, or with the film starring Marianne Faithfull and her trusty motor-cycle; *Rifles and Miss Blandish* would compare the 1939 version of glamorized political violence with its 1968 version, and *Politics and the English Language* would deal with the corruption of language during the 22 years since the original essay was written.

He would notice that while 'doublethink' has received some strong knocks in the communist countries since the death of Stalin, there has also been infiltration of 'newspeak' into the non-communist areas. In the Soviet Union and 'People's Democracies' euphemistic circumlocutions became a *de rigueur* method of not facing the realities they were supposed to describe and the issues arising from them. Stalin's terror became 'the era of personality cult', his crimes became 'errors' or 'mistakes' or 'distortions'. In Hungary the 1956 revolution became the 'counter-revolution', in Poland the 1968 students' revolt was promptly encapsuled as 'the March events', and the Czechoslovaks have to refer to the invasion of their country as 'the August events'. Is it conceivable that Orwell would not indignantly refuse to accept the derivatives of this doubletalk in the West (such as the descriptions of the shot-gun talks and the *diktat* in Moscow as the Czechoslovak-Soviet 'negotiations' resulting in an 'accord' which 'legalized' the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia) and that he would not denounce the all-too-familiar tendency of the 'progressive' intelligentsia not to call a spade a spade if they consider it a 'progressive' spade? Or, is it conceivable that he would not refuse to accept the moral lessons coming from those whose moral hollowness he exposed in his lifetime and who themselves can no longer deny that he was right on the issues on which he earned their hostility when he was alive?

THE points at issue which made Orwell, the writer of the left, so unpopular with the left, are no longer in dispute; because the Soviet mystique practically ceased to exist between Krushchev's speech and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, they have become a thing of the past,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

outside the communist universe, not only intellectually, but also emotionally. Is then what remains only a question of the *unbewältigte Vergangenheit* of a few elderly survivors of the thirties? After all, Stalin has been dead for 15 years and the present consensus on Orwell can be taken not only as an historical redress for the lonely and intransigent defender of intellectual integrity, but also as a symptom that the particular type of intellectual corruption he was fighting has been overcome. Like other classics, he can be 'kicked upstairs', his relevance limited to 'eternal truths' no longer specifically connected with the particular problems of our age.

If Orwell was concerned with the *trahison des clercs*, so too was Julien Benda who named it. But apart from Benda's confusion, as against Orwell's lucidity, there is a world of difference between the two authors. To read Benda is to read about the historical past. To read Orwell is to read about the present. He is particularly relevant about the special character of the *trahison des clercs* in our epoch: their tendency to self-deception, when the information is available. It has taken 30 years for a book [2] which gives comprehensive and incontrovertible evidence of Stalin's terror to be received with a similar consensus as the volumes of Orwell's writings. But the basic facts presented in this book were known long before Orwell's death, and some among those who now reluctantly accept the conclusions of Conquest's book were strenuously denying these facts at the time.

Yet, the consensus on Conquest's book is suspect too. Have we seen any soul-searching on the part of those who treated the Stalinist genocide so lightly? Have those among them who are still alive expressed any remorse for their past attitudes? Morally they are more to blame than those who, caught in the mechanism of terror, became its instruments, because they were under no constraint to justify it; they did so voluntarily, apologists from abroad at a safe distance. Today they continue to write and publish books, but make no attempt to re-examine morally their own past writings. Ironically, their memoirs often receive similar praise to that given to Orwell's writings and Conquest's book. There was a similarly strange consensus about the autobiography of the Founding Father of the *New Statesman*, Mr Kingsley Martin, without any of the reviewers raising the question of what *moral* lessons Mr Martin has drawn from the thirties. Patricia Cockburn has published a book, *The Years of the Week*, dealing with what is called in the blurb the 'legendary political news-sheet' produced by her husband in the thirties. The Moscow Trials are not even mentioned in it, with the exception of the notorious Metro-Vickers trial of April 1933 (described in the Appendix of Mr Conquest's book) of which Mrs. Cockburn still gives a 100 per cent Soviet version. In a letter to the *New Statesman* (11 October 1968), Owen Lattimore, who in 1938 considered the Moscow Trials a 'triumph for democracy', has even charged Mr Conquest, and

[2] Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror* (London, 1968).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his reviewer, Mr John Gross, with McCarthyism for their critical reference to Lattimore's article praising the 'extraordinary achievement' of the 'director' of the forced labour region in Kolyma, Mr Nikishov. In his 1944 article, Lattimore compared it to a 'combination of the Hudson Bay Company and the TVA', and lyrically extolled Mr Nikishov and his charming wife. Today, Mr Gross noticed in his reply, he does not express any regrets for having misled his readers, and there was not a single word in his letter 'to suggest outrage at the scale of the horrors' perpetrated.

Would a 'progressive conscience' be equally untouched if somebody had written at the time a similarly lyrical account of a visit to the Commandant of Auschwitz, Rudolph Hoess, or to Frau Ilse Koch in Belsen, and were to use today Lattimore's kind of arguments to justify a whitewashing of the Nazi horrors?

According to Conquest, the number of the victims of the Stalinist terror was no less than 20 million (he adds that this figure is probably far too low). Reviewing his book (*International Herald Tribune*, 15 November 1968), Mr Joseph Alsop noticed an interesting contrast in the reactions to such horrors in the nineteenth and in the twentieth centuries:

> The contrast is interesting with the first George F. Kennan's 'Siberia and the Exile' which touched off a perfect blaze of moral indignation throughout the western world in the late 19th century. When Kennan rendered his report in 1891, the czarist police seldom executed their political prisoners—who were Kennan's near exclusive topic. Many 'politicals' moreover, were merely exiled to Siberian villages—Kennan describes picnicking with one group. And, if Kennan can be depended upon, the grand total of all political prisoners in Russia, cumulated for the years 1879 through 1884, was no less than 749.

THE views of Western 'progressive intellectuals' on the Stalin era may have changed, but their gullibility, their masochistic tendency to self-deception and their moral numbness combined with their constant posturing of moral superiority, all the characteristics which Orwell diagnosed so precisely, are as alive today as they were when he was writing about them. Historical 'revisionists' who are so frantically trying to rewrite the history of the Cold War and of the Second World War, have not yet reached the thirties, but this time may not be too far away (*pace* Lord Snow). A powerful voice of sanity, like that of Orwell, is needed today to counteract the impact on the younger generation of the Bourbons of the twenties and the thirties. In an interview given to *Le Nouvel Observateur* (28 October 1968), Tariq Ali disclosed that Isaac Deutscher had a 'profound' influence on him, the same Isaac Deutscher who in his book, *Heretics and Renegades*, described Orwell as a 'fanatic'. . . .

Today, it is even more difficult to reconcile logically some of the stands taken in the past by the 'progressives' with their 'progressive

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consciences'; this affects both the Old and the New Left. After Czechoslovakia, the difficulties involved have become glaring. The consensus on the condemnation of the Soviet action has been almost complete. But then what about past Soviet actions? It is possible for Western communists to rationalize the different attitudes taken up by them on Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 by referring to some differences in the two situations: a doctrinal formula can always consecrate a 'dialectical' distinction between them. But for others it can only be verbal quibbling: it is obvious that in both cases the roots of the struggle were the same, as indeed they have been in other cases which have contributed to the progressive disillusionment of the 'progressive intellectuals' with the Soviet Union. Orwell would have shown clearly how the condemnation of one case must logically lead to a retrospective reassessment of all previous moral and political outrages, which the 'progressive intellectuals' have swallowed hook, line and sinker. It is like a film projected backwards: Czechoslovakia 1968; Hungary 1956; the Doctors' Plot 1953; *Zhdanovshchina* 1948; the deportation of nationalities 1940–44; the invasion of Finland, the incorporation of the Baltic states, and Katyn 1940; the Soviet-Nazi Pact 1939; the Great Purge 1936–38; collectivization 1931; Kronstadt 1921; the invasion of the Republic of Georgia 1919. . . . It is ironical to hear today Roger Garaudy, in reply to a question about the 'Stalinist phenomenon', using in 1968 almost verbatim the words which Trotsky used in his polemic with Lenin in 1904 (*Le Nouvel Observateur*, 23 October 1968):

> One must not confuse the Party with a simple discussion club, but one must not confuse it with bureaucracy either so that one would see then substitution of the working class by the Party and finally of the Party by the apparatus and of the apparatus by the leader.

After Czechoslovakia, the French *progressistes* have belatedly begun to discover some old and familiar (but not to them) truths. One of them, Giles Martinet, even said in *Le Nouvel Observateur* (30 September 1968) that the enthusiasm of some *hommes de gauche* for the 'new democracy' in Yugoslavia, Cuba, or China is misplaced:

> For them true democracy is 'direct rule', such as appeared in the Commune of 1793, the Commune of 1871, and then in the form of Soviets in 1917. Each time that a party or a government flaunts before them the theme of 'sovereign assemblies from below', they lose their critical sense from joy. Their subsequent deception is all the greater. They cannot understand why the forms of 'direct rule' are always so ephemeral and why they tend to become a screen for the tyranny of a manipulating minority.

Even Louis Aragon was accused (by *Literaturnaya Gazeta*) of 'political myopia' for his denunciation of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. His reply appeared in *Les Lettres Françaises* (which he edits) under the pointed title, 'I Call a Cat a Cat'. In it he said that this attack on him 'forced him to recollect' that during the German occupation of France, the same *Literaturnaya Gazeta* 'in its characteristic eagerness always to

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

accuse one's best friends, hastened to announce to its readers that I had become a collaborator with Marshal Petain'. Aragon added: 'This hardly qualifies this journal to give anyone lessons.' But what about his own qualifications in this respect? What would happen, for instance, to his own writings on Soviet affairs, and in particular to his *History of the USSR*, if he were 'forced to recollect' (or in Orwellian language 'to take out of the memory hole') all those occasions in the Soviet past when he did not call 'a cat a cat' or 'a spade a spade'?

The 'consensus' on Czechoslovakia, like other cases of 'consensus' mentioned here, implies no basic change of attitude among the 'progressive intelligentsia'. True, the situation has changed since Walter Duranty was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for his reports from Moscow, but many are still accorded respect they do not deserve. And of course there is always a generational changing of the guards.

If Orwell were alive, he would not be concerned with the raking over of the past, but with the failure to learn from it. Hegel remarked that we learn from history what we do not learn from history; Manès Sperber put into the mouth of one of his heroes the words 'stupidity is born anew with each generation'. It seems obvious that today Orwell would closely scrutinize the relationship between political perception and political morality, just as he did in his own time and, in his typically unsentimental way, would searchingly apply the same criteria to the new generation.

Would his belief (and satisfaction) that his standing 'with today's young left' was high be justified; would he recognize this young left as his spiritual heirs, or would he sadly recognize a different paternity? There can be little doubt about the answer, despite assertions that the 'new radicals' have learnt from the past.[3] Here is what Irving Howe, who remained, like Orwell, a man of the left, wrote about them in the New York *Commentary* (October 1968):

> In our own moment we see 'the old crap', as Marx once called it, rise to the surface with unnerving ease; there is something dizzying in an encounter with Stalin's theory of 'social fascism', particularly when it comes from the lips of young people who may not even be quite sure when Stalin lived. . . .
>
> The new intellectual style, in so far as it approximates a politics, mixes sentiments of anarchism with apologies for authoritarianism; bubbling hopes for 'participatory democracy' with manipulative elitism; unqualified populist majoritarianism with the reign of the cadres.
>
> A confrontation of intellectual outlooks is unavoidable. And a central issue is certain to be the problem of liberalism as one or another version of current politics, nor even as a theory of power, but as a cast of mind, a structure of norms by means of which to humanize public life. . . .

[3] In a special issue of the *Journal of Contemporary History* (no. 2, 1966) devoted to 'Left-wing intellectuals between the Wars', Martin Peretz emphatically asserted that the 'new radicals are not like Bourbons with their notorious learning difficulties'.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> The notion that we live in a society that can be described as 'liberal fascism' (a theoretic contribution from certain SDS leaders) isn't one that serious people can take seriously; but the fact that it is circulated in the academic community signifies a counter-revolution of the mind: a refusal of nuance and observation, a willed return to the kind of political primitivism which used to declare the distinctions of bourgeois rule—democratic, authoritarian, totalitarian—as slight in importance. . . .
>
> Having lived through the ghastliness of the Stalinist theory of 'social fascism' (the grand-daddy of 'liberal fascism') I cannot suppose any literate person really accepts this kind of nonsense, yet I know that people can find it politically expedient to pretend that they do.

Thus we can see that there is a link between the Old Stalinist 'oldspeak' and the New Left 'newspeak', and that it is politically expedient in this context to engage in doubletalk, or perhaps even in 'doublethink'.

THE Left Bank is not all that far from Greenwich Village. Perhaps only those who have really experienced institutionalized 'newspeak' (the real thing) can properly perceive the obtuseness of its imitators in the West. A Czechoslovak communist gave a plastic description of the mental characteristics of the French *progressistes* by contrasting his experience and knowledge with their preconceptions and ignorance in an anonymous article in *Le Nouvel Observateur* (21 October 1968). He described a supper with one such French intellectual:

> A formidable meal, fancy food, elaborate dishes, exquisite wines, everything. At this overabundant table he spoke to me about Cuba. 'It is extraordinary over there, money does not exist any more, a new spirit is being born! And you know, everyone eats. Cubans get 1 kilogram of rice per person a month.' But I know that to get this kilogram of rice one has to stand for one and a half hours in a queue. I know that the Cuban government had to prohibit queues before 6 o'clock in the morning. And then, almost all my life I have had to queue to buy anything: bread, potatoes. And rice.

He then reflected:

> What can they know they who have not lived through the absurd, as we did, and who have not experienced the absence of freedom in all its crudity? I am not talking of the camps or prisons, but simply of the daily suffocation, of the state of fear which deforms you. And the French left? From the moment I arrived here I have often asked the question: 'How do you see and analyse your situation?' I receive no answer. They play—marvellously—with words, sipping a glass of whisky. But they are not re-thinking their concepts. I believe that the French left, communists and others, is at the moment totally impotent. Impotent in action, in thought, in everything. They want to make a revolution. 'We have taken the Faculty of Medicine' one student told me. I smiled. . . .

Orwell would have smiled too. When, wounded in the throat by a sniper's bullet, he returned from Spain in 1937, he found that Gollancz

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had refused to publish *Homage to Catalonia* before a word of it had been written. May 1937 in Barcelona was different from May 1968 in France; Cohn-Bendit found no difficulty in publishing his book.[4] On the contrary, as he says in his introduction, 'far from having to go down on my knees to them, the publishers now come chasing after me, begging me to write anything I choose, good or bad, exciting or dull . . .'. They paid him 50,000 German Marks before he had written a single line. It is unlikely, however, that in 32 years' time, Deutsch will find as many readers (if any at all) for Cohn-Bendit's book as Warburg now finds for Orwell's, which he published in 1938, and will most certainly continue to find for at least another 16 years (until 1984). What will happen in another 32 years' time, in the year 2000, no one, except perhaps Cohn-Bendit and the experts in futurology, knows.

One can appreciate the perils of prediction and at the same time realize how infantile was the type of leftism [5] Orwell was dealing with in the thirties and forties by looking at a book by G. D. H. Cole, *Europe, Russia, and the Future*, published in 1942, at the exact time Orwell began work on *Animal Farm*. Cole said in it that he did not like Stalin's methods and that he had been 'a strong critic of Soviet policy', but that he would not allow his dislike of 'much that Stalin has done' to alter his perspective of the future:

> I would much sooner see the Soviet Union, even with its policy unchanged, dominant over *all* Europe, including Great Britain, than see an attempt to restore the pre-war States to their futile and uncreative independence and their petty economic nationalism under capitalist domination. Much better be ruled by Stalin than by the restrictive and monopolistic cliques which dominate Western capitalism. Nay more: much better be ruled by Stalin than by a pack of half-hearted and half-witted Social Democrats who do not believe in Socialism, but do still believe in the 'independence' of their separate, obsolete national States.

After the war, Cole wrote an 'Introduction' to the Dutch 1946 edition of the book in which he admitted having 'failed to anticipate correctly the course of the war and its immediate aftermath':

> Accordingly, in the short run much of what I wrote is not working out as I thought it would. I frankly admit this; and yet, looking back on my book, I do not feel dissatisfied with it, except on secondary points, and I feel no wish to modify the general ideas behind it.

Professor Cole then wrote another book, which he entitled—with unintentional humour—*The Intelligent Man's Guide to the Post-War World*. Like the other work, this bulky volume is now also deservedly forgotten.

Habent sua fata libelli, but so do people. Czechoslovakia, which

[4] Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, *Obsolete Communism, The Left-Wing Alternative* (London, Andre-Deutsch, 1968).

[5] The French edition of Cohn-Bendit's book is called *Le Gauchisme, Remède à la Maladie Sénile du Communisme* (Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1968).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tried to escape from the fate wished on her by Professor Cole during the war, provided for his widow and collaborator, Mrs Margaret Cole, an occasion not only for admitting her error, but also for modifying the general attitude behind it, or at least the old instinctive reflex which led to it.

In her 'Notes by the Way', written before the Soviet invasion, but published only in the September 1968 issue of *Socialist Commentary*, Mrs Cole referred to 'the commonsense—and humanity—of the behaviour of the USSR' in its handling of Czechoslovakia. Two months later she wrote in the same column:

> One should not keep files of papers—not in these days. Or at least one should not look at them again. After a gap of only two months, it is agonizing to read what I sent to press in late August about the 'humane' attitude of the Russians to Czechoslovakia; and it is poor consolation to know that others at the time were equally deceived. Others will, no doubt, be writing about the cruel shock given to hopes of freedom and democracy by the action, not of a dictator like Stalin, or a maniac like Hitler, but of a little group of almost faceless men whose parallel (and this is the frightening thing) might be found in almost any part of the world where a machine develops a fear that it is going to lose some bit of its power.

Orwell would have recognized, with his usual fairness, the honest and unambiguous character of this statement by an old member of the Old Left. But what would he think of the sentiments expressed in what is now an organ of the New Left, the New York *Guardian* (28 September 1968), by its columnist, Julian Lester:

> Many radicals were disturbed and confused by the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia. Almost all felt that they had to choose who was right and who was wrong in this context, and the Czechs won. Their freedom had been trampled by mean ol' Russia. And everyone wept a few sentimental liberal tears for occupied Prague.
>
> This kind of reaction to the recent events in Eastern Europe is more a reflection of our youth and untested idealism than it is a reflection of whatever might have occurred there. What would have been our reaction if Fidel had had to send troops onto the campus of the University of Havana to put down a student uprising there? What would have been our reaction to Ho Chi Minh's unhesitating elimination of thousands of political foes in the mid-50s if we had been politically active then? And our reaction is decidedly negative to the purges under Stalin, even though we know nothing about them.
>
> This will undoubtedly be interpreted by some as a covert approval of Russian action against Czechoslovakia. It is not. Nor is it disapproval. Perhaps the correct position on the matter was that taken by China and Cuba—condemnation of both Russia and Czechoslovakia. Neither country is a model of socialism that anyone is following, and serious questions can be raised as to whether either country is totally worthy to be called socialist. But all of that is irrelevant to our infant movement taking sides because we see

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> pictures of tanks entering a city, and, like well-conditioned animals, we scream that he at whom the tank is aimed has been wronged. This kind of reaction reveals an all too typical American syndrome—apolitical morality.

Twenty-eight years earlier Orwell wrote: 'The thing that frightens me about the modern intelligentsia is their inability to see that human society must be based on common decency, whatever the political and economic forms may be.' Can there be any doubt at all about how he would have treated the 57 varieties of the New Left: ex-Stalinists and neo-Trotskyites, pro-Castroites and cultural Maoists? Can there be any doubt that he would have seen in them a repetition of those tendencies of the intelligentsia which he detested most? In most of their characteristics he would have recognized the same old, exploded phenomena, now become the *dernier cri* of today's young 'revolutionaries'. In 1948 he wrote in his essay, 'Writers and Leviathan':

> Obviously, for about fifteen years past, the dominant orthodoxy, especially among the young, has been 'left'. The key words are 'progressive', 'democratic' and 'revolutionary', while the labels which you must at all costs avoid having gummed upon you are 'bourgeois', 'reactionary' and 'Fascist'.

Orwell would have noticed what little difference there is today in the linguistic usages of the New Left. They are almost the same, except that the word 'democratic' is no longer used as a positive label, unless to oppose 'participatory democracy' to 'bourgeois democracy'.

'We are all of us good democrats', wrote Orwell in the same essay, referring ironically to the then dominating concensus (or as he called it 'orthodoxy'). This is no longer the case. Now we are all agreed only on Orwell.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Our Contributors

MAX BELOFF is Gladstone Professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Oxford and Fellow of All Souls College. His published works include *New Dimensions in Foreign Policy* (1961), *The United States and the Unity of Europe* (1963), and a forthcoming study of Britain's world position, *Imperial Sunset*.

ROBERT CONQUEST has held Fellowships in Soviet Politics at Columbia University and the London School of Economics. His books include *Power and Policy in the USSR*, *Russia After Khrushchev*, and, most recently, *The Great Terror*.

COLIN CROUCH is reading for a sociology degree at the London School of Economics, where he was until recently President of the Students' Union.

MARC FERRO is editor of *Annales* (Paris), Deputy Director of Studies at the Ecole Practiques des Hautes Etudes (Sorbonne), and author of *La révolution de 1917: la Chute du Tsarisme* (1967).

LEWIS S. FEUER is Professor of Sociology at the University of Toronto, and author of *The Scientific Intellectual*, and *Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism*.

JOSEPH FRANKEL is Professor of Politics at the University of Southampton, and the author of *The Making of Foreign Policy* (1961 and 1966), *International Relations* (1963), etc.

GÜNTER GRASS, the well-known German novelist, playwright, and poet, is the author of *Dog Years*, *Cat and Mouse*, and *The Tin Drum*.

MANYA HARARI is a Director of the Harvill Press and co-translator of Pasternak's *Dr Zhivago* and Paustovsky's *Story of a Life*.

GEORGE HEITMANN is Associate Professor of Quantitative Business Analysis at the Pennsylvania State University. He has a specialized interest in international petroleum economics and was formerly an adviser to the Libyan government.

SIDNEY HOOK, until recently Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at New York University, is the author of *Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx*, *From Hegel to Marx*, *Reason, Social Myths and Democracy*, and other works.

HAROLD R. ISAACS is Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His recent works include *India's Ex-Untouchables* (1965), and *American Jews in Israel* (1967).

JOHN MANDER is a contributing editor of *Encounter*, and author of *Berlin: Hostage for the West* (1962), and *Great Britain or Little England* (1963).

PATRICK WADDINGTON is a lecturer in Russian Studies at the Queen's University of Belfast.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SURVEY: Index Nos. 66—69, 1968

Author	*Title*	*No.*	*Page*
ARMSTRONG, Terence	Soviet Planning: The Soviet North	67	116
BEER, Fritz	Ten Weeks that Shook Czechoslovakia	68	56
BELOFF, Max	Students and Revolution: Universities and Violence	69	39
BLACKWELL, Vera	Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads	68	67
BOCIURKIW, Bohdan R.	Church-State Relations in the USSR	66	4
BOURDEAUX, Michael	Soviet Baptists Today (with Peter Reddaway)	66	48
BOURRICAUD, François	The French Student Revolt	68	29
CHAMBERLIN, William Henry	The Moscow Correspondent: Under Lenin and Stalin	68	125
CHAUDHURI, Nirad C.	Nationalism in India	67	41
CONQUEST, Robert	The Moscow Correspondent: A Comment	69	122
CROAN, Melvin	Bonn and Pankow	67	77
CROUCH, Colin	Students and Revolution: The Chiliastic Urge	69	55
DUNN, Ethel	Sects and the Survival of Religion	66	84
FERRO, Marc	Students and Revolution: Emancipation of a Generation	69	41
FEUER, Lewis S.	Students and Revolution: Patterns of Irrationality	69	43
GITELMAN, Zvi	The Jewish Question	66	77
GRASS, Günter	The Lessons of Prague	69	3
HASSNER, Pierre	The Nation-State in the Nuclear Age	67	3
HOOK, Sidney	The Costs of the Revolution	66	129
,, ,,	Academic Freedom and Academic Anarchy	69	62
HURWITZ, Harold	Germany Today: Student Revolt	67	90

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Author	*Title*	*No.*	*Page*
ISAACS, Harold R.	Group Identity and Political Change	69	76
JOHNSON, A. Ross	Poland: The End of the Post-October Era	68	87
KORENGOLD, Robert J.	The Moscow Correspondent: Reflections on Coming Back	68	148
LABEDZ, Leopold	Dear Editor: Alexander Werth and the Story of a Correspondence	68	169
,, ,,	Students and Revolution	68	3
,, ,,	Czechoslovakia and After	69	7
LANG, David M.	Religion and Nationalism in the Caucasus	66	33
LEVENSON, Joseph R.	The Past and Future of Nationalism in China	67	28
LEVI, Arrigo	The Moscow Correspondent: Khrushchev and the Press	68	145
LOURIE, Richard	*In Memoriam*: Alexander Wat	66	159
LYONS, Eugene	The Moscow Correspondent: A Journalist in Utopia	68	131
MANDER, John	Students and Revolution: An Indispensable Activity	69	52
McINNES, Neil	The Christian-Marxist Dialogue	67	57
MEHNERT, Klaus	The Moscow Correspondent: The Thirties and the Fifties	68	133
OBOZREVATEL	The Moscow Correspondent: In the Shadow of 1947	68	158
PHILIPS PRICE, M.	The Moscow Correspondent: Before and During the Revolution	68	122
PÖRZGEN, Hermann	The Moscow Correspondent: Today and Yesterday	68	135
REDDAWAY, Peter	Soviet Baptists Today (with Michael Bourdeaux)	66	48
ROBERTI, Vero	The Moscow Correspondent: 'Caro Censore'	68	138
SALLOCH, Roger	International Communism: Budapest to Moscow	68	44
SCHILLER, Ulrich	The Moscow Correspondent: TV—Pictures from Moscow	68	168

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Author	*Title*	*No.*	*Page*
SMOLINSKI, Leon	Soviet Planning: How it Really Began	67	100
SORMANI, Pietro	The Moscow Correspondent: Under Kosygin and Brezhnev	68	163
STEHLE, Hansjakob	Vatican Policy Towards Eastern Europe	66	108
STÖGER, Hermann	Last Year in Marienbad	66	117
TODD, Albert	The Spiritual in Recent Soviet Literature	66	92
WADDINGTON, Patrick	'Attack or Defend . . .' Sholokhov Examined	69	99
WHEELER, Geoffrey	Soviet Islam	66	67
ZEHM, Günther	Is There a Left-Wing Fascism?	68	38
	The Moscow Correspondent: An Introduction	68	118

VIEWS AND REVIEWS

Author	*Title*	*No.*	*Page*
BIANCO, Gino	The First Ten Years of Italian Communism	67	150
BOGEFELDT, C. G.	Introduction to the USSR	66	158
CONOLLY, Violet	Two Rewarding Studies	66	147
CROAN, Melvin	Political Science and Eastern Europe	67	156
FITZPATRICK, Sheila	Portraits of Revolutionaries	66	156
FRANK, Victor S.	Definitive Translation?	67	163
FRANKEL, Joseph	Poland and Czechoslovakia: The Individual and Power Relations	69	125
HEITMANN, George	Soviet Policy and the Middle East War	69	134
GLENNY, Michael	Sinyavsky and Daniel on Trial	66	145
GÖMÖRI, George	Hungary 1919	67	158
HARARI, Manya	*Cancer Ward*, Part II	69	145

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Author	*Title*	*No.*	*Page*
LICHTHEIM, George	The Impact of 1917 Abroad	66	142
MacINTYRE, Alasdair	Diamat Revisited	67	139
PAVLOWITCH, Stevan K.	Dedijer's Road to Sarajevo	66	150
SCHAPIRO, Leonard	Lenin and 1917	67	142
SHEEHY, Ann	Russia in Asia	67	145
SHUKMAN, Harold	Lenin	67	160
TIGRID, Pavel	Voices of Revolt in Czechoslovakia	66	138
WEISSBORT, Daniel	Solzhenitsyn's *Cancer Ward*	68	179
Documents			
	Writers on Trial	67	122
	Vaclav Havel: 'On the Subject of Opposition'	68	80
	Ivan Svitak: 'Banging One's Head Against the Wall'	68	83
	Polish Writers' Meeting	68	100
	Jan Ruszczyc: Writers, Politics, Culture	68	111
	Resolution of the Polish Students	68	114
	Students and Zionists	68	115
	Veniamin Kaverin: An Open Letter to Konstantin Fedin	68	187
	Czechoslovakia: Before and After the Invasion	69	22
	Soviet Union: Writers' Protests	69	107
Letters to the Editor	Gustav Herling, Alec Nove, Ann Sheehy	69	150
Quarterly Notes		69	154

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Herbert Schneider: Grossbritanniens Weg nach Europa. Eine Untersuchung über das Verhalten und die Rolle der britischen Handels- und Industrieverbände, Gewerkschaften und Farmerorganisationen zwischen 1955/56 (Spaak-Komitee) und 1961 (EWG-Beitrittsverhandlungen).

Freiburg: Rombach 1968. 253 Seiten, gebunden 16.—DM (sammlung rombach).

INHALT (AUSZUG): Das Problem · Der Europäische Meinungs- und Willensbildungsprozess in Grossbritannien von 1955 (Spaak-Ausschuss) bis 1961 (EWG-Bewerbung): Bühne und Vorspiel/Erster Akt: Die FHZ- und EFTA-Diskussion/Zweiter Akt: EWG-Kampagne/Dritter Akt: EWG-Bewerbung/ Wirtschaftlich-Politisches Klima.

AUTOR: Herbert Schneider, geboren 1929 in Karlsbad, Studium der Politischen und Wirtschaftswissenschaften in Tübingen, Freiburg, Genf und Oxford. Promotion zum Dr. phil. in Tübingen und zum Dr. rer. pol. in Genf (Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales). Nach dem Studium u. a. Assistent am Nuffield-College in Oxford und Leiter der Studienstelle des Institutes für Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik Haus Rissen, Hamburg. Seit 1966 Hauptgeschäftsführer der Arbeitsgemeinschaft DER BÜRGER IM STAAT in Stuttgart.

EUROPA ARCHIV: Der Autor behandelt die entscheidende Phase des Meinungsbildungsprozesses in Grossbritannien zwischen 1955 und 1961 und setzt sich kritisch mit der These auseinander, die britische Wirtschaft habe die Regierung ihres Landes 1961 zum EWG-Beitritt gedrängt. Die Untersuchung will die Entwicklung der britischen Europa-Politik verständlich machen und darüber hinaus einen Beitrag zur Theorie der Integration und der Interessenverbände leisten.

WISSENSCHAFTLICHER LITERATURANZEIGER: Die ablehnende Haltung Frankreichs in der Frage eines britischen EWG-Beitritts erscheint vielen Kritikern nur noch als Ausdruck einer persönlichen, von Ressentiments beladenen Altersstarrheit verständlich. Dabei wird jedoch immer mehr übersehen, dass es zunächst Grossbritannien selbst gewesen ist, das sich den Anschluss an Europa versagt hat. Der Ablehnung des Schumanplans folgte 1955 die Zurückziehung der britischen Vertreter aus dem Spaak-Komitee, das dazu einberufen war, die Gründung der EWG vorzubereiten. Erst die Commonwealth-Desillusionierung, der wirtschaftliche Aufschwung der Sechs und die ökonomische Dauermisere im eigenen Land weckten das Interesse Grossbritanniens an Europa. 1961 erfolgte das erste Beitrittsgesuch. Welchen Einfluss die Spitzenverbände der britischen Wirtschaft auf diese Wende ausgeübt haben und welche Auseinandersetzungen damit verbunden gewesen sind, wird in dem vorliegenden Buch in vorzüglicher Weise dargestellt und zugleich als gelungener Beitrag zur Theorie der Integration und der " Pressure Groups " analysiert.

Verlag Rombach Freiburg

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SURVEY

A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies

The Lessons of Prague *Günter Grass*

Czechoslovakia and After *Leopold Labedz*

Documents: Czechoslovakia Before and After The Invasion

Students and Revolution: A Discussion
Max Beloff Marc Ferro Lewis S. Feuer
John Mander Colin Crouch

Academic Freedom and Academic Anarchy
Sidney Hook

Group Identity and Political Change
Harold R. Isaacs

Sholokhov Examined *Patrick Waddington*

Documents Soviet Union *Lidia Chukovskaya*
Alexander Tvardovsky

The Moscow Correspondent: A Comment
Robert Conquest

Views and Reviews:

The Individual and Power Relations—*Joseph Frankel*
Soviet Policy and the Origins of the 1967 Middle East Crisis - *George Heitman*
'The Cancer Ward', Part II—*Manya Harari*

Letters to the Editor Quarterly Notes

Printed in Great Britain by The Eastern Press, Ltd., London and Reading

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED